Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062

Petitioners Guerrero-Lasprilla and Ovalles were ordered removed years after drug convictions; each later filed a motion to reopen outside the 90-day statutory deadline and sought equitable tolling.
Both relied on a Fifth Circuit decision (Lugo-Resendez) holding the 90‑day deadline could be equitably tolled; they filed motions to reopen months after that decision.
The Board denied reopening, finding petitioners had not shown the due diligence required for equitable tolling.
The Fifth Circuit dismissed their appeals for lack of jurisdiction, holding that due‑diligence for equitable tolling is a factual question and thus barred by 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(C) subject to the Limited Review Provision §1252(a)(2)(D).
The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the phrase “questions of law” in §1252(a)(2)(D) includes application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts.
The Court held that “questions of law” does include such applications (i.e., certain mixed questions), reversed the Fifth Circuit, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether “questions of law” in §1252(a)(2)(D) includes application of legal standards to undisputed/established facts	Petitioners: yes — Board’s application of the due‑diligence standard to undisputed facts is a question of law reviewable by courts of appeals	Government: no — such applications are mixed questions (fact‑intensive) and therefore barred by §1252(a)(2)(C)	Held: Yes — statutory phrase encompasses the application of law to established facts; courts may review these claims
Whether statutory presumptions, context, and history support reviewability of those mixed questions	Petitioners: presumption favoring judicial review, zipper clause context, and St. Cyr history indicate Congress intended review of law‑applied‑to‑facts errors	Government: Congress intended to sharply limit review; permitting such review would undermine §1252(a)(2)(C)’s purpose	Held: The presumption, statutory context (including zipper clause), and legislative history support treating such applications as “questions of law” and permit review

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (describing dismissal on dispositive legal issues under Rule 12(b)(6))
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (characterizing certain appeals as purely legal questions whether facts support legal claim)
Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (noting effect of admitted facts is a question of law)
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (framing limits on review and urging Congress to provide an adequate habeas substitute)
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action)
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (applying presumption of reviewability to immigration statutes)
Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., 509 U.S. 43 (requiring clear and convincing evidence to preclude judicial review)
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (discussing mixed questions of law and fact)
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (describing equitable‑tolling due‑diligence as an equitable, fact‑intensive inquiry)
Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337 (5th Cir.) (held 90‑day motion‑to‑reopen deadline may be equitably tolled; relied on by petitioners)
Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir.) (post‑St. Cyr courts treating habeas review to include application of law to undisputed facts)
Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207 (3d Cir.) (same)
Mu‑Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.) (same)
Singh v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435 (9th Cir.) (same)