Gregory Dewayne Tennyson v. State
12-16-00225-CR
| Tex. App. | Jul 31, 2017Background
- On Oct. 25, 2015 Deputy Clayton Taylor stopped Gregory Tennyson for an unreadable license plate, learned of an outstanding warrant, and asked Tennyson to exit the vehicle; Tennyson fled instead.
- While stopped at a red light during the pursuit, Tennyson shifted into reverse and struck Deputy Taylor’s patrol car, then led officers on a high‑speed chase on wet roads, ultimately crashing into multiple law‑enforcement vehicles and being arrested.
- Tennyson was indicted for aggravated assault on a peace officer (including a deadly‑weapon finding based on use of his vehicle); convicted by a jury on June 29, 2016 and sentenced to life.
- During voir dire Tennyson raised a Batson challenge to three peremptory strikes (asserting racial discrimination); the trial court found a prima facie case but accepted the State’s race‑neutral reasons and overruled Batson.
- Tennyson requested jury instructions on necessity and an Article 38.23 probable‑cause instruction related to the traffic stop; the trial court refused both. He also sought post‑conviction reduction of a consolidated court cost fee under Salinas (decided after his trial).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Tennyson) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Batson challenge to three peremptory strikes | Strikes were racially motivated; prosecutor’s proffered reasons were pretextual | Prosecutor offered race‑neutral reasons (rehabilitation preference, employment/education, prior jury behavior, family criminal history); defendant failed to rebut | Trial court’s Batson ruling affirmed — State’s reasons credible and not shown to be pretextual |
| 2. Sufficiency of evidence for deadly‑weapon finding (vehicle) | Driving/contacts insufficient to show vehicle was used in a manner capable of causing death/serious injury | Video and testimony showed ramming of occupied patrol car, dangerous high‑speed flight on wet roads, illegal passing — vehicle use was capable of causing death/serious injury | Jury’s deadly‑weapon finding affirmed as legally sufficient |
| 3. Request for necessity (justification) instruction | Tennyson contends he acted to avoid perceived imminent harm and was entitled to instruction | Tennyson repeatedly testified the collision was accidental and denied the requisite culpable mental state; confession‑and‑avoidance not satisfied; no reasonable belief of immediate necessity | Trial court properly denied necessity instruction |
| 4. Request for Article 38.23 probable‑cause instruction (illegal stop) | Stop was unlawful; evidence should be treated as possibly obtained in violation of law and jury instructed | Aggravated assault evidence did not exist at time of stop — crime occurred after the stop; Article 38.23 protects suppression of preexisting evidence, not new crimes that arise after detention | Denial of Article 38.23 instruction proper; no charge error |
| 5. Challenge to consolidated court cost fee under Salinas | Reduce fee based on Court of Criminal Appeals holding in Salinas | Salinas was decided after trial and the court announced its ruling applies prospectively; Tennyson’s trial concluded before Salinas | No fee reduction — Salinas held prospective and does not apply to his completed trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (peremptory strikes based solely on race violate Equal Protection)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (legal‑sufficiency standard: any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (vehicle may be a deadly weapon based on manner of use; danger can be real even if no actual injury)
- Juarez v. State, 308 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (confession‑and‑avoidance requires defendant to admit act and the applicable culpable mental state to trigger necessity instruction)
- Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (standard for reviewing Batson rulings; factual credibility determinations entitled to deference)
- Kunkle v. State, 771 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (denial of requested defensive instruction is not error when evidence fails to raise the issue)
- Sierra v. State, 280 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (factors for assessing whether motor vehicle was used as a deadly weapon)
- Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (framework for reviewing jury‑charge error and harm analysis)
- Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (when even one venireperson is excluded for racial reasons, the jury selection is tainted)