Genusa v. Asbestos Corp.
18 F. Supp. 3d 773
M.D. La.2014Background
- Genusa moves to sever and remand his state-law claims; magistrate recommends severance/remand while allowing BRMC’s claims against Unions to remain in federal court.
- Unions removed the action under § 1441(c), arguing LMRA § 301 preemption gives federal question jurisdiction over BRMC’s third-party claims.
- BRMC’s Third Party Demand seeks indemnity or contribution from Unions based on a contractual relationship to warn about asbestos exposure.
- Genusa’s claims are disputed as whether they are separate and independent from BRMC’s third-party claims, triggering § 1441(c)(2) remand analysis.
- The court analyzes admiralty jurisdiction, LHWCA preemption, and supplemental jurisdiction in deciding whether to sever/remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does BRMC’s Third Party Demand against Unions support removal under § 1441(c)? | Genusa argues BRMC’s claims are not removable or independent of state claims. | Unions contend LMRA § 301 preemption makes the claims removable as federal questions. | Yes; removal proper under complete preemption. |
| Are Genusa’s claims separable from BRMC’s third-party claims so they can be severed/remanded under § 1441(c)(2)? | Genusa claims are separate and independent from BRMC’s third-party demands. | BRMC argues relatedness keeps claims inseparable from the third-party action. | Genusa’s claims severable and remand warranted; BRMC’s third-party against Unions remanded. |
| Does the court have original jurisdiction over BRMC’s or Genusa’s claims via admiralty or LHWCA? | Genusa’s claims may be maritime or LHWCA-governed. | LHWCA preemption or admiralty could confer original jurisdiction. | No original admiralty jurisdiction or LHWCA-based jurisdiction; remand appropriate. |
| Does the court have supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367 over Genusa’s claims after removal? | Genusa seeks to invoke supplemental jurisdiction for related state claims. | Because removal rests on separate/independent third-party claims, supplemental jurisdiction should not extend. | No § 1367(a) supplemental jurisdiction exercised; remand appropriate. |
| Is BRMC’s removal under § 1441(c) proper given amendments to § 1441 and related authority? | Amendments affect the applicability of Heck’s separate-and-independent interpretation. | Amendments do not undermine complete preemption-removal rationale. | Removal authorized under current § 1441(c) framework; sever/remand follows. |
Key Cases Cited
- Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (U.S. 1995) (two-prong connection test for admiralty jurisdiction)
- Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (U.S. 1987) (contractual duty can yield preemption under LMRA § 301)
- United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (U.S. 1990) (duties arising from labor contracts can preempt state tort claims)
- Johnson v. Baylor Univ., 214 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 2000) (complete preemption as jurisdictional removal mechanism)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1987) (well-pleaded complaint rule excludes federal defenses from creating jurisdiction)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1985) (preemption analysis focuses on whether state claim defines contractual relations)
- Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (U.S. 1995) (explicitly adopts Grubart two-prong test for maritime connection)