363 F. Supp. 3d 823
W.D. Mich.2019Background
- In December 2018 ATF issued a Final Rule reinterpreting undefined terms in the statutory definition of "machinegun," concluding bump stocks fall within that definition and barring possession of newly manufactured machineguns, with an effective disposal deadline for bump stocks of March 26, 2019.
- Plaintiffs sued seeking a preliminary injunction under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing the Rule is unlawful; the government defended the Rule as a reasonable statutory interpretation.
- The court held a hearing and took judicial notice of related district-court denials of preliminary injunctions in Guedes and Aposhian.
- The governing standard: a preliminary injunction requires a likelihood of success on the merits among other factors; when an agency interprets a statute courts decide whether Chevron or Skidmore deference applies before reviewing arbitrary-and-capricious claims.
- The court found the statutory phrases "automatically" and "single function of the trigger" ambiguous as applied to bump stocks and concluded ATF’s interpretations were permissible and entitled to Chevron deference.
- The court held ATF’s Final Rule was not arbitrary and capricious (including in response to arguments about rubber bands/belt loops and ATF’s change of position) and denied the preliminary injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ATF exceeded statutory authority by classifying bump stocks as "machineguns" under the NFA/GCA | Bump stocks do not make a firearm "shoot automatically" or fire by a "single function of the trigger"; statute excludes device requiring non-trigger manual forces | ATF reasonably interprets "automatically" and "single function of the trigger" to include devices that harness recoil to allow continuous firing with a single pull | Court: Statutory language ambiguous; ATF’s interpretation permissible and entitled to Chevron deference; no likelihood of success for plaintiffs |
| Whether Chevron or Skidmore deference applies to ATF’s Final Rule | Plaintiffs downplay Chevron; cite APA review standards | Defendants argue Chevron applies because Congress delegated rulemaking authority and ATF used formal rulemaking | Court: Chevron applies given delegation and formal rulemaking, so agency interpretation gets Chevron deference |
| Whether ATF’s reinterpretation is arbitrary and capricious (e.g., inconsistent with prior ATF positions) | ATF previously treated bump stocks differently; reversal is arbitrary | ATF provided reasoned explanation for changed interpretation and addressed comments | Court: ATF gave adequate reasoned explanation; change not arbitrary or capricious |
| Whether interpretations sweep too broadly (e.g., would criminalize use of rubber bands/belt loops) | Rule could criminalize commonplace items or permit overbroad enforcement | ATF addressed this; such items are not parts "designed and intended" for converting a weapon and do not harness recoil like bump stocks | Court: ATF’s distinctions are reasonable; rule is not unconstitutionally or unreasonably overbroad |
Key Cases Cited
- McGirr v. Rehme, 891 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2018) (standards for district-court review of preliminary injunctions)
- S. Glazer's Distrib. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 2017) (preliminary-injunction factor balancing)
- Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction is extraordinary relief; must balance harms)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (two-step test for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations)
- United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (distinguishing Chevron from Skidmore deference; effect of formal rulemaking)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary-and-capricious review of agency rulemaking)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (merger of public-interest factors when government is a party)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (discussion of "single pull" language in machinegun context)
- United States v. Olofson, 563 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2009) (judicial interpretation consistent with ATF’s reading of "automatically")
- United States v. Fleischli, 305 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2002) (treating "trigger" as a mechanism initiating firing sequence)
- Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2016) (post-Heller holding that machineguns may be outside Second Amendment protection)