Glycine & More, Inc. v. United States
880 F.3d 1335
Fed. Cir.2018Background
- Commerce regulation 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1) allows withdrawal of a request for an antidumping administrative review within 90 days of initiation and states the Secretary "may extend this time limit if the Secretary decides that it is reasonable to do so."
- Historically Commerce applied a broad, fact-specific “reasonableness” standard (considering agency resources, stage of review, prior-review results, etc.) when deciding untimely withdrawal extensions.
- In 2011 Commerce published a Notice (guidance) narrowing the standard: for reviews with anniversary months on/after Aug. 2011, extensions would be granted only for demonstrated "extraordinary circumstances."
- In 2012 GEO and Baoding Mantong requested review of glycine imports; GEO timely withdrew within 90 days; Baoding Mantong submitted a withdrawal after 90 days and requested an extension, citing reliance on GEO’s withdrawal and that the review was at an early stage.
- Commerce denied Baoding Mantong’s untimely withdrawal under the 2011 Notice, later assigned Baoding an adverse dumping margin when it didn’t cooperate, and Glycine & More challenged that denial in the Court of International Trade (CIT).
- The CIT held Commerce’s 2011 Notice unlawfully altered the regulation’s meaning, remanded for reconsideration under the regulation’s original reasonableness standard; on remand Commerce—under protest—granted the extension and rescinded the review; the CIT affirmed, and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Commerce’s 2011 Notice improperly amended § 351.213(d)(1) without notice-and-comment rulemaking | 2011 Notice narrows the regulation unlawfully; the regulation requires a fact-specific reasonableness inquiry, not an "extraordinary circumstances" rule | 2011 Notice is an interpretive/guidance statement entitled to deference; Commerce may clarify exercise of discretion | Court held the Notice changed the clear meaning of the regulation and thus could not replace the rule absent notice-and-comment rulemaking; no deference owed |
| Whether the Notice was ambiguous (triggering deference) | The regulation is ambiguous only as to standards; deference inappropriate because the Notice changes regulatory purpose | Notice reflects Commerce’s permissible interpretation and should receive Auer/Skidmore deference | Court held the Notice was unambiguous in effect and inconsistent with the regulation’s original purpose; deference not warranted |
| Whether Commerce’s denial of Baoding Mantong’s extension was reasonable on the record | Denial was unreasonable given early stage of review, lack of agency resources expended, and timing shortly after 90 days | Denial proper under Commerce’s announced stricter standard; agency discretion should control | Applying the proper regulatory standard, the court sustained remand grant of extension and rescission of review |
| Whether CIT exceeded its role by directing remand findings | Plaintiff: CIT lawfully required application of the regulation’s text and purposive factors | Defendant: CIT improperly constrained Commerce and failed to defer to agency interpretation | Court concluded CIT did not nullify Commerce’s discretion; CIT properly enforced the regulation and required a decision consistent with it |
Key Cases Cited
- Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (agencies cannot rewrite unambiguous rules via informal interpretations)
- Tesoro Haw. Corp. v. United States, 405 F.3d 1339 (2005) (court enforces clear regulatory text and refuses to insert new provisions)
- Roberto v. Dep’t of Navy, 440 F.3d 1341 (2006) (use statutory/regulatory construction principles when interpreting agency regulations)
- Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 419 F.3d 1342 (2005) (standard of review: de novo for legal questions, clear-error for facts)
- Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 515 F.3d 1372 (2008) (review standards for agency decisions in trade contexts)
- Gibson v. United States, 194 U.S. 182 (1904) (courts must enforce unambiguous statutory/regulatory language and avoid judicially inserting terms)