Garcia, Victor Martinez
2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1672
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2012Background
- The State sought discretionary review to determine if the common-law due-diligence requirement survived codification in Article 42.12, §24.
- The court of appeals applied the common-law due-diligence standard to a revocation motion, which the State contends is superseded by statute.
- The 2003 amendments added Article 42.12, §§ 21(e) and 24; §21(e) extends jurisdiction if a capias is issued before supervision ends, §24 creates an affirmative due-diligence defense.
- §24 limits the due-diligence defense to two alleged violations: failure to report as directed and failure to remain within a specified place.
- The trial court revoked community supervision based on a substance-abuse treatment violation and other violations; the defense argued delay in executing the capias.
- The Court held that the common-law defense was eliminated as to the two §24 allegations, but noted the revocation could be sustained on other grounds even if due diligence was lacking for those two violations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Article 42.12, §24 replace the common-law due-diligence defense? | Garcia argues common law still governs due diligence. | Garcia argues §24 provides the sole defense and supersedes common law. | Yes; §24 supersedes the common-law defense. |
| Is the due-diligence defense limited to two allegations under §24 in revocation actions? | State contends §24 applies only to two listed violations. | Garcia argues broader applicability under common law. | Limited to two specified allegations. |
| If the court erred by applying common law, should remand occur for other allegations? | State argues remand unnecessary because other grounds exist for revocation. | Garcia argues remand is required to apply §24 properly to all allegations. | Remand not required; revocation upheld on remaining ground. |
| Do the post-amendment provisions affect the validity of revocation where a treatment violation is implicated? | State asserts §24 does not bar reliance on non-listed violations. | Garcia contends due-diligence defense is unavailable for non-listed violations. | Yes; §24 defense does not apply to non-listed violations, so revocation valid on sole violation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Peacock v. State, 77 S.W.3d 285 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (common-law due-diligence doctrine origin; no statutory basis)
- Brecheisen v. State, 4 S.W.3d 761 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (burden-shifting due-diligence framework)
- Pena v. State, 201 S.W.3d 764 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (§24 applicability; consolidation of statutory defense)
- Stover v. State, 365 S.W.2d 808 (Tex.Crim.App.1963) (early context for jurisdiction and capias timing)
- Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (one valid ground supports revocation)
- Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (statutory interpretation guidance; legislative intent governs)