Harrington v. Sessions
863 F.3d 861
| D.C. Cir. | 2017Background
- Putative Title VII class action filed (originally by David Grogan) alleging racial discrimination in USMS promotion, lateral assignments, and HQ duty assignments; injunctive relief was predominant.
- Herman Brewer became the sole named plaintiff for the surviving assignments and promotions claims; he retired at mandatory age 57 in March 2014.
- Brewer moved (post-retirement) to substitute additional class representatives and for class certification; the district court denied substitution as untimely and denied certification because Brewer, as a former employee, lacked standing to seek class-wide injunctive relief and thus failed adequacy/typicality under Rule 23(a).
- Brewer petitioned for interlocutory review under Rule 23(f); while that petition was pending he settled his individual claims and filed a stipulated dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
- Four current/former African‑American deputy marshals moved to intervene in the D.C. Circuit to pursue Brewer’s pending Rule 23(f) petition; the panel granted intervention but denied the Rule 23(f) petition and remanded to allow substitution of absent class members and further district-court proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Brewer) | Defendant's Argument (US) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether post‑dismissal intervenors may pursue interlocutory review of denial of class certification | Intervention is timely; absent class members can substitute to preserve review and have Article III stake to appeal | Dismissal moots case and precludes intervention/appeal | Intervention granted: absent class members may intervene to pursue Rule 23(f) petition; circuit has jurisdiction to decide intervention despite stipulated dismissal |
| Whether Rule 23(f) interlocutory review should be granted | District court’s adequacy/typicality rulings were allegedly novel/manifestly erroneous and warrant immediate review | Certification denial was discretionary and not the kind of exceptional error Rule 23(f) targets | Rule 23(f) petition denied: petitioners did not meet Lorazepam criteria (no death‑knell, no novel issue likely to evade review, no manifest error) |
| Whether a stipulated dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) uniquely strips jurisdiction to consider post‑dismissal motions to intervene | Stipulated dismissal should not defeat intervenors’ ability to protect class interests | A final voluntary dismissal may deprive courts of jurisdiction over subsequent motions | Court held stipulated dismissal is not jurisdictionally unique; mootness (not dismissal type) determines jurisdiction; intervention can survive stipulated dismissal |
| Whether district court abused discretion in denying substitution/amendment to add new class reps | Denial was erroneous given availability of current employees who could seek injunctive relief | District court denied substitution for lack of diligence and failure to show good cause under scheduling order | Circuit found no manifest abuse: substitution denial was discretionary and grounded in Brewer’s lack of diligence; remand for reasonable time to move to substitute plaintiffs and renew certification |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (framework for when Rule 23(f) interlocutory review is appropriate)
- United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (Sup. Ct.) (absent class members may have standing to appeal denial of class certification)
- Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (Sup. Ct.) (limits on using voluntary dismissals to create immediate appeals of class certification orders)
- In re Thornburgh, 869 F.2d 1503 (D.C. Cir.) (permitting substitution/intervention after named plaintiff’s individual claims are mooted)
- In re Wolf, 842 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir.) (stipulated dismissals are effective upon filing)
- Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (Sup. Ct.) (preventing defendants from defeating class litigation by buying off named plaintiffs)
- Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (Sup. Ct.) (court’s power to enforce settlement depends on incorporation into dismissal order)