George Wise v. Department of Transportation, 943 F.3d 1161

Project: Arkansas DOT and FHWA approved widening I-630 in Little Rock from six to eight lanes (≈2.5 miles), replacing bridges; DOT owned the 220–400 ft right-of-way and reported no additional permanent ROW required.
NEPA issue: FHWA concluded the I-630 project qualified for a categorical exclusion under 23 C.F.R. § 771.117(c)(22) for actions within the "existing operational right-of-way."
Plaintiff (Wise) filed suit and moved for a temporary restraining order to stop project work (including demolition of the Hughes Street Overpass); demolition proceeded after the district court denied emergency relief.
Key testimony: Arkansas DOT’s program administrator testified the "existing operational right-of-way" included areas disturbed or maintained for transportation purposes (traffic lanes, clear zones, mitigation, drainage, ramps—essentially property-line-to-property-line within the DOT-owned ROW).
District court found Wise failed to show any construction would occur outside the existing operational ROW and denied injunctive relief; Wise appealed the denial.
Eighth Circuit affirmed: applying the regulation’s plain language, the court held Wise failed to show the project exceeded the existing operational ROW or that FHWA’s categorical-exclusion determination was arbitrary or capricious.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the I-630 project qualifies for the § 771.117(c)(22) categorical exclusion because it occurs within the "existing operational right-of-way."	Wise: "Existing operational right-of-way" is limited to lanes, shoulders, and clear zones; new lanes/clear-zone expansions extend beyond that and thus require EA/EIS.	FHWA/Arkansas DOT: "Existing operational right-of-way" includes land disturbed or maintained for transportation purposes (mitigation, drainage, ramps, landscaping); project stays within DOT-owned ROW.	Court: Affirmed categorical exclusion—regulation’s plain language includes areas disturbed/maintained for transportation; Wise did not show project would extend beyond existing operational ROW.
Whether unusual circumstances (e.g., significant noise or air impacts) preclude use of the categorical exclusion.	Wise: Project will produce significant noise and air impacts and thus cannot be categorically excluded.	FHWA: No evidence agency acted arbitrarily in determining no significant impacts or unusual circumstances.	Court: Wise failed to show FHWA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious; categorical exclusion remains proper.

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (U.S. 1989) (NEPA prescribes procedural requirements, not substantive results)
Friends of Richards-Gebaur Airport v. FAA, 251 F.3d 1178 (8th Cir. 2001) (standards for agency categorical-exclusion determinations under NEPA)
Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (U.S. 2018) (orders with the practical effect of granting/denying injunctions treated as such for appellate jurisdiction)
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (U.S. 1974) (treatment of temporary restraining orders as preliminary injunctions when effect is equivalent)
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (U.S. 2008) (four-factor preliminary injunction standard)
Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981) (preliminary injunction standard in the Eighth Circuit)
Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 826 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2016) (abuse-of-discretion review for denial of preliminary injunction)
PCTV Gold, Inc. v. SpeedNet, LLC, 508 F.3d 1137 (8th Cir. 2007) (district-court abuse-of-discretion reversed when based on clearly erroneous facts or erroneous legal conclusions)