Gay v. Shaffer, 3:16-cv-05998

Background

Plaintiff Omar Sharrieff Gay, a prisoner, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions arising from a September 2015 psychological diagnostic interview by Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) psychologists Amy Parsons and Gregory S. Goldstein while he was at CTF.
Gay alleges Parsons and Goldstein rated him as high risk for future violence because he is African‑American and Muslim and had previously refused evaluations, asserting equal protection and retaliation claims.
Gay separately alleged BPH Chief Psychologist Cliff Kusaj and Secretary Jennifer Shaffer ignored or mishandled his administrative appeals and complaints about the assessment.
The court conducted the required § 1915A screening of a prisoner civil rights complaint and liberally construed the pro se pleadings.
The court found Gay’s equal protection and retaliation claims against Parsons and Goldstein cognizable and dismissed the claims against Kusaj and Shaffer for failure to state a § 1983 claim.
The court ordered service on Parsons and Goldstein and set deadlines and notice requirements for dispositive motions, exhaustion challenges, and summary judgment practice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether psychologists’ assessment stating high risk because of race/religion states equal protection claim	Gay: assessment was motivated at least in part by his being African‑American and Muslim, so it is intentional discrimination	Psychologists (addressed implicitly): assessment was professional judgment, not discriminatory (defenses to be raised later)	Court: Liberally construed, allegations state an arguably cognizable § 1983 equal protection claim against Parsons and Goldstein
Whether the assessment constitutes retaliation because of protected status	Gay: being rated high risk was retaliatory because of his protected status and past refusals	Defendants (implicitly): actions were not motivated by retaliation; they were assessment-based	Court: Allegations also state an arguably cognizable retaliation claim tied to equal protection against Parsons and Goldstein
Whether BPH officials’ handling of grievances states a constitutional claim	Gay: Kusaj and Shaffer ignored/mishandled his appeals, violating § 1983	Kusaj and Shaffer: processing of grievances does not create constitutional rights (as a general legal rule)	Court: Dismissed claims against Kusaj and Shaffer — no constitutional right to prison grievance process; no § 1983 claim

Key Cases Cited

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990) (pro se pleadings must be liberally construed)
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (elements of § 1983 claim: violation of federal right by state actor)
Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998) (intentional discrimination based on protected class states equal protection claim)
Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff must allege defendant acted at least in part because of protected class to state equal protection claim)
Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396 (9th Cir. 1994) (retaliation in equal protection context requires showing acts deprived plaintiff of rights at least in part because of protected status)
Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2003) (no constitutional right to prison administrative appeal or grievance system)
Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1988) (same principle regarding grievances)
Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 1996) (state-created grievance system does not create due process liberty interest)
Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1993) (grievance procedures do not implicate due process liberty interest)
Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991) (right to petition does not guarantee a response or particular action)
Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rule 56 summary judgment notice requirements for pro se prisoners; Rand notice discussion)
Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (notice required when moving for summary judgment against pro se prisoner)
Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003) (procedural requirements for exhaustion motions; factual record development)
Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2012) (exhaustion motion notice requirements)
Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (overruled parts of prior exhaustion framework; cited regarding procedural posture)