Hecht v. National Heritage Academies, Inc, 499 Mich. 586

Background

Craig Hecht, a white third‑grade teacher at Linden Charter Academy (predominantly Black student body), was investigated and terminated after making a racially charged joke about "white tables" and saying "all brown tables should burn," and then giving inconsistent accounts and allegedly contacting coworkers during the investigation.
School policy required mandatory reporting of negative racial stereotyping and imposed a zero‑tolerance harassment rule; several Black employees had engaged in racial banter that, according to testimony, went unreported or unpunished.
Weaver (dean) testified that when she told principal Caine‑Smith that racial jokes "happen among African Americans," Caine‑Smith responded in a way the jury could construe as condoning differential treatment; that testimony was central to the jury’s finding of discrimination.
The jury found Hecht proved race was a factor in his termination and awarded past and substantial future economic losses; defendant moved for JNOV and a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and that evidence of statutorily mandated disclosures (MCL 380.1230b) was inadmissible.
MCL 380.1230b requires former employers to disclose applicants’ unprofessional conduct to prospective schools, provides a release, and grants employers immunity from civil liability for disclosures made in good faith.
The trial court admitted evidence of defendant’s mandatory disclosures to prospective employers (which Hecht used to prove difficulty securing later teaching jobs); the Court of Appeals affirmed in part; the Michigan Supreme Court reviewed sufficiency of evidence and admissibility under MCL 380.1230b.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether there was direct evidence of racial discrimination	Hecht relied on Weaver’s recounting of Caine‑Smith’s remark as direct evidence of discriminatory animus	NHA argued no decision‑maker made an explicit discriminatory statement; Weaver’s testimony was inferential	No direct evidence; the Court held the evidence was circumstantial, not direct proof of intent
Whether circumstantial evidence sufficed (McDonnell Douglas framework / similarly situated comparison)	Hecht argued differential enforcement of the zero‑tolerance policy against him vs. Black employees supported an inference that race was the "but‑for" cause	NHA argued distinctions (e.g., joke occurred in classroom in presence of children; interference with investigation) defeated a similarly situated comparison and provided legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons	Circumstantial evidence (policy plus unequal enforcement, credibility findings) was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find race was the but‑for cause; JNOV properly denied
Admissibility of evidence of mandatory disclosures under MCL 380.1230b	Hecht argued the statute only immunizes disclosure‑based claims (e.g., defamation) and does not bar using the disclosures to prove damages from the discriminatory discharge	NHA argued the statute grants broad immunity from "civil liability" for disclosures and thus evidence and damages tied to disclosures are precluded	Evidence of the statutorily mandated disclosures was inadmissible because MCL 380.1230b(3) grants employers immunity from civil liability for such disclosures; the future damages award tainted by that evidence was vacated
Remedy and remand	Hecht sought to preserve the full jury award	NHA sought JNOV or new trial and exclusion of disclosure evidence; argued future damages unsupported	Court affirmed discrimination verdict (circumstantial evidence) but vacated future damages due to erroneous admission of disclosure evidence and remanded for further proceedings consistent with opinion

Key Cases Cited

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (established burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial employment discrimination)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (on evaluating whether employer’s stated reasons permit inference of discrimination)
In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich. 367 (statutory immunity analysis; scope of "liability" under immunity statutes)
Hannay v. Transportation Dep’t, 497 Mich. 45 (interpretation of "liable for" language in statutory immunity context)
Matras v. Amoco Oil Co., 424 Mich. 675 (on direct vs. circumstantial evidence distinctions)