Gonzalez Ex Rel. Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 5895
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- At ~2:00 a.m. on Sept. 25, 2009, Anaheim officers Wyatt and Ellis stopped a Mazda minivan driven by Adolph Gonzalez after observing erratic driving; officers had no records showing prior violent history or warrants and never saw a weapon in the van.
- Officers approached from both sides; Gonzalez clenched his hands, appeared to try to swallow a plastic bag, and resisted commands to show his hands and turn off the vehicle; officers used nonlethal force (flashlight strikes, punches) to try to gain control.
- Gonzalez shifted the van into drive and accelerated with Officer Wyatt still inside (passenger side); officers disputed how fast the van was going and how long elapsed before Wyatt fired a single, close-range shot to Gonzalez’s head, killing him.
- Plaintiffs (Gonzalez’s successors and family) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive deadly force (Fourth Amendment) and for deprivation of familial relationship (Fourteenth Amendment); the district court granted summary judgment for defendants; plaintiffs appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit majority reversed as to the deadly-force Fourth Amendment claim because of an internal inconsistency in Officer Wyatt’s testimony about distance/time/speed that created a triable issue; it affirmed summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment familial-loss claim and non-deadly-force claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wyatt’s shooting constituted unreasonable deadly force (Fourth Amendment) | Wyatt’s inconsistent testimony about the van’s speed/distance/time (50 ft in 5–10 sec but ~50 mph) creates a genuine dispute whether he faced an immediate threat justifying deadly force | Shooting was reasonable because Gonzalez "stomped" accelerator, violently accelerated, and Wyatt was trapped — creating an immediate threat that justified deadly force | Reversed summary judgment on deadly-force claim; inconsistency in officer testimony could allow a jury to find no immediate deadly threat and therefore unreasonable force |
| Whether alternative, less-lethal measures or a warning were required before using deadly force | If the van was moving slowly, nonlethal options or a practicable warning existed and would make deadly force unreasonable | Given split-second, rapidly evolving danger and failed nonlethal attempts, additional warnings or alternatives weren’t feasible | Left for jury: record permits a finding either that alternatives/warning were practicable or not; summary judgment inappropriate on deadly-force claim |
| Whether plaintiffs proved a Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process deprivation of familial relationship | Family argued officers’ conduct shocked the conscience and showed purpose to harm beyond legitimate law enforcement objectives | Officers acted without time to deliberate and had no ulterior motives; conduct aimed at legitimate law-enforcement objectives | Affirmed summary judgment for defendants — plaintiffs produced no evidence of a purpose to harm unrelated to law enforcement objectives |
Key Cases Cited
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (deadly force permissible only if officer has probable cause to believe suspect poses significant threat of death or serious injury)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (use-of-force reasonableness test: severity of crime, immediate threat, active resistance/flight)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (objective-reasonableness can be a question of law at summary judgment when video or undisputed facts settle relevant facts)
- Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912 (9th Cir.) (careful scrutiny of officer testimony when decedent is the only non-officer witness)
- Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546 (9th Cir.) (officer may be reasonable to shoot a driver of a slowly moving vehicle if sudden acceleration could threaten an officer or partner)
- Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir.) (warnings before deadly force relevant when practicable)