Gregory Leeb v. Nationwide Credit Corporation, 806 F.3d 895

Leeb received emergency medical care; provider submitted a claim to Cigna which closed the file without payment after requests for more information. Nationwide was later hired to collect the unpaid bill.
On Dec. 28, 2011 Nationwide called Leeb; he disputed the debt, stating Cigna should pay, and sent written dispute communications to Nationwide.
Nationwide sent a Dec. 26 form letter (mailed before the dispute) and later sent a Jan. 5, 2012 form letter after the dispute that: (1) showed a $327 "balance" on the detachable top portion with instructions to return with payment; (2) asked for additional information on the bottom portion; and (3) stated it was "from a debt collector attempting to collect a debt."
Leeb informed Nationwide that the medical provider was stopping collection because it would pursue Cigna; Leeb nonetheless sued Nationwide under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., claiming Nationwide failed to "cease collection" after his dispute as required by § 1692g(b).
The district court granted summary judgment for Leeb; the Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed, holding the Jan. 5 letter was an objective attempt to collect and Nationwide failed to prove the § 1692k(c) bona fide error defense.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Nationwide "cease collection" after Leeb disputed the debt under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b)?	The Jan. 5 letter, which stated a balance and asked for payment, was an attempt to collect and violated § 1692g(b).	The letter was sent to acknowledge Leeb's dispute per his request and was not objectively an attempt to collect; Leeb subjectively knew he did not owe the debt.	The court held objectively the Jan. 5 letter was an attempt to collect (balance, payment stub, collection language) and Nationwide failed to "cease collection."
Is Nationwide excused by the FDCPA "bona fide error" defense, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c)?	N/A (plaintiff argues no defense applies).	Nationwide contends the violation was unintentional, a bona fide error, and it maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such mistakes.	The court rejected the defense: violation was intentional in sending the form letter, it was not a clerical/factual mistake, and Nationwide failed to show adequate "procedures reasonably adapted" as required by Jerman.

Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380 (7th Cir.) (uses objective standard to determine whether communication is "in connection with an attempt to collect a debt")
Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790 (7th Cir.) (analysis considers letter content and context to assess FDCPA coverage)
McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 756 F.3d 240 (3d Cir.) (holding a letter stating amount due and that sender is a debt collector is an attempt to collect)
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573 (Supreme Court) (bona fide error defense limited to clerical or factual mistakes; mistakes of law not covered; “procedures” must be mechanical processes to avoid such errors)
Kort v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., 394 F.3d 530 (7th Cir.) (discusses limits of bona fide error defense in particular statutory-text contexts)
Bailey v. Sec. Nat’l Servicing Corp., 154 F.3d 384 (7th Cir.) (relationship scope can inform whether a communication is an attempt to collect)
Owen v. I. C. Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir.) (procedural adequacy under § 1692k(c) is a fact-intensive inquiry)