452 F. App'x 3
1st Cir.2011Background
- Gómez-Pérez worked for USPS since 1987, transferring from New York to Puerto Rico in 1995 and later to Dorado, Puerto Rico.
- In Oct 2002 Gómez transferred to Moca as a part-time Flexible Window Distribution Clerk, losing a forty-hour week; she believed she would still get full hours, conflicting with the CBA.
- The CBA guarantees part-time employees like Gómez two hours per day and schedules of less than 40 hours per week, not a forty-hour guarantee.
- Cintrón and Ramos held meetings in early 2003 addressing sexual harassment complaints and then posted anti-harassment posters; posters were defaced and Gómez felt ridiculed.
- From Mar-Apr 2003 Gómez faced harassment by co-worker Muniz and received statements about her conduct; in Mar 2003 she wrote to the District Manager alleging retaliation and filed with EEOC in Feb 2003; EEOC dismissed in Aug 2003.
- Gómez filed suit in Nov 2003; district court granted summary judgment for USPS in 2006; First Circuit remanded after Supreme Court recognition of retaliation under ADEA; on remand, court again granted summary judgment for USPS.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gómez proved a prima facie retaliation claim under the ADEA. | Gómez asserts protected activity via EEOC complaint; actions after show causal link. | USPS contends no materially adverse action or causation. | No, Gómez failed to show a materially adverse action. |
| Whether any actions by USPS constituted a materially adverse employment action. | Gómez argues reduced hours and scheduling actions were adverse. | Actions were not materially adverse under First Circuit standards. | No, absence of material adversity; no prima facie case. |
| Whether a causal link existed between protected activity and adverse action. | Temporal proximity and retaliation allegations suggest causation. | Record lacks sufficient causation; actions were not retaliation-based. | No sufficient evidence of causation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (materially adverse action standard for retaliation must be objective)
- Mariani-Colón v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. ex rel. Chertoff, 511 F.3d 216 (1st Cir. 2007) (prima facie retaliation framework; protected activity, adverse action, causation)
- Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2002) (discrete workplace incivilities not necessarily adverse actions; pervasiveness required for hostile environment)
- Bhatti v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 659 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2011) (reprimands with no tangible consequences not materially adverse)
- Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2003) (multifactor test for severity/pervasiveness of harassment)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (framework for proving pretext and shifting burdens in discrimination claims)