520 F.Supp.3d 51
D.D.C.2021Background
- In October 2017 a mass shooting in Las Vegas used rifles equipped with bump stocks, which increase a semiautomatic firearm’s rate of fire by harnessing recoil so the trigger can reengage without additional distinct pulls.
- ATF issued a final rule (Dec. 26, 2018) classifying “bump‑stock‑type devices” as "machineguns" under the National Firearms Act by interpreting "single function of the trigger" to mean a "single pull of the trigger" and "automatically" to include a self‑acting mechanism that yields multiple rounds from that single pull.
- The rule required current possessors to destroy or relinquish bump stocks by an effective date and stated criminal liability would attach only for possession after that date.
- Plaintiffs (in Guedes and Codrea) sued under the APA and raised related constitutional claims seeking injunctive relief; the district court denied preliminary injunctions and the D.C. Circuit affirmed; cert. was denied.
- On summary judgment the court reviewed Chevron deference, arbitrary-and-capricious principles, takings, retroactivity, and vagueness challenges and granted the defendants’ motions, upholding ATF’s rule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chevron applicability / statutory interpretation | Chevron inapplicable (waiver, rule of lenity, or unconstitutional) | Chevron applies; ATF expressly invoked and used Chevron in rulemaking | Chevron applies; court follows D.C. Circuit—agency entitled to deference |
| Whether bump stocks fall within the NFA "machinegun" definition | "Single function of the trigger" and "automatically" mean a mechanical trigger act and exclude bump stocks | "Single pull"/limited human input readings reasonably include bump stocks that create a self‑acting firing sequence | ATF’s interpretation is reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference; bump stocks fit the definition |
| APA arbitrary & capricious / procedural challenges | ATF arbitrarily excluded other aids, failed to hold a hearing, acted under political pressure, and changed position improperly | ATF considered comments, explained distinctions (e.g., no self‑acting mechanism in a belt or jacket), followed notice‑and‑comment, and reasonably explained change in view | Not arbitrary or capricious; ATF adequately considered comments, explained distinctions, and permissibly changed position |
| Takings / retroactivity / vagueness / ex post facto | Rule effects a taking by depriving owners without compensation; rule is retroactive or unconstitutionally vague | Regulation provides a post‑effective‑date criminal standard and compliance period; government acted under police power; notice via notice‑and‑comment | Takings claim rejected (police‑power regulation; compensation not required now); no ex post facto or void‑for‑vagueness violation because notice was adequate |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (establishes two‑step deference to reasonable agency statutory interpretations)
- Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (sets arbitrary-and-capricious standard for agency rulemaking)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (discusses "single pull" formulation of machinegun definition)
- Guedes v. ATF, 920 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (affirmed preliminary denial and applied Chevron to uphold ATF's bump‑stock rule)
- Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (agency deference can apply even where statute has criminal implications)
- United States v. Olofson, 563 F.3d 652 (7th Cir.) (construed "automatically" in NFA context)
- United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir.) (interpreting trigger function in statutory context)
- Akins v. United States, [citation="312 F. App'x 197"] (11th Cir.) (upheld ATF classification of Akins Accelerator as machinegun)
- Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (takings doctrine requires adequate provision for compensation; compensation need not be contemporaneous)
- Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (distinguishes police‑power regulation from a compensable taking)