Heather A. Harada v. State, 368 P.3d 275

In 2011 Heather Harada pled guilty to third-degree sexual assault (sexual contact between a correctional employee and an inmate) in exchange for deferred prosecution and five years supervised probation.
The presentence report recommended a condition that she "attend any counseling and/or submit to evaluations deemed appropriate by her probation agent." At sentencing the court adopted recommended conditions, modified one associational restriction, and ordered Harada to sign a Probation Agreement.
Harada signed the Probation Agreement, which explicitly required submission to a sex‑offender evaluation and payment for recommended treatment.
In November 2014 the State filed a petition to revoke probation alleging Harada had failed to obtain a psychosexual evaluation directed by her probation agent; Harada argued the agent lacked authority because the court’s order did not expressly require the evaluation.
At an April 2015 hearing the court converted the revocation matter into a motion to modify probation, heard argument, and then entered an order modifying its judgment to expressly require Harada to submit to and pay for a psychosexual evaluation and complete recommended counseling.
Harada appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion because no change in circumstances was shown and the modification was unsupported by evidence relating to rehabilitation or community protection. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed.

Issue	Harada's Argument	State's/Probation's Argument	Held
Whether the court may modify probation conditions without a showing of changed circumstances and evidence reasonably linking the modification to rehabilitation or community protection	Modification requires a finding of changed circumstances and evidence that the change is reasonably related to rehabilitation or protection	Statutes allow the court to modify probation "at any time"; the psychosexual evaluation is reasonably related to rehabilitation and supervision for a sex offense	The court may modify probation without a statutory prerequisite finding of changed circumstances; here modification was proper and not an abuse of discretion

Daugherty v. State, 44 P.3d 28 (Wyo. 2002) (probation is a form of sentencing and court authority flows from legislature)
DeMillard v. State, 190 P.3d 128 (Wyo. 2008) (statute permits modification of probation at any time and a modification hearing process differs from revocation)
Perkins v. State, 317 P.3d 584 (Wyo. 2014) (probation conditions must be reasonably related to rehabilitation, the offense, or deterrence)
Leyba v. State, 882 P.2d 863 (Wyo. 1994) (sex‑offender counseling as a probation condition is reasonably related to rehabilitation)
Ward v. State, 735 P.2d 707 (Wyo. 1987) (court must defer to legislative authority defining sentencing powers)