976 F.3d 259
2d Cir.2020Background
- In April 2016 Hayes, a New York State inmate at Coxsackie, alleges C.O. T. Dahlke sexually molested him during a clothed pat frisk and thereafter filed PREA reports and written grievances.
- Hayes alleges subsequent retaliation by staff: a false misbehavior report by C.O. Hoffman (keeplock/SHU placements), threatening comments from C.O. Meier and Superintendent Martuscello, and a later physical attack by Meier and Langtry.
- Hayes pursued DOCCS’s three-step Inmate Grievance Procedure (IGRC → superintendent → CORC); CORC did not issue decisions within the 30‑day deadline prescribed by NYCRR §701.5(d)(3)(ii).
- Hayes filed a §1983 complaint on November 17, 2016 while several CORC appeals remained pending; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants in part, citing failure to exhaust.
- The Second Circuit held that when an inmate completes the DOCCS grievance process but CORC fails to decide within its mandatory 30‑day period, administrative remedies are exhausted under the PLRA; however Hayes filed suit prematurely on one appeal (superintendent) before that 30‑day period expired.
- On the merits the court reversed summary judgment as to: (1) Hayes’s Eighth Amendment sexual-assault claim against Dahlke (Claim One); (2) First Amendment retaliation claims against Hoffman and Meier (Claims Two and Five); and (3) excessive-force claims against Meier and Langtry (Claim Six); it affirmed dismissal of claims against Martuscello and Iarusso (Claims Three and Four).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether exhaustion occurs when CORC fails to decide within 30 days | Hayes: following all grievance steps and waiting the regulatory 30 days suffices; CORC’s failure renders remedies unavailable | Defendants: inmate must receive a CORC decision; CORC’s delay doesn’t preclude exhaustion and only unreasonable delay makes remedies unavailable | Court: exhaustion occurs when inmate completes process and CORC fails to decide within the mandatory 30‑day period; but inmate must wait the 30 days before suing |
| Retaliation claim against Hoffman (false misbehavior report/keeplock) — adverse action & causation | Hayes: report and keeplock/SHU plus contextual threats were causally linked to his grievances | Defendants: one‑day keeplock and lack of proof Hoffman knew of grievances show no adverse action/causation | Court: triable issues of fact exist on adverse action and causation; reversed summary judgment for Hoffman |
| Retaliation claim against Iarusso (threats, delay filing grievance) — adverse action | Hayes: Iarusso’s comments and month delay chilled grievance filing | Defendants: comments were vague, delay minimal and did not deter grievances | Court: statements and delay were not objectively adverse; affirmed dismissal for Iarusso |
| Eighth Amendment sexual‑contact claim against Dahlke during pat frisk | Hayes: frisk was unusually long, invasive (genital-to-buttock contact and manipulation) and followed by sexualized comments — no penological purpose | Defendants: frisk was legitimate, incidental contact; denies the allegations | Court: factual disputes about nature/purpose of contact preclude summary judgment; reversed and remanded for trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (prison’s grievance rules, not PLRA, define exhaustion)
- Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (when administrative remedies are "unavailable")
- Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (proper exhaustion requires using all steps the agency holds out)
- Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252 (Eighth Amendment violated by intentional, non‑penological contact with inmate genitals)
- Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (not every malevolent touch is constitutional injury; standard for Eighth Amendment force claims)
- Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116 (exhaustion after suit is filed generally insufficient)
- Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717 (administrative remedies exhausted where prisoner followed procedure and prison failed to respond in allotted time)