Gila River Indian Community v. United States, 729 F.3d 1139

Tohono O’odham Nation sought to have Parcel 2 (54 acres) taken into trust under the Gila Bend Act for a potential resort/casino, a county island entirely surrounded by Glendale, Arizona.
Parcel 2 is located in Maricopa County, outside Glendale’s corporate limits, but geographers describe it as an island within the city’s extended exterior and zoning influence.
Glendale and Gila River Indian Community challenged the Nation’s trust application, arguing Parcel 2 is within Glendale’s corporate limits and thus ineligible under § 6(d) of the Gila Bend Act.
Interior granted trust for Parcel 2, interpreting § 6(d) as ambiguous and applying Chevron deference to uphold the agency’s interpretation.
District court affirmed the Interior decision, finding ambiguity and deferring to agency interpretation under Chevron, while rejecting Tenth Amendment/Indian Commerce Clause challenges.
Panel majority reversed in part and remanded for reconsideration, holding § 6(d) ambiguous and requiring fresh agency consideration of the interpretation, while affirming the decision otherwise.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 'within the corporate limits' restricts trust land for Parcel 2	Glendale—Parcel 2 lies within Glendale's corporate limits (a county island), making it ineligible.	Interior—'within' is ambiguous or jurisdictional; Parcel 2 can be held in trust under the Act.	Ambiguous; remand for fresh agency interpretation
Whether §6(c) acreage cap restricts total acquisitions or only trust land	Cap applies to total land acquired under the Act; Parcel 2 would push beyond cap.	Cap applies to land placed in trust under §6(d), not to total acquisitions in fee or outside trust.	Cap applies to trust land, not total acquisition
Whether the Gila Bend Act complies with the Indian Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment	Act intrudes on state sovereignty and exceeds Congress’s power under the Indian Commerce Clause; violates the Tenth Amendment.	Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs; Act is within constitutional bounds.	Constitutional under Indian Commerce Clause; Tenth Amendment not violated
Whether Chevron deference applies given the agency’s reasoning and canons of construction	Agency misread plain meaning and failed to consider Indian canon; deference inappropriate on remand.	Agency’s interpretation should be given deference if reasonable under Chevron step two.	Remand for reconsideration; deferential analysis not warranted given ambiguity and misapplication

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishes Chevron two-step framework for agency interpretations)
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (agency must provide reasoned explanation for its interpretation on remand)
Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act, Pub.L. No. 99-503, 100 Stat. 1798 (1986) (statutory framework governing replacement lands and trust acquisitions)
United States v. Romo-Romo, 246 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (illustrates approach to statutory interpretation and plain meaning guidance)
Carderi v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (illustrates plain meaning vs ambiguity in statutory interpretation)
SWANCC v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (clear statement concerns when federalism interests are implicated)
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (clear statement rule to protect state interests when interpreting federal authority)
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (states’ protections via political process; congressional power over Indian affairs predominant)
Flagstaff Vending Co. v. City of Flagstaff, 578 P.2d 985 (1978) (Arizona recognizes geographic meaning of 'within' corporate limits)
Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893) (plain/common meaning guidance for ordinary words)
Yeskey v. United States, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (illustrates role of clear statement and canons in Chevron analysis)