Ginette Bone v. Kelli Dunnaway
657 F. App'x 258
5th Cir.2016Background
- On Dec. 14, 2013 in New Orleans French Quarter, Bone deposited trash onto an SUV’s hood after passengers threw it; an argument followed and police were summoned.
- Officer Dunnaway arrived, questioned Bone, and sought a signed summons; Bone refused and began to walk away. Officer Jones intervened and, according to Bone, grabbed her and slammed her face into a window, causing bruising and a swollen cheek.
- Dunnaway arrested Bone for disturbing the peace (tumultuous behavior) and resisting an officer; Bone was taken to jail. Passengers received citations but were not arrested.
- Bone sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest (against Dunnaway) and excessive force (against Jones); district court granted qualified immunity for both officers and dismissed state claims.
- On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed qualified immunity for Dunnaway (probable cause for the municipal offense) but vacated and remanded as to Jones because genuine factual disputes precluded resolving qualified immunity at summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| False arrest (Dunnaway) — whether probable cause existed for disturbing the peace | Bone: No probable cause; she merely picked up trash and refused to sign a summons | Dunnaway: Totality of circumstances (confrontation, eyewitness statements, late-night chaotic scene) gave reasonable belief Bone committed or attempted to commit the ordinance offense | Affirmed: Dunnaway entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer could believe probable cause existed |
| Excessive force (Jones) — whether force used was unconstitutional | Bone: Jones violently grabbed and slammed her to the window without warning or arrest, causing injury; no threat or flight existed | Jones: He grabbed her wrist to prevent flight after she refused to sign and ran off; the "slam" was accidental; force justified if she attempted to flee | Vacated/remanded: Genuine dispute over critical facts (whether Bone was fleeing/under arrest) prevents summary disposition on qualified immunity |
| Clearly established law for excessive force — whether precedent put Jones on notice | Bone: Precedent prohibits force when suspect is not resisting or fleeing; officers cannot use such force in minor-offense context | Jones: Arguably within settled cases where officers face resistance/fleeing suspects, so qualified immunity applies | Remanded: Disputed facts (flight/resistance) preclude finding the law was clearly established as a matter of law |
| Supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after federal ruling | Bone: State claims should proceed if federal claims survive against any defendant | City/Defendants: District court may decline jurisdiction if federal claims are resolved | Court: Left dismissal intact as to Dunnaway; vacated and remanded as to Jones so district court can reconsider supplemental jurisdiction in light of unresolved federal claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Goodman v. Harris Cty., 571 F.3d 388 (5th Cir.) (section 1983 individual/official-capacity framework)
- Thompson v. Mercer, 762 F.3d 433 (5th Cir.) (summary judgment standard review)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework)
- Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181 (5th Cir.) (probable cause requirement for false arrest)
- Lockett v. New Orleans City, 607 F.3d 992 (5th Cir.) (officer may arrest for minor offense committed in presence)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness test for excessive force)
- Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757 (5th Cir.) (qualified immunity summary-judgment analysis for excessive force)
- Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156 (5th Cir.) (denying qualified immunity where no flight/resistance justified force)
- Pratt v. Harris Cty., 822 F.3d 174 (5th Cir.) (denying/affirming qualified immunity turns on presence of resistance or flight)
- Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014) (courts must credit the nonmovant's version of disputed facts at summary judgment when assessing qualified immunity)