Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916

Background

After the 2010 census Wisconsin enacted Act 43, a State Assembly redistricting plan challenged as a Republican-favoring partisan gerrymander (packing and cracking of Democratic voters).
Twelve Democratic voters sued state election officials alleging Act 43 diluted Democratic votes statewide and violated First Amendment association and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights; they relied heavily on the “efficiency gap” partisan-asymmetry metric and a Demonstration Plan.
The Western District of Wisconsin held a bench trial, adopted a three-part test for unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders, found Act 43 enacted with partisan intent and effect, and enjoined use of the map.
Defendants appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The principal threshold dispute at the Supreme Court was Article III standing and whether plaintiffs had shown individualized injury.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded: it held plaintiffs had not proved Article III standing because their asserted injury was largely statewide/collective (measured by efficiency gap) rather than a concrete, district-specific burden on their own votes; remand was ordered so plaintiffs could attempt to prove they live in packed or cracked districts.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Article III standing — injury in fact	Plaintiffs argued statewide vote-dilution (efficiency gap) shows concrete injury to their votes and collective representation.	Defendants argued individual voters must show a particularized, district-specific injury (i.e., that their own district was packed or cracked).	The Court held plaintiffs failed to prove individualized injury; vote-dilution claims require showing a burden on the plaintiff's own vote (packed or cracked district).
Use of partisan-asymmetry metrics (efficiency gap) as proof	Efficiency gap measures statewide packing/cracking and thus demonstrates unconstitutional partisan advantage.	Efficiency gap is an average, party-focused metric that does not show effect on any particular plaintiff’s vote.	Court said efficiency-gap evidence measures party fortunes not individual injury and is insufficient by itself to establish standing.
Justiciability / judicially manageable standard	Plaintiffs urged courts can adopt metrics (like efficiency gap) to manage partisan-gerrymandering claims.	Defendants warned of lack of judicially manageable standards and political question concerns.	Court did not decide justiciability; declined to reach merits because plaintiffs lacked standing, noting prior fractured precedent on standards.
Remedy scope	Plaintiffs sought statewide relief invalidating Act 43 and a remedial statewide map.	Defendants argued remedies must be tailored to the plaintiffs’ particular injuries.	Court reiterated remedies must be limited to redressing each plaintiff’s established injury; however, if enough plaintiffs show district-specific injuries, comprehensive remedies may follow.

Key Cases Cited

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (standing requires a personal stake)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (injury in fact must be concrete and particularized)
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (right to vote is individual and personal)
United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (racial gerrymander plaintiffs limited to district-specific challenges)
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (political considerations in redistricting are inevitable)
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (partisan-gerrymander claims are justiciable but standard unsettled)
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (plurality: no manageable standard; Kennedy: open possibility for future standard)
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (discussion of symmetry/asymmetry metrics; no controlling standard)
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (remedy must be limited to inadequacy that produced the injury)
Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (federal courts are not forums for generalized grievances)
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (dismissal when standing lacking is typical)
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (judicial power limited to concrete cases and controversies)