Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769

Background

Marvin Green, a long‑time Postal Service employee, alleged he was constructively discharged after supervisors threatened criminal charges and negotiated a settlement that required him to retire or accept a distant, lower‑paid post.
Green signed a settlement agreement on December 16, 2009; he submitted retirement paperwork on February 9, 2010 (effective March 31) and contacted an EEO counselor on March 22, 2010.
The EEOC regulation requires federal employees to initiate contact with an EEO counselor "within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).
The Tenth Circuit held Green’s claim time‑barred, ruling the 45‑day period began at the employer’s last discriminatory act (the settlement), not at Green’s resignation.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split about when the limitations period begins for constructive‑discharge claims and appointed an amicus to defend the Tenth Circuit’s judgment.
The Court held that for constructive‑discharge claims the "matter alleged to be discriminatory" includes the resignation; the 45‑day period begins when the employee gives definite notice of resignation (e.g., when he gives two‑weeks’ notice), and remanded to determine when Green gave notice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does the 45‑day EEOC counseling period start for a constructive‑discharge claim?	Green: the period starts when the employee resigns (when he gives definite notice).	Government/Tenth Circuit: the period starts at the employer’s last discriminatory act (e.g., settlement date).	The Court: the period begins when the employee resigns (gives definite notice); resignation is part of the "matter alleged to be discriminatory."
Is a constructive discharge claim a complete cause of action before resignation?	Green: no—claim accrues only after resignation because resignation is an essential element.	Amica/dissent: yes—the discriminatory act by employer completes the actionable matter; resignation is consequence, not part of the matter.	The Court: constructive‑discharge claim accrues after resignation; default accrual rule applies.
Can the regulation’s text displace the default accrual rule?	Green: regulation doesn't clearly displace accrual rule; therefore default rule controls.	Amica/dissent: "matter alleged to be discriminatory" clearly refers to employer acts and displaces accrual rule.	The Court: nothing in the regulation clearly displaces the standard rule; therefore accrual rule governs.
When does an employee "resign" for timeliness purposes?	Green: date he gave definite notice (here, when retirement papers submitted).	Government: earlier events (e.g., settlement) constituted resignation.	The Court: resignation occurs when employee gives definite notice; left factual determination to the court of appeals on remand.

Key Cases Cited

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (distinguishes discrete acts from continuing violations and explains limitations for hostile‑work‑environment claims)
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004) (defines constructive discharge and explains remedial equivalence to actual discharge)
Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980) (limitations period runs from employer's adverse action notice, not later consequences)
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (discriminatory intent must occur within limitations period; subsequent nondiscriminatory acts don't restart clock)
Mac's Shell Service, Inc. v. Shell Oil Products Co., 559 U.S. 175 (2010) (accrual rule applied to constructive termination of contract)
Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192 (1997) (a cause of action is complete when plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief)
Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258 (1993) (courts will not infer a departure from the standard accrual rule absent clear indication)