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Brecheisen v. State
4 S.W.3d 761
Tex. Crim. App.
1999
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*1 implement to “serve to cause it is intended jury, to Tex.Code pursuant instructs 3(a) (b), requirement,” Geesa is 87.07, § the constitutional Proc. art. & Crim. phase. It is guilt-innocence limited to the any proven offense must be extraneous punishmеnt phase inapplicable to the it could beyond a reasonable doubt before are Fields, convictions which any prior In as to at 688. be considered. S.W.3d Therefore, a contrast, with offered for enhancement. the instant case deals at that phase instruction of “reasonable doubt” reasonable-doubt whether definition There- required sponte. sua required is sua of trial is not punishment phase at the fore, Attоrney’s ground to de- District second jury is instructed sponte, when 12.42,1 Prosecuting At- termine, and the State to Tex. Pen.Code for review pursuant sus- for review should be torney’s ground are allegations the enhancement whether Thus, doubt. tained. beyond true reasonable give guidance can us some

while Fields only in foregoing, I concur Based on case, it to “dic- the instant cannot be said Ap- judgment reversing the Court in this decision. tate” the outcome pеals. Fields, As we stated set

The definition of reasonable doubt specifically applies

out Geesa trial; al- phase of

guilt-innocence

though the rules are not of constitutional ‍​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‍[they] se ... serve to per

dimension require- the constitutional

implement ment that a criminal conviction cannot BRECHEISEN, Appellant, Kathleen E. proof beyond a rea- except upon stand sonable doubt. of Texas. The STATE Fields, Geesa, (citing at 688 S.W.3d Winship, at 163 & In re 397 U.S. S.W.2d No. 0452-98. (1970)) 25 L.Ed.2d 368 S.Ct. Texas, Court of Criminal omitted). (internal quotation marks En Banc. contrast, purposes for enhancement at is not punishment stage, prosecution 27, 1999. Oct. required prove guilty to the defendant convictions al- prior each element of the previ- at the

leged; already that has done Rather, offenses.

ous trials for those beyond a

prosecution prove to the defendant on

reasonable doubt that named each

trial is the same defendant and, if alleged felony convictions alleged

applicable, that the order statutory re- comports with

prior offenses pertain The burden does not

quirements. trial, rather offense at but proving

to in- authority to establishing the ‍​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‍state’s Enhancement of punishment.

crease statute, rather

punishment is based on Be- mandate.

than on constitutional (Tex. grounds, Bell v. 994 S.W.2d 173 parte Augusta, 639 S.W.2d 481 1. See also Ex other Crim.App.1999). overruled (Tex.Crim.App.1982), *2 Denton, Zellmer, for appel- Joseph F. lant. defense, DA, Denton, plea in bar or Joosten, of due

Yolanda M. Assist. Austin, by a defendant аt the must raised Paul, Atty., for which be State’s Matthew hearing. revocation the State. defense, however, is not an

This *3 State, v. Rodriguez defense. affirmative 516, (Tex.Cr.App.1991). 804 S.W.2d WOMACK, J., opinion delivered the the burden of meets Once the dеfendant Court, MEYERS, PRICE, in which the due-diligence is by raising the production KEASLER, JOHNSON, HOLLAND, and hearing, the State at the revocation sue ‍​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‍JJ., joined. to show persuasion the incurs burden application in this case is the The issue Id.; Lang diligence. it due thаt exercised denial analysis a to the harmless-error (Tex.Cr. State, 553, 555 v. 800 S.W.2d ston probation-revoca- a of a motion to dismiss App.1990). the did not use

tion when State 12, 1991, case, the September on In this executing capiаs. in the We diligence due ap- the suspended imposition of trial court did not Appeals hold that the Court of placed and her sentence for DWI pellant’s analysis, and we properly apply such The years. on for two State probation judgment. reverse its 31, 1992, a motion to revoke on March filed 16, 1992, trial court issued April the and met for requirements Two must be But appellant’s for the arrest. capias a jurisdiction to re acquire a trial court to 4, 1993, did the State not until October The must file with voke State During capias appellant. on the serve the court, of the expiration the trial before the the the interim between issuance most оf probationary period, a motion to revoke it, the and the service capias alleges probationer that vio probation custody in in other had been appellant probation judgment. lated the terms of the of which charges, of Texas on new counties (Tex. State, 650, v. Guillot 543 S.W.2d The pro- officer was aware. probation her then, Cr.App.1976). The trial court must call telephone made one bation office had expiration probationary before unanswered, went appellant, which upon this mo period, capias issue based attempt did little to to locate but otherwise proba tion that orders the arrest of the her. tioner. Id. dismiss filed a motion to appellant The jurisdictional In addition to these motion, arguing probation-revocation required court is to use requirements, in diligence by the State exe- lack of due determining in and diligence hearing due urged her motion cuting capias. She motion. allegations in the revocation trial court hearing. The at the revocation (Tex.Cr. State, 34, 34

Harris v. 843 S.W.2d proba- and revoked her denied her motion to App.1992). The State is also tion, credit on her sentence gave but her executing capias diligence use due jails of confined in the for the time she was from the motion to revoke. that results capias was out- while her other counties State, Connolly 983 S.W.2d standing. Harris v. (Tex.Cr.App.1999) (quoting that found The Court (Tex.Cr.App. 35 n. 843 S.W.2d its to “wholly failed” to meet burden 1992)), previous opinions we disavowed State diligence due it exercised rеquirement of due show which we held the capias apprehending executing ele jurisdictional to be a third diligence trial court’s it affirmed the appellant, The lack but probation revocations. ment of ishment,” it was essential to them. judgment by applying harmless-error See 44.2(a). analysis. Tex.R.App. P. Rule And it cannot said that a defendant’s be substantial existing ease law does We understand rights the failure by were not affected to anаlysis not for harmless error provide give complete prose- effect to a defense to grant of a trial court’s failure to a mo- 44.2(b). P. Tex.R.App. cution. See Rule a motion to revoke for tion dismiss long So as the State’s failure to exercise diligence executing lack of due revo- revocation,3 is a defense to However, cation arrest warrant. under give the erroneous failure to effect to the case, this and fair- the facts of reason defense cannot be said to be harmless. harm- compel ness our decision to utilize analysis. less error The harm from reversible errors *4 State, 490, Brecheisen v. 958 S.W.2d 492 plain; appel that would is bar a retrial the 1997). (Tex.App. Worth The court - Fort lant if not for the error. would be free said, and in this presumed, first “Harm is remedy The standard for reversible error case, It found that the it is clear.” Ibid. provide appellant is to the with a new credit appellant harm to the was “denial of that is free from the error that proceeding custody” in in for the time she was the required reversal. Because the outcome cоunties, potential other and the “loss of a pro appellant’s probation-revocation reaped windfall” which should would have the trial ceeding depended upon court’s from a dismissal. Id. at 492-93. Because remedy on this is not ruling diligence, due granted appellant the trial court had A practical. new without the in custody, credit for the time she was in appellant’s error would result re whole,” appellant had been “ma[d]e probation. lease from her not to the convic error “did contribute deprive it punishment. tion or Nor did Supreme The United States Court Appellant right.” of a Id. at substantial remedy of for errors took this view the disсretionary granted 493.1 We review. that would retrial after reversal on bar in a that is similar to ours. appeal, case The conclusion is Appeals’ Court States, 434, 412 Strunk v. United U.S. 93 wrong on its face under either standard (1973), 2260, L.Ed.2d 56 the de S.Ct. in Tеx.R.App. for reversible error found in a 44.2(a) (b).2 prison was confined state fendant only did the trial Proc. & Not a federal officer that when he confessed to denying motion to dis court’s error he of a federal offense. When pun- guilty miss “contribute to the conviction or was beyond a adverted to stan- the court determines ‍​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‍reasonable 1. Here the Court dards for reversible error of both constitution- doubt that the error did not contributе dimension, al and non-constitutional which punishment. conviction or 44.2(a) (b). & error, defect, are found in Tex.R.App. Proc. (b) Any Errors. other Other opinion due The Court said earlier in its that irregularity, does not affect or varianсe that process required due State to exercise dili- disregarded. rights substantial must be warrant; gence executing an arrest opinion of a district court was cited as federal 738, State, Connolly v. S.W.2d 3.See case, аuthority. To resolve this it Id. at 492. 1999) (Keller, J., (ar concurring) (Tex.Cr.App. necessary pro- due is not to decide whether concerning the guing jurisprudence that the diligence. requires such due cess justi due-diligence questionable dеfense is fication); Rodriquez v. 992 S.W.2d 44.2(a) (b) provide: & 2. Rule J., (Mansfield, (Tex.Cr.App.1999) concur (a) appellate Constitutional Error. If the (arguing due-diligence defense ring) that the reveals constitution- record in criminal case basis). nо statutory The State makes has no subject that is to harmless error re- al error due-diligence requirement claim that view, appeals reverse a the court of must applied case. should not be in this punishment judgmеnt of or unless conviction diligence pursuing him for to exercise prosecute failed to government That case revoke motion to months, trial speedy denied the ten he was defendant only whether conсerned required by the Sixth Amend- which is could, from the revocation appeal attempted appeals ment. The court complain of the suf- adjudication, deferred by giving credit cure the error Strunk of the so-called ficiency of the evidence during for the time against his sentence held that no at 741. We defense. speedy denied a trial. which he had been deci- the district court’s appeal lies from reversed, holding that Supreme The Court Id. at 741. sion on that matter. remedy” for a violation “only possible speedy to a right Amendment Sixth not raise the issue of case also does This Id. at 93 S.Ct. 2260. is dismissal. a valid lack of due whether vio- distinguished speedy-triаl The Court lack Whether the defense to revocation. from violations of other Sixth lation legitimate diligence constitutes of due rights Amendment that could be remedied is an issue de- defense to revocation by рroviding rights those at a new hear- appropriate in an serves consideration “by defini- ing.4 The Court reasoned that (Keller, concurring). I case. Id. at 741 J. not be speedy-trial tion” a violation could judgment. concur the Court’s through a retrial without remedied *5 438-39, at

violation. See id. 93 S.Ct. 2260.

Similarly, probation- failure to dismiss a has

revocation when State cannot be

failed to show a new that would by hearing

remedied

permit the defense. Ap- hold that the

Because we Court finding that the trial court’s

peals erred

failure to motion to dismiss the State’s ‍​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‍Sally GRACE, Appellant, error, Ann

revoke was harmless we reverse judgments and the Appeals Court of v. court, and remand the case trial court with direсtions dismiss COLORITO, M.S., Janey motion to revoke L.P.C., Appellee. Reversed and remanded. No. 03-99-00143-CV. Texas, Court KELLER, J., concurring opinion filed a Austin. McCORMICK, P.J., and

in which MANSFIELD, J., joined. Oct. 1999.

KELLER, J., concurring delivered McCORMICK,

opinion in which P.J.

MANSFIELD, J., joined. Connolly 983 S.W.2d 738 did not address

(Tex.Crim.App.1999), we the State is

the issue whether by pro- be remedied public Amendment that could afford a 4. The Court listed failure to Strunk, trial, charges, viding rights at a new trial. jury, or those impartial notice of S.Ct. 2260. U.S. at compulsory process as violations of the Sixth

Case Details

Case Name: Brecheisen v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Oct 27, 1999
Citation: 4 S.W.3d 761
Docket Number: 0452-98
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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