Gibson v. Texas Department of Insurance-Division of Workers' Compensation, 700 F.3d 227

Background

Gibson ran a workers’ compensation law domain at texasworkerscomplaw.com and was sent a cease and desist letter by the Texas DWC asserting § 419.002 of the Texas Labor Code prohibited his domain name use.
The letter targeted use of words Texas, Workers’ Compensation, and related identifiers in Gibson’s domain/name and materials.
Gibson filed suit in the Northern District of Texas alleging the statute violates First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments; district court dismissed some claims for failure to state a claim.
The district court dismissed Gibson’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims and declined to consider facial First Amendment challenge; Gibson appealed.
The court held the statute is content-neutral and not a prior restraint, remanding for further factual development on as-applied First Amendment challenges; other constitutional claims were affirmed as to their merits or dismissed.
The concurrence would reverse only to the extent of allowing further development of the First Amendment as-applied challenge.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is §419.002 a valid commercial-speech restriction under Central Hudson?	Gibson contends domainName may be commercial speech; regulation should be narrowly tailored.	Texas argues the law targets misuse of agency names and symbols to prevent confusion; it need not be least restrictive.	Remand for factual development; not decided as to commercial-speech validity on record.
Whether Gibson has an actionable First Amendment as-applied challenge	Domain name is expressive and not inherently deceptive; should be protected.	Statute may regulate misleading or deceptive speech.	As-applied challenge viable; district court erred in dismissing; remand for fuller record.
Whether Gibson's First Amendment facial challenge is ripe after as-applied ruling	Facial challenge pending; statute invalid on its face irrespective of application.	Favors deciding as-applied first; facial challenge premature.	Unnecessary to reach facial challenge before resolution of as-applied challenge.
Does the statute violate Equal Protection or Due Process?	Statute lacks rational basis or procedural safeguards for Gibson.	Statute rationally advances legitimate state interests in preventing misuse.	Equal protection and due process claims affirmed/upheld; due process found adequate procedural scheme.
Is the Takings claim ripe under the Fifth Amendment?	Regulatory action deprives Gibson of property value without compensation.	Ripeness requires final decision and compensation procedures.	Takings claim dismissed without prejudice for lack of ripeness.

Key Cases Cited

Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (U.S. 1976) (commercial speech protected but less so than noncommercial speech)
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (U.S. 1980) (four-part test for commercial-speech regulation)
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (U.S. 1994) (content-neutral regulations subjected to intermediate scrutiny unless viewpoint-based)
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (U.S. 2000) (content-neutral restrictions; safety concerns justify limits on speech)
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (U.S. 1977) (false, deceptive, or misleading speech exceptions to First Amendment)
Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2011) (distinguishes inherently misleading from potentially misleading advertising; informs Central Hudson analysis)
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (U.S. 1978) (solicitation risks; not directly controlling domain-name cases but contrasts with in-person solicitation)
Pruett v. Harris Cnty. Bail Bond Bd., 499 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2007) (importance of substantial record for Central Hudson analysis)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (factors for due-process protections in administrative actions)