Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264

Background

Baltimore Ordinance 09-252 (Dec. 2009) required “limited-service pregnancy centers” that do not provide or refer for abortions or certain birth-control services to post conspicuous disclaimers in English and Spanish stating they do not provide or refer for those services.
Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns (the Center) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the Ordinance violated the First Amendment (free speech, free exercise), Fourteenth Amendment, and state conscience protections; St. Brigid’s and the Archbishop were co-plaintiffs.
The Center moved for partial summary judgment early; the City opposed and submitted legislative record material and a Rule 56(f) affidavit seeking discovery to develop facts on advertising practices, commercial nature of the centers, and expert proof of public-health harms.
The district court converted the City’s motion, denied the City discovery, treated the claim mainly as a facial challenge, applied strict scrutiny (concluding the Ordinance was content- and viewpoint-based or at least compelled noncommercial speech), and entered a permanent injunction for the Center while dismissing St. Brigid’s and the Archbishop for lack of standing.
On en banc review the Fourth Circuit (majority) vacated the district court’s summary judgment and permanent injunction and remanded for further proceedings (holding denial of discovery and failure to apply summary-judgment standards was reversible error), but affirmed dismissal of St. Brigid’s and the Archbishop for lack of standing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether district court properly granted summary judgment without permitting discovery	Ordinance facially unconstitutional; strict scrutiny applies because it compels speech and is viewpoint-based; no discovery needed for facial ruling	City: summary judgment premature; Rule 56(d) discovery necessary to develop factual record on advertising, commercial nature, and experts	Court: Vacated and remanded — denial of discovery abused discretion; discovery required before final summary judgment/ permanent injunction
Whether speech regulated is commercial (lower scrutiny) or noncommercial/compelled (strict scrutiny)	The Center: speech is noncommercial, religious/political; strict scrutiny applies	City: many centers propose commercial transactions (tests, ultrasounds, counseling); if commercial or separable, Zauderer/Central Hudson rational-basis or intermediate scrutiny applies; need facts to decide	Court: Fact-driven question; district court erred by assuming noncommercial motive and applying strict scrutiny without discovery; remand for development of record
Whether the Ordinance is content-/viewpoint-based or a permissible disclosure to prevent deception	Center: Ordinance targets centers because of viewpoint (pro-life), compels message contrary to beliefs, so it's viewpoint discrimination	City: ordinance aimed at preventing deceptive advertising and protecting public health, not suppressing viewpoint; legislative record supports consumer-protection purpose	Court: District court prematurely labeled it viewpoint-based; appellate court requires City opportunity to present evidence and be credited at summary judgment stage; remand
Standing of St. Brigid’s and the Archbishop	Plaintiffs argued they were injured as landlords/affiliated organizations	City argued no concrete injury to them	Held: Affirmed — St. Brigid’s and the Archbishop lack standing to be co-plaintiffs (no concrete, particularized injury)

Key Cases Cited

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard and need for adequate record)
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (post-hoc justifications are suspect in governmental explanations)
Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (speech that is "inextricably intertwined" with noncommercial speech may lose commercial character)
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (compelled disclosures of misleading commercial speech subject to relaxed scrutiny)
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (content-based/compelled-speech regulations generally trigger strict scrutiny)
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (facial-challenge standards and overbreadth framework)
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (commercial speech test)
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (factors for identifying commercial speech)
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (content- and viewpoint-based restrictions presumptively invalid)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requirements explained)
Playboy Entm't Group, Inc. v. United States, 529 U.S. 803 (narrow tailoring and strict-scrutiny principles for content-based speech regulation)