529 F.Supp.3d 316
D. Del.2021Background
- Plaintiff Robert M. Glen is a U.S. national who inherited claims to two contiguous beachfront parcels in Varadero, Cuba that were confiscated by the Cuban government; hotels now operate on those parcels.
- Defendants are online travel-booking platforms (Tripadvisor, Booking, Expedia) and payment networks (Visa, Mastercard) that allegedly facilitated bookings/payments for the Subject Hotels and profited from those transactions.
- Glen filed suit under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act alleging defendants "trafficked" in confiscated property; defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
- The court considered whether issues decided in a prior Glen decision in the Northern District of Texas (Glen I) preclude relitigation; interlocutory appeals and contrary district-court decisions existed.
- The court held Glen has Article III standing (Congress conferred a cognizable injury under Helms-Burton), but dismissed the complaint with prejudice because Glen did not acquire his claim before March 12, 1996 (statutory bar); the court also found scienter inadequately alleged as to Visa.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of issue preclusion from Glen I | Glen argues Glen I was wrongly decided, on appeal, and that non‑jurisdictional findings shouldn’t preclude relitigation | Defendants argue Glen I decided the same issues and precludes relitigation here | Court: non‑mutual collateral estoppel does not apply; because Glen I dismissed for lack of jurisdiction its merits findings are not preclusive, and the standing ruling was not "sufficiently firm" given conflicting authority and pending appeal |
| Article III standing | Glen: intangible injury from unauthorized trafficking is concrete under Helms‑Burton and redressable by damages | Defendants: injury is the original confiscation by Cuba, not traceable to defendants; no concrete injury | Court: Glen has standing — Congress created a legally cognizable injury in Helms‑Burton, and causation/redressability are plausibly alleged |
| Statutory acquisition date (22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B)) | Glen: inheritance should not be treated as a post‑enactment acquisition that bars suit; "acquire" should exclude passive inheritance | Defendants: statute unambiguously bars suits by U.S. nationals who acquired claims after March 12, 1996 regardless of how acquired | Court: held statutory text is unambiguous; inheritance does not avoid the pre‑enactment ownership requirement → dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a claim |
| Scienter requirement for "traffics" (22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)) | Glen: only requires knowingly engaging in the commercial activity; constructive knowledge of general Cuban confiscations suffices; post‑notice trafficking supports knowledge | Defendants: statute requires knowledge of the confiscated status of the specific property; allegations do not plausibly show such knowledge | Court: scienter requires knowledge of the relevant elements (i.e., that property is confiscated); Glen plausibly alleges scienter for defendants who continued after pre‑suit notice, but not for Visa (which ceased activity on notice) |
Key Cases Cited
- B & H Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138 (U.S. 2015) (issue preclusion principles)
- Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2006) (requirements for issue preclusion under Third Circuit law)
- Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Federal Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 126 F.3d 461 (3d Cir. 1997) (jurisdictional dismissal prevents preclusive effect of merits findings)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (Article III standing framework)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. 2016) (concrete injury analysis for intangible harms and Congress’s role in defining injuries)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading requirements and reasonable inference standard)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (U.S. 1984) (deference to reasonable agency statutory interpretations)
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (U.S. 2019) ("knowingly" applies to all listed elements of an offense/statute)