Groundfish Forum v. Ross
375 F. Supp. 3d 72
D.C. Cir.2019Background
- The North Pacific Fishery Management Council and NMFS (the Service) manage Bering Sea–Aleutian Islands (BSAI) Pacific cod under the Magnuson‑Stevens Act (MSA); annual TACs and sector allocations are set and applied regionwide.
- Adak and Atka are remote Aleutian communities with onshore processing plants (Adak operational; Atka under expansion in 2016) that historically relied on shore processing revenues.
- In 2016 the Council adopted Amendment 113 (A113), and NMFS implemented it, creating an annual A‑season Aleutian Islands (AI) set‑aside (up to 5,000 mt) reserved for catcher vessels that deliver AI cod to AI shoreplants (defined as facilities west of 170°W, effectively Adak and Atka), plus a temporary limitation on BS trawl CVs until the set‑aside period ends.
- Plaintiffs (trade associations and fishing companies) sued under the MSA and the APA, arguing A113: (1) exceeded NMFS authority by effectively allocating shore‑based processing privileges; (2) violated National Standards 4, 5, and 8; and (3) was arbitrary and capricious. Adak and Atka intervened to defend the rule.
- The Court held NMFS had statutory authority to adopt a harvest set‑aside tied to onshore delivery, but vacated A113 because NMFS failed to show the amendment complied with National Standard 8 (cannot allocate resources to specific communities) and National Standard 4 (an allocation must be reasonably calculated to promote conservation).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether MSA's definition of "fishing" bars NMFS from imposing onshore delivery requirements / shore‑processing allocations | MSA limits NMFS to regulating "fishing" and "operations at sea," so A113 unlawfully regulates onshore processing privileges | A113 regulates harvesting (who may harvest during the set‑aside) by conditioning harvest privileges on intended delivery; even if ambiguous, NMFS interpretation is reasonable under Chevron | NMFS has authority to implement a harvest set‑aside with an onshore delivery requirement; Plaintiffs' categorical challenge rejected |
| Whether A113 complies with National Standard 8 (consider impacts on fishing communities; not a basis to allocate to specific community) | A113 allocates fish to Adak and Atka, effectively giving preferential treatment to specific communities, contrary to NS8 and NMFS guidelines | A113 benefits any AI shoreplant west of 170°W; not exclusive, thus consistent with NS8 | Vacated: A113 is arbitrary and capricious under NS8 because it in practice allocates resources to two specific communities contrary to NS8 guidance |
| Whether A113 complies with National Standard 4 (allocations must be fair/equitable and reasonably calculated to promote conservation) | A113 is an allocation that lacks a conservation purpose and is not "reasonably calculated to promote conservation"—it is conservation‑neutral and socio‑economic in aim | The measure is conservation‑neutral and does not weaken conservation; socio‑economic benefits tie into conservation objectives or at least do not undermine them | Vacated additionally under NS4: NMFS failed to show the allocation promotes conservation as required by the statute |
| Remedy | Plaintiffs sought vacatur and remand | Defendants sought to uphold the rule | Court vacated the rule implementing A113 and remanded to NMFS for reconsideration consistent with the opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- C & W Fish Co. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (standard for judicial review of FMP amendments—court asks whether Secretary's conclusion that National Standards are satisfied is rational and supported by record)
- Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker, 809 F.3d 664 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (councils develop FMPs and amendments under MSA)
- Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 831 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D.D.C. 2011) (advisory guidelines receive deference though not binding)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary and capricious standard: agency must articulate rational connection between facts and choice)
- NRDC v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (agency scientific determinations entitled to deference but not post hoc rationalizations)
- A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (courts will not uphold agency action on basis of counsel's post hoc rationalizations)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (two‑step framework for deference to agency statutory interpretation)
- Catawba County v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (describes Chevron step‑one and step‑two inquiry)