Garland v. Morgan Stanley and Company, Inc.
996 N.E.2d 188
Ill. App. Ct.2013Background
- Consolidated appeals arising from a fatal airplane crash that killed four aboard; Garland (administrator of decedent Scott Garland) sues Morgan Stanley and Mark Turek for wrongful death and survival claims.
- Morgan Stanley employed Garland and Turek as financial advisers and allowed private aircraft use for business; no formal travel policy existed, and reimbursement for travel was discretionary.
- Turek, a licensed pilot, piloted the crash aircraft; there is debate whether Morgan Stanley’s involvement created a dual capacity liability separate from employer-employee duties.
- Plaintiff argued the exclusive remedy provision of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) did not bar the claims due to purposeful endangerment and a dual capacity theory.
- Trial court granted summary judgment/dismissals in favor of Morgan Stanley and Turek; Garland appeals asserting two exceptions to the exclusivity rule apply.
- Court affirms, holding the exclusive remedy provision bars the common law tort claims, and the dual capacity doctrine does not apply here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether exclusive remedy bars the common law claims | Garland argues exceptions apply (not accidental injury; dual capacity) | Morgan Stanley/Turek contend exclusive remedy bars all claims | Yes; exclusive remedy bars the claims |
| Whether the injury was not accidental under the Act | Injury not accidental due to willful conduct and policies | Injury remained accidental; no specific intent to injure | No; injury considered accidental; no specific intent shown |
| Whether the dual capacity doctrine applies | Morgan Stanley/Turek acted in a second capacity unrelated to employment | No distinct second capacity; duties intertwined | No; no separate legal persona; dual capacity not established |
| Whether Morgan Stanley’s conduct created a de facto air-transport operation | Company policy/reimbursement created independent travel entity | Record shows rare private flights; no de facto transport operation | No; record does not show a de facto air-transport operation |
Key Cases Cited
- Ocasek v. Krass, 153 Ill. App. 3d 216 (1987) (mere employer duties do not create a second persona)
- Sharp v. Gallagher, 95 Ill. 2d 322 (1983) (two-prong dual capacity test; separate legal persona required)
- Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, 77 Ill. 2d 313 (1979) (dual capacity requires a distinct separate legal persona)
- Fregeau v. Gillespie, 96 Ill. 2d 479 (1983) (exclusivity; co-employee liability limited by Act)
- Copass v. Illinois Power Co., 211 Ill. App. 3d 205 (1991) (specific intent to injure required to defeat accidental character)
- Ocasek (repeated), 153 Ill. App. 3d 216 (1987) (private travel by employer does not automatically create second persona)
- Murcia v. Textron, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 433 (2003) (limits on dual capacity applicability)
- Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill. 2d 455 (1990) (exclusive remedy balance; faultless employer liability)
- Rosales v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 41 Ill. App. 3d 787 (1976) (strict construction of exclusivity)