Grogan v. United States, 271 A.3d 196

Rives Grogan, a preacher, loudly protested abortion from a public Senate gallery immediately after the Senate adjourned; officers escorted him out and he continued shouting after explicit orders to stop.
He was charged and tried on two counts: demonstrating within a U.S. Capitol building (D.C. Code § 10-503.16(b)(7)) and unlawful demonstration (D.C. Code § 22-1307(b)).
A jury convicted Grogan on both counts; he received concurrent seven-day jail terms for each conviction.
On appeal Grogan argued (inter alia) double jeopardy (duplicitous punishment), a RFRA violation, facial overbreadth of § 10-503.16(b)(7), insufficiency under § 22-1307(b), and that the gallery is a public forum so the statute was unconstitutional as applied.
The court held the two convictions must merge because the D.C. Council intended § 22-1307(b) as a lesser alternative to Capitol-building demonstration charges, and § 10-503.18(c) ties penalties to the highest authorized punishment; it remanded to vacate the § 22-1307(b) conviction.
The court rejected Grogan's RFRA claim (no substantial burden), upheld § 10-503.16(b)(7) against facial overbreadth under the 'tourist standard', and found no plain error as-applied in the gallery context.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Double Jeopardy / merger of convictions	Grogan: unlawful demonstration (§ 22-1307(b)) depends on proving illegality under § 10-503.16(b)(7), so punishments are duplicative	Government: Blockburger shows each offence has distinct elements (location v. continuing after order), so no merger presumptively	Court: Blockburger presumption applies but clear legislative intent (Omnibus Act preamble and § 10-503.18(c)) required merger; vacate § 22-1307(b) conviction
RFRA defense	Grogan: removal/charge substantially burdened his sincere religious exercise	Government: removal barred only one means among many to convey message; less than substantial burden	Court: No prima facie RFRA violation; restriction was one of many means so not a substantial burden
Facial overbreadth of § 10-503.16(b)(7)	Grogan: 'demonstration' is vague/overbroad across manners, locations (Rotunda), and times	Government: statute can be narrowed by established 'tourist standard' to proscribe disruptive conduct	Court: § 10-503.16(b)(7) is not substantially overbroad when construed under the tourist standard; upheld
As-applied public forum / time-place-manner	Grogan: Senate gallery is a public forum; statute not narrowly tailored to serve significant interest after adjournment	Government: substantial interest in preventing disruption persists; regulation is a valid time-place-manner restriction	Court: Plain-error review fails — not clear or obvious error; upheld as-applied

Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (interpreting Blockburger and legislative drafting choices for merger analysis)
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (establishing element-by-element test for multiple punishments)
Mooney v. United States, 938 A.2d 710 (D.C. 2007) (merger remedy when legislature did not authorize duplicative punishments)
Pelote v. District of Columbia, 21 A.3d 599 (D.C. 2011) (merging offenses when one statutory provision predicates the other)
Byrd v. United States, 598 A.2d 386 (D.C. 1991) (Double Jeopardy protects against multiple punishments beyond legislative authorization)
Markowitz v. United States, 598 A.2d 398 (D.C. 1991) (applying limitations to Capitol demonstration prosecutions; site-specific analysis)
Wheelock v. United States, 552 A.2d 503 (D.C. 1989) (recognizing Rotunda as a unique forum for demonstrations)
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (overbreadth doctrine: substantial unconstitutional applications required to invalidate statute)