Harrison v. Gillespie
2011 WL 1758657
9th Cir.2011Background
- Harrison was convicted of first-degree murder; the State pursued the death penalty in the penalty phase; the jury deadlocked on sentencing.
- The trial court discharged the deadlocked penalty-phase jury without polling to determine if it had rejected the death penalty, based on statements of the foreperson and juror notes.
- Completed verdict forms showed one aggravating factor and twenty-four mitigating factors, but the weighing/penalty forms were not completed or signed.
- Post-trial juror affidavits asserted the death penalty was “off the table,” while at least one juror denied that characterization; Nevada courts denied relief, and Harrison pursued federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
- The district court denied relief, and a merits panel affirmed the district court’s approach, holding that the AEDPA did not apply and that the state mistrial was not upheld as a matter of double jeopardy.
- The court held that Harrison was not entitled to a per se right to polling, analysis of Nevada’s three-step capital-sentencing regime, and that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial for the death penalty in this context; the district court’s denial was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether there was manifest necessity to declare a mistrial without polling | Harrison argues poll needed to confirm death-penalty viability. | The court had discretion; no per se polling required. | No manifest necessity; poll not required; discretion acceptable. |
| Whether the jury’s deadlock precluded retrial on the death penalty | Double Jeopardy bars retrial if the death-eligibility question was effectively resolved. | Nevada procedure and non-final nature of partial verdicts permit retrial. | Retrial on the death penalty permissible; no per se acquittal. |
| Whether polling the jury is constitutionally required in unbifurcated capital proceedings | Constitution creates right to poll before discharge when death eligibility is at issue. | No constitutional per se right; discretion governs polling. | No per se right to polling; discretion to discontinue deliberations remains. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (Double Jeopardy in capital sentencing, acquittal touchstone)
- Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984) (Acquittal precludes retrial in death-penalty context)
- Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986) (Second death sentence allowed after remand if first sentence invalid, acquittal significance discussed)
- Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003) (Acquittal for death-penalty eligibility; deadlock as non-result in some contexts)
- Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855 (2010) (Deference to trial court discretion in deadlocked jury situations; no mechanical polling rule)
- Washington v. United States, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (General principles on mistrial and termination in presence of deadlock; coercion concerns)
- Jorn v. United States, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (Manifest necessity standard; caution against abrupt mistrial declarations)
- Perez v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824) (Classic Perez formulation on manifest necessity in capital cases)