Goga Djadju v. Juan A. Lopez Vega
32 F.4th 1102
11th Cir.2022Background
- Petitioner Goga Djadju, a native of North Macedonia, challenged his ICE post-removal-order detention via a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, arguing it violated due process by exceeding the presumptively reasonable period from Zadvydas v. Davis.
- The BIA affirmed denial of his withholding application in November 2019, making his removal order final; the BIA later granted a motion to reopen and an administrative stay based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen.
- ICE performed a post-order custody review and initially found continued detention appropriate, but in November 2020 ICE conditionally released Djadju under an order of supervision with electronic monitoring.
- Djadju sought only immediate release in his habeas petition and did not challenge the conditions of his supervised release or assert collateral consequences from those conditions.
- After Djadju’s conditional release, the Eleventh Circuit ordered supplemental briefing, held argument, and concluded the appeal was moot because Djadju had already obtained the relief he sought; the court vacated the district court’s judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Djadju’s conditional release moots his § 2241 claim that his detention exceeded the Zadvydas presumptively reasonable period | Djadju argued his detention was unlawful and sought immediate release; release is voluntary cessation and should not moot the case | Government argued release satisfies the requested relief, no collateral consequences were asserted, and there is a presumption the government will not resume detention | Case is moot; appeal dismissed and district court judgment vacated |
| Whether the administrative stay of removal affected the Zadvydas removal-period calculation | Djadju contended the stay should not justify prolonged detention under Zadvydas | Government pointed to the stay and administrative processes impacting removal timing | Court declined to decide because the case is moot (no jurisdiction) |
| Whether the voluntary-cessation exception prevents mootness where the government released the petitioner | Djadju argued release was voluntary cessation of illegal conduct so case should proceed | Government argued there is a rebuttable presumption it will not resume the conduct; here release followed regulatory procedures and substantial time has passed | Court assumed without deciding that even if doctrine applies, petitioner failed to rebut presumption; mootness stands |
| Whether collateral consequences exist to sustain habeas jurisdiction after release | Djadju did not identify collateral consequences or challenge conditions of supervision | Government noted petitioner did not claim ongoing injury from supervision and could be re-detained only after administrative hurdles | Petitioner bore burden to show collateral consequences and did not; no live controversy remains |
Key Cases Cited
- Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (establishes presumptively reasonable post-removal detention period and § 2241 route to challenge post-removal detention)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (habeas requires continuing injury or collateral consequences after sentence expiration)
- Soliman v. U.S. ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2002) (released/deported detainee’s habeas challenge to detention is moot absent collateral consequences)
- Salmeron-Salmeron v. Spivey, 926 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2019) (in-custody requirement and collateral-consequences doctrine apply in immigration habeas context)
- Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach Cty., Fla., 382 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2004) (voluntary-cessation doctrine and government presumption against recurrence)
- Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018) (factors for assessing reasonable expectation of recurrence under voluntary-cessation doctrine)
- Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2020) (burden on defendant to show cessation prevents recurrence)
- Al-Arian v. United States, 514 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2008) (mootness jurisdictional requirement on appeal)
- Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001) (vacatur of lower-court judgment when appeal mooted by subsequent events)
- Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (in-custody requirement satisfied by restraints on freedom of movement)
- Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (reluctance to assume plaintiffs will engage in conduct justifying renewed detention)
- Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 945 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2019) (standard of review for § 2241 denial)
- Madu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 470 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. 2006) (jurisdiction to review constitutional challenges to detention)