Background

• Appellant Gipson was on community supervision; the State filed a motion to revoke alleging, among other things, failure to pay court-assessed fees.
• At the revocation hearing, the State's motion did not specify which fees were unpaid and alleged only a general failure to pay as directed by the court.
• Gipson pled true only to the failure-to-pay allegation; the State dropped other alleged violations, and the trial court revoked supervision and sentenced Gipson to eight years.
• The Beaumont court of appeals reversed, finding no evidence Gipson willfully refused to pay, and thus no abuse of discretion occurred in revoking supervision.
• This concurrence analyzes whether Article 42.12, §21(c) (the ability-to-pay provision) applies when revocation rests solely on failure to pay fines and crime-stoppers fees.
• The concurrence concludes that §21(c) does not apply and that revocation was proper under the general revocation provision, §21(b).

Issues

Key Cases Cited

• Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (plain-meaning canon and limited application of ability to pay)
• Campbell v. State, 49 S.W.3d 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (legislative language exclusion implies consistency)
• Gipson II, 347 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2011) (earlier reversal for lack of willfulness findings)
• Gipson III, 395 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2013) (remand and continued reversal ordering)
• Solis v. State, 589 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (discussion of ability-to-pay framework)
• Whitehead v. State, 556 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (common-law ability-to-pay requirement prior to statutory changes)