Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629

On Nov. 26, 2014 around 8:30 PM, Officer Newport responded to a dispatcher report that a Mercury Grand Marquis had driven around an O’Reilly Auto Parts parking lot about five times near closing time.
Newport knew the store had been robbed within the prior two months and believed the circling was consistent with "casing" for a robbery.
Newport found the Marquis parked near the store with Davin Green in a neighboring Chevrolet Malibu; Newport observed (a fact disputed by Green) another person, Joe Lindsey, lean into Green’s passenger window.
Newport activated his lights, ordered both men to put up their hands, asked Green whether he had a weapon (Green said no), and directed Green to exit the vehicle.
Newport contends Green partially complied with a hands-up instruction, gripped Green’s wrist to position his arm, and during a pat-down discovered a handgun in Green’s waistband; Green disputes portions of Newport’s account.
Green sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming the stop and frisk violated the Fourth Amendment; the district court denied qualified immunity, and Newport appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Newport’s investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion (Terry stop)	Green: stop was based only on a generic "suspicious person" dispatch and thus unconstitutional per circuit precedent	Newport: totality of circumstances (repeated circling near closing, recent robbery at the store, officer experience) gave reasonable suspicion	Court: stop was not clearly established as unlawful; facts distinguishable from cases rejecting vague dispatches; qualified immunity granted
Whether the protective frisk violated the Fourth Amendment	Green: frisk lacked articulable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous (relying on same precedents)	Newport: prior robbery involved a weapon and reported “casing” plus Lindsey’s alleged leaning into Green’s car created reasonable suspicion he might be armed	Court: frisk plausibly justified under the circumstances and existing precedent does not clearly establish it was unlawful; qualified immunity granted

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (established investigatory stop/reasonable suspicion framework)
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (clearly established law must place question beyond debate)
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (clearly established law must be particularized)
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (relevance of location and contextual characteristics to suspicion)
Gentry v. [unspecified], 597 F.3d 843 (generalized suspicious-person dispatch insufficient for Terry stop)
United States v. Packer, 15 F.3d 654 (citing that generalized dispatches without detail do not justify stops)
Kiddy-Brown v. Blagojevich, 408 F.3d 346 (plaintiff’s burden to show right clearly established)
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (frisk requires articulable suspicion that person is armed and dangerous)
United States v. Snow, 656 F.3d 498 (burglary-like conduct often raises suspicion someone is armed)
United States v. Barnett, 505 F.3d 637 (same principle regarding weapon-related crimes and frisk justification)