*1 OF ELECTRICAL BROTHERHOOD INTERNATIONAL AFL-CIO, HECHLER WORKERS, et al. 26, May Argued January 1987 Decided No. 85-1360. *2 Blackmun, J., opinion Court, delivered the in which Rehn- quist, J., Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, C. O’Connor, Scalia, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., opinion filed an concurring part dissenting part, post, p. 865. argued petitioners.
Laurence Gold the cause for him With on Silberman, the briefs were David M. Cohen, Laurence J. Elihu I. and Richard Leifer, M. Resnick. . argued respondent. Perwin
Joel S. the cause for With Schlesinger. him on the brief was Sheldon J. opinion delivered the of the Court.
Justice
Blackmun
Corp.
(1985),
In Allis-Chalmers
I plaintiff-respondent Sally At all relevant case, times to this employed by Light Hechler was Florida Power and Com- (Florida Power) pany apprentice. as an electrical Petition- ers, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and *3 (collectively Union), its Local 759 referred to as the are bargaining representatives bargaining the exclusive for the respondent employed. January unit in which was On 11, assigned respondent job 1982, Florida Power to a an elec- required perform trical that her substation to tasks she al- leges beyond scope training experience. were of her and Shortly commencing assignment, respondent after her new injured highly was came into when she contact with ener- gized components at the substation. years respondent
Two later, sued the Union state court County, complaint, alleged in Broward Fla. In her she that “pursuant agreements to contracts and entered into and “pursuant between” Power, the Union and and Florida to the relationship by respondent, and between” the Union and duty respondent provided Union had a “was ensure that safety place place,” in her work work and a safe and to ensure required respondent that or “would not allowed to take performance her undue risks in the duties which were not training experience.” App. commensurate with her pursuant C. Union, to 28 U. S. removed the law- suit Court for to the United States District the Southern Dis- grounds “alleged duty that trict of Florida on the arises bargaining agreement solely alleged collective be- from the [the Union] Power,” Florida and therefore that tween §301. duty any under of this was actionable breach objection Respondent that time no Record 3. at raised the removal. complaint. court,
In the Union moved dismiss federal solely argued federal claim arose under It that untimely applicable under the stat- labor law and was federal Respondent at 66-70. conceded: Id., ute of limitations. [her] scope of the of care owed is deter- “The nature and bargaining agreement.” to the collective mined reference argued, however, that the basic nature of her Id., She common-law “suit tort” for the Union’s action was state negligence failing provide workplace. á her safe prayed Respondent that the case be remanded to 100-102. the state court. granted
The District Court the Union’s motion to dismiss. gravamen complaint The court observed that the of the was respondent had breached a of care to the Union workplace. “Significantly, duty alleg- provide her a safe edly bargaining [Hechler] owed to flows from the collective imposes duty agreement, [Union] on the which to monitor safety training App. of its members.” to Pet. for respondent Cert. 3a. The court concluded because had allegedly negligent [Union’s] that the failed “to demonstrate bargaining agreement activity unrelated to the collective employee-union beyond scope fiduciary relation- *4 pre-empted ship,” Id., her claim was federal labor law. governed by Having that suit was at 4a. found the law, federal the court then held that 6-month statute of adopted Teamsters, limitations in DelCostello v. 462 U. S. (1983), applied the suit case, 151 to Hechler’s dismissed untimely. as Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
The Court (1985). complaint It that the face 772F. 2d 788 ruled “on its negligence may cognizable a commonlaw claim that be states
855 in state is not court and the federal preempted by labor laws.” at 790-791. The court Id., concluded: “Though the be of use in [collective-bargaining] may defining duty owed, of the will turn on basic scope liability negligence as state at 794. principles developed by law.” Finding “federal labor law was not in invoked com- plaintiff’s at id., 799, the court directed plaint,” that the District Court remand the case to the state court for on the adjudication merits.
Because the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
to con
appeared
flict with the decision of the
Circuit in
Sixth
Mu
Michigan
tual
Ins.
Steelworkers,
Co. v.
“Suits employees industry affecting representing nization commerce as de- chapter, any organizations, may such labor fined this between brought any having jurisdiction of the district court of United States respect controversy regard parties, without to the amount or without 185(a). citizenship parties.” 29 U. S. C. *5 856 in Lincoln
209, that the Mills Court “understood 301 as a congressional body to the mandate federal courts to fashion disputes arising of federal commonlaw be used to address out of labor contracts.” long decided, after Lincoln
Not Mills was the Court held §301 jurisdiction that state courts have concurrent over Dowd, Courtney, claims. Charles Box 368 Co. v. U. S. 502 (1962). Although proceeded upon hy- the Court in Dowd pothesis apply they that state courts would federal law when §301 jurisdiction claims,2 exercised over it inwas another case that Term, same Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 (1962), expressly U. S. that the Court held that federal §301 adjudicating law, and not state must law, be used claims. There the Court observed: “The dimensions of 301 require principles the conclusion that substantive of federal paramount labor law must be in the area covered the stat- uniformity ute.” 369 S.,U. at 103. The need for this was clearly explained: possibility might
“The that individual contract terms meanings have different under state and federal law inevitably disruptive upon would exert a influence both negotiation agree- of administration collective party ments. Because neither could be certain of the rights process it which had obtained or conceded, the negotiating agreement immeasurably would made necessity trying more difficult to formulate con- provisions way tract in such a as to contain the same meaning systems might under two or more of law which someday enforcing be invoked the contract. Once the bargain possibility conflicting made, collective interpretation competing legal sys- substantive under Co., (1962), Teamsters v. Lucas Flour 2 See 369 U. discussing S. (1962). Courtney, Dowd, Charles Dowd Box Co. v. 368 U. In S. impliedly Court referred to state working courts as with the federal courts there management body “as evolves this field of labor relations that spoke.” federal common law of which Lincoln Mills *6 prolong disputes terns would tend to stimulate and as to interpretation.” its at Id., 103-104. § enacting Congress
The thus “in Court concluded that 301 in- uniformly prevail of tended doctrines federal labor law local over inconsistent rules.” in
While Court Lucas Flour observed that federal law paramount by” in “the area covered §301, S., 369 at U. range in 103, Allis-Chalmers the Court defined the of claims coming coverage. that should be considered as within that ordinary party case is a contract claim in which a collective-bargaining agreement expressly the provision asserts that a agreement g., has been violated. e. See, (claimby employer Flour, Lucas 369U. atS., that strike by provision collective-bargaining agree- union violated of ment). In Allis-Chalmers, however, the Court considered employee’s against employer state-law tort action his for handling disability-benefit payments bad-faith due under a collective-bargaining agreement, and concluded in- that the supporting interpretation terests the uniform of collective- bargaining agreements apply under federal common law equally in the context of certain state-law tort claims. The principle: Court set forth this basic interpretive uniformity predictabil- “The in interests ity require disputes that labor-contract be resolved require meaning reference federal law also that the given phrase subject a contract or term be to uniform interpretation. questions relating federal Thus, to what parties agreement agreed, legal ato labor and what consequences were intended to flow from breaches of agreement, must be resolved reference to uni- questions law, form federal whether such arise in the alleg- context of a suit breach of a contract suit ing liability Any in tort. other result would elevate parties form over substance and allow to evade the re- quirements by relabeling their contract claims as for tortious claims breach contract.” 471 S.,U. pointed out that if The Court state context law, of a meaning par- were action, tort allowed to determine the phrases collective-bargaining ticular or terms agreement, “all the evils addressed Lucas Flour would “parties they recur”; the would be uncertain as to were what binding collective-bargaining agreement, themselves to” in a agree- and, result, as “it would more difficult to reach disputes agreement ment, and as to the nature of the would *7 proliferate.” Ibid. applied
In Allis-Chalmers, the Court the rule that a tort “inextricably claim with intertwined consideration of the pre-empted terms of the labor contract” is §301, under U. S., 213, at and concluded that the claim in Allis-Chalmers category. employee’s allegation fell within that The there employer company was that his insurance its intention- ally required disability payments had failed to make under a plan negotiated collective-bargaining agreement, in a doing, they that, duty so had breached a state-law insurance good in’paying disability to act “in faith” benefits. Id., any at attempt 206. The Court observed li- assess ability part employer inevitably on the of the would involve interpretation underlying collective-bargaining of the con- disability plan adopted tract. First, the in the collective- bargaining agreement might implied itself have included requirement good employer by of faith that the breached its explained: “[I]t question The conduct. Court is a of federal interpretation obligation contract whether there was an provide payments under this labor contract timely manner, if and, so, whether Allis-Chalmers’ conduct ” implied provision. breached that Id., at 215. Sec- duty “good ond, under the relevant law, state faith” on plaintiff “intrinsically relate[d] which the relied to the nature concept existence contract.” 216. “good ‘“being duty obliga- faith” meant faithful to one’s quoting ibid., Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., tion/” 204 (1931), 1, 13, Wis. 235 N. and, W. under state primarily by analyzing law, that was determined responsibilities agreed insurer the written con- right tract. The Court reasoned: “Because asserted not only derives from the contract, but is defined the contrac- obligation good any attempt liability tual faith, to assess inevitably interpretation.” here will involve contract U. S., at Inasmuch as federal law must control the meaning given uniform contract terms a collective- bargaining agreement, employee’s however, an state-law necessarily interpretation tort action that rests on an of those pre-empted by terms is 301. Id., at 218-219.3
B principle Under the forth in set we Allis-Chalmers, must sufficiently independent if determine claim is agreement collective-bargaining pre- withstand emptive Respondent’s force of 301. claim state-law tort is allegation based on her that the Union owed a of care to provide workplace her with a safe and to monitor her work assignments they to ensure that were with commensurate experience. her skills and law, however, Under the common *8 employer, employees it is the not a labor a union, owes duty providing to exercise work- reasonable care a safe place. g., e. See, Keeton, W. R. & D. Keeton, Dobbs, D. (5th Prosser and Owen, Keeton on of Torts 569 ed. The Law 3 took Allis-Chalmers to define precise The Court care in the limits of its holding. that, The rule there set forth is a state-law claim is when sub stantially dependent collective-bargaining on analysis agreement, of a a § plaintiff may not pre-emptive by evade of 301 of LMRA the force the S., casting as a the suit state-law claim. 471 U. The Court em phasized, “In extending pre-emptive beyond § however: effect of 301 contract, suits for breach congressional it would be inconsistent with in conduct, tent that section pre-empt proscribe under to rules that state rights and obligations, independent establish of a labor contract.” 860 Freight Lines, 192 Wash. 146, v. Consolidated
1984); White law, as (1937). Florida case Under 359 358, 73 P. 2d 148, a duty “owes law, the employer common general under and work, safe reasonably place a furnish his employees 2 Fla. it safe.” keep diligence care and ordinary must use (foot- (1977) 343 154, p. Employment and 2d, Agency Jur. Berry, g., Putnam Lumber Co. e. 146 v. see, omitted); note (1941). also See 2 2d 137-138 133, So. 604-607, 595, Fla. (1981) fur- §440.56(1) . . . shall employer (“Every Fla. Stat. the employees safe for which shall be employment nish . . . safeguards safety and use devices furnish therein, protect reasonably necessary thing other every do of such employees”). health, safety life, course, as- union, may a such as labor Another party, accepting by towards employees a responsibility sume If a party arrangement. a contractual care through under Florida rule the settled duty, a contractual breaches an action for either may bring party law is that the aggrieved suffered as for the injuries or a tort action of contract breach g., e. v. See, breach. the contractual a result of Banfield Addington, 893, (1932); 897 140 So. 661, 669-670, 104 Fla. (1933) Clark, 850 848, Parrish 145 598, 603, 107 Fla. So. v. contract, or for (“[A]n arise for breach may action of a duty arising by tort committed violation the positive relation”); the contractual assumption out of Safeco Reynolds, 1984) (Fla. Title Ins. v. Co. 45, App. 452 So. 2d caused (it injuries principle general is “long-established of a contractual performance allegedly negligent action”). in- The threshold a tort through be redressed may is an examina- if of action exists a cause determining quiry were accepted what duties the contract to ascertain tion of Fla. duties. See of those and the scope each of the parties Wright, Vorndran (1982); 2d, Negligence p. Jur. not 1979) (architect’s did (Fla. App. 2d 1070 So. *9 safety regulations with ensure compliance include a to duty of action cause had no on the job injured and thus employee architect); against Co., Blair Schauer v. Construction 1979) (Fla. App. (summary judgment in 2d So. improperly granted genuine favor of architect when issue of alleged regarding architect’s contractual material fact existed construction). obligation supervise to complaint, respondent alleges precisely type In her this “pursu- tortious breach-of-contract claim. She asserts that agreements” ant to contracts and between the Union and agreements “to contracts and Power, Florida which beneficiary,” third-party Plaintiff the Union owed duty working respondent a to ensure her a safe of care envi- Having App. 4. assumed this under the ronment. collective-bargaining agreement, according Union— “by complaint negligent allowing [Hechler] then —was assigned dangerous be to work ... a location and environ- by failing provide ascertaining ment and her with or necessary training, experience, background, she had the and dangerous and environment,” education to work such negligent failing “provid[e] enforc[e] was further and/or safety regulations requirements pre- which rules, and would inadequate persons and clude such with insufficient back- experience, ground, training, such as the education, inherently being placed danger- in such an . . from Plaintiff,. working ous environment.” negligence significance
Respondent’s allegations assume only Union, fact, if—and if—the had assumed the complaint alleges The care that the the Union breached. collective-bargaining agreement the Union and Flor between ancillary agreements parties, those between Power, ida requirements safety working provisions contain on try apprentices could to base an on which Hechler electrical implied duty argument assumed care.4 Union collective-bargaining agreement “Safety” reads: provision in the on paramount importance, safety matter of shall employees “The is a consideration, employee required shall allowed or receive first and no *10 however, tort a liability, In order to determine the Union’s ascertain, first, whether the collective- court would have in fact an of care placed implied duty bargaining agreement Hechler on the Union to ensure that safe provided second, the nature and of that and, scope duty, workplace, what is, whether, extent, that and to Union’s re responsibilities by extended to the particular alleged in Allis- Thus, in case, her this as spondent complaint. Chalmers, it is clear that of contract “questions interpreta S., . . . underlie of tort 471 U. any finding liability.” tion The need for federal uniformity interpretation as AUis- here, terms therefore mandates Chalmers, from is respondent precluded evading pre force of 301 her claim as a tort emptive by casting state-law action.5 any performance
take undue risk in the of his duties which he or Fore- his Supervisor man or consider unsafe to himself or to fellow his workers. Su- pervisors strictly responsible and Foreman will be held for the enforce- working App. ment of safe rules.” 13-14. provision labor-management Safety also establishes a “Joint Commit- “responsible developing is recommending
tee” which an effective safety program employees by Agreement, including for all covered this changes present safety rules, conducting investigations or additions to necessary.” Id., accidents when deemed at 14. provision, present
A agreement second a side entitled Manner “The Apprentice An Electrical Will Work” states: recognized Apprentice “It is that an training Electrical is in under Jour- neymen qualified Journeyman. recognized to become a It is also that as he progresses in apprenticeship, qualified perform his he becomes produc- work, expected perform tive and will be Journeyman all the duties of a qualified which he has become to do. It is not the intention of the Com- pany Apprentice any type to use an on Apprentice of work which the has qualified perform not become through experience In training. this regard, Company require Apprentice on, will not to work climb through energized or work above carrying conductors more 500 volts than year during apprenticeship.” his first Court, respondent In her brief to this argues, time, for the first dependent her claim is not on an interpretation collective-bargaining agreement, because the may through Union’s of care to her arise inde- y
l—I HH—i If suit is treated SOI as a claim, court must determine whether her claim is time barred applicable pendent responsibilities placed upon state-law simply the Union virtue of relationship members, its with its rather as a than result of the collective- *11 agreement. bargaining Respondent for points Brief 15-19. Respondent alleged out that duty she that the Union a “pursuant owed her of care to agreements” contracts and entered into between the Union and Florida pursuant Power “and relationship by to the and between” Union the added). App. (emphasis Hechler. assuming respondent’s may Even that pleadings be liberally construed stating various, as place that unenumerated laws duty Florida a of care on provide workplace members, a union to a respondent safe for its effectively theory abandoned that in lower the courts we decline to consider the that, argument argued here. Hechler simply duty below the Union’s of care from by arose and was determined collective-bargaining agree- the third-party ment to she beneficiary. which was a In opposing the Union’s Court, in motion to dismiss the District Hechler conceded: “The nature and scope duty of by the of care owed Plaintiff is determined reference to the bargaining agreement.” collective 1 Record 98. She made no reference theory scope” to an duty alternative that the “nature and of the Union’s of may by care also be operating independ- determined reference to state law ently of collective-bargaining agreement. Although repeated the she her duty by “by statement that the of care owed Union her the arose virtue of parties the relationship bargaining [sic] and the agreement,” collective ibid., suggested “relationship” parties she never that the between the gave duty duty by rise a of care distinct from the created the collective- bargaining agreement. surprisingly, Court, relying Not the District on claim, “Significantly, duty alleg- Hechler’s formulation of her observed: the edly plaintiff bargaining owed to from agreement.” flows the collective App. for to Pet. Cert. 3a. appeal Appeals,
On
to the Court of
Hechler continued to characterize the
grounded
agreement.
of
collective-bargaining
Union’s
care as
the
presented
pre-
She described the issue
as
the federal labor laws
“whether
empt
against
negligence
a worker’s state common-law action
her union for
by
employer—
in breaching its
the union's contract with the
—created
plaintiff
properly
assignment.”
for
insure that the
trained
her work
added).'
(CA11),
Appellant
p.
(emphasis
Brief for
ii
No. 84-5799
See
id.,
1, 45,
also
mention
of
Again,
n. 47.
there was no
Hechler
the
might
existence
other
form alternative source of the
of
state law that
Appeals
proposition
the
duty.
accepted
Union’s
the
that
Un-
Court of
argues
The Union
federal law.
of limitations under
statute
“duty
only
characterized
as
claim can be
failing
against
representation”
Union for
the
claim
of fair
represent
the em-
properly
before
interests
Hechler’s
governed
the
ployer,
claim must therefore
her
prescribed by
period
DelCostello
of limitations
6-month
(1983).6 Respondent argues, how-
S. 151
Teamsters, 462 U.
“duty
representation” claim,
is
fair
ever, that her suit not
simply
her
as a
status
claim,
a 301
on
basis
is
but
third-party
agree-
beneficiary
collective-bargaining
collective-bargaining agreement,
duty of
would
from
ion’s
care
arise
may
that, “[t]hough the
use
de-
Heehler
be of
agreed
but
with
duty owed,”
essentially
a state-
the suit
remained
fining
scope
(1985).
788, 794
772 F. 2d
negligence.
law claim of
theory adopted by
Appeals
in her
Respondent repeated the
Court
Opposi-
petition in this Court. Brief
opposition to the Union’s certiorari
Court,
argued
she
8-9.
In her brief on the merits
this
tion
independent
subject
possibly was
to an
state-law
first time that the Union
care,
agreement, and aris-
collective-bargaining
duty of
unconnected
*12
if
a
relationship
to members. Even
such
ing simply from the
of a union
its
a
directly
responsibility
the
obligation,
regulate
which would
state-law
power
labor
workplace,
pre-emptive
in a
could survive the
of federal
union
respondent
present
in
law,
day
that it is too late
the
for
we conclude
legal theory.
impact
rule on
We decline to
the Court this newfound
pre-
when
relevance
law was neither
hypothetical state law
of such
below,
presented
in the re-
passed
to or
on
the courts
nor
to us
sented
sponse
petition
to the
for certiorari.
6
suit, consisting of a
DelCostello,
hybrid
In
the Court concluded that a
employer
duty-of-fair-representation
claim
against
§301 claim
an
charge,
fed
union,
practices
unfair labor
and that
against a
is similar
an
period
estab
courts
therefore borrow
6-month limitations
eral
should
10(b)
Act,
160(b),
§
29
in
the National Labor Relations
U. S. C.
lished
union
duty-of-fair-representation
A
claim arises when a
charges.
such
for
employee
grievance
procedure acts
represents an
in a
or arbitration
that
arbitrary,
“discriminatory, dishonest,
perfunctory”
fashion.
in a
(1967);
v. Anchor
S.,
Sipes,
v.
ment and the Union’s breach of duties assumed under that agreement.7 Appeals the District Court’s
The Court of did not review adopted holding period that the 6-month limitations governs that suit, Hechler’s because it concluded DelCostello pre-empted labor claim was not under federal appropriate Appeals believe it Court of law. We period instance, in the first whether the of limita- consider, adopted applicable in DelCostello is to Hechler’s claim. tions judgment Appeals The of the Court of for the Eleventh vacated, therefore is and the case is remanded to that Circuit proceedings opinion. court for further consistent with this
It is so ordered. Stevens, concurring part dissenting Justice part.
Respondent alleged nothing than a breach of the has more representation. of fair She has not Union’s federal alleged any specificpromise that the Union breached made augmented argument and her that Florida law has her, plainly pre-empted by representational fed- duties is Union’s suggestion “third-party that she is a benefi- eral law. collective-bargaining agreement ciary” the Union of the concept simply negotiated I on and executed her behalf a is rights that con- Whatever she has under do not understand. employer, against party rights against her tract are not negotiation. represented her claim her its Since may employer §801 employee bring against 7 An claim individual collective-bargaining agreement the union and between for violation (1962). Evening Assn., News Al Smith employer. 371 U. S. *13 duty-of-fair-representation against employees usually bring claims though supra, g., Sipes, e. claims, see, Vaca third- union rather than 301 their ordinarily right bring a claim have the party beneficiaries to a respondent’s right to The Union has not contested on the contract. based third-party benefi against it based on her status as a bring a 301 claim attempted to collective-bargaining agreement, although it has ciary to the duty-of-fair-representation as a claim. recast her suit duty-of-fair-representation against claim, her is a Union pre period complaint limitations the 6-month is barred Teamsters, decision DelCostello v. this Court’s scribed (1983).* Remanding the the Court of case to U. S. unnecessary. simply Appeals I would reverse is therefore Appeals judgment Dis the Court of and reinstate the complaint. dismissing the order trict Court’s respondent Court found that had sued the union “over *The District years injury.” App. her to Pet. for Cert. 5a. two after she sustained