Goad, Joshua Lee
2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1513
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2011Background
- Texas Court of Criminal Appeals case captioned Goad v. State, No. PD-0435-11, pursuing review of lesser-included-offense instructions.
- Alcala, J., authored a concurring opinion addressing standard of review for trial-court decisions to give or refuse lesser-included-offense instructions.
- Issue concerns whether appellate review of the trial court’s denial of a lesser-included-offense instruction should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard, and how that standard interacts with direct vs circumstantial evidence.
- The two-prong test for lesser-included offenses is established: first prong is a de novo, law-determinative inquiry; second prong analyzes sufficiency of the evidence as an abuse-of-discretion review.
- In the case, the trial court denied a trespass instruction, and the opinion concludes the denial was an abuse of discretion under the second prong when considering circumstantial evidence.
- Alcala endorses giving all lesser-included offenses in some circumstances and urges uniform application of abuse-of-discretion review to second-prong rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What standard of review applies to lesser-included-offense instructions? | Alcala: abuse-of-discretion, second prong. | Majority: fails to specify second-prong review. | Abuse-of-discretion under the second prong. |
| How does evidence type affect appellate deference in the second prong? | Direct evidence reduces deference; circumstantial allows deference within zone of disagreement. | Deference uniform across evidence types. | Deference varies by evidence type; greater deference for circumstantial evidence within reasonable disagreement; less for direct. |
| Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying trespass instruction here? | Circumstantial evidence could support trespass as rational alternative to burglary. | Evidence supports burglary; trespass not warranted given record. | Yes, the denial was outside the zone of reasonable disagreement; trial court abused discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (two-prong test for lesser-included offenses)
- Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (first prong is de novo; second prong abuse of discretion)
- Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (jury determines credibility; lesser-included instruction basis)
- Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (trial court better position to assess evidence; deference to trial court)
- Sweed v. State, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1395 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (circumstantial-evidence example; required lesser instruction when rational)
- Hampton v. State, 109 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (mere disbelief of greater-offense evidence is not enough for lesser instruction)
- Skinner v. State, 956 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (not enough that jury disbelieves crucial greater-offense evidence)
- Bell v. State, 693 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (evidence from any source may raise lesser-included issue; jury credibility)
- Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (any more than a scintilla of evidence entitles to instruction)
- Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (jury decides credibility; proper instruction governs)
- Wesbrook v. State, 9 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (comparison with Mathis on direct testimony of intent)
- Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (direct evidence of lesser intent; split with Wesbrook)
- Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences for culpability)