879 F.3d 769
7th Cir.2018Background
- Baer murdered a woman and her four-year-old daughter, conceded guilt, and sought a guilty-but-mentally-ill (GBMI) plea that the trial court rejected; jury found him guilty and he was sentenced to death.
- Defense theory at penalty phase centered on Baer’s mental illness and the role of methamphetamine use as mitigation; experts testified about psychosis and long-term substance abuse, while prosecution presented conflicting evidence on contemporaneous methamphetamine use.
- At voir dire and trial the prosecutor repeatedly misstated the law (conflating GBMI and insanity), referenced victim-family desire for death, suggested life-without-parole might be abolished, and made inflammatory personal remarks; defense counsel largely failed to object.
- At penalty phase the court modified a statutory mitigating-factor instruction by omitting "or of intoxication" and later gave a separate voluntary-intoxication instruction; defense counsel did not object to either instruction.
- Baer raised ineffective-assistance claims in state post-conviction proceedings and federal habeas under Strickland/AEDPA; state courts rejected relief; the Seventh Circuit granted habeas relief limited to the penalty phase, affirming convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Baer) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to object to modification of statutory mitigating instruction (omitting "or of intoxication") and to voluntary-intoxication instruction | Omission and intoxication instruction foreclosed the jury from considering voluntary intoxication and related mental-health mitigation | Instructions were correct in isolation; intoxication evidence was contested and jury still heard link between drug use and mental illness | Court: Counsel ineffective for failing to object; state court unreasonably applied Strickland and prejudice shown; relief for penalty phase granted |
| Failure to object to prosecutor's conflation of GBMI and legal insanity during voir dire and closing | Prosecutor misled jurors about GBMI vs insanity, undermining mitigation and was never corrected; counsel's tactic to let prosecutor discredit himself was unreasonable | Defense strategy was deliberate: allow prosecutor to overreach and then correct law later; not deficient | Court: State unreasonably applied Strickland; counsel deficient for not objecting/clarifying; prejudice shown |
| Failure to object to victim-impact and other inflammatory prosecutorial comments (facts not in evidence, personal opinions) | Prosecutor repeatedly asserted victims' family wanted death, injected inflammatory personal remarks and speculative law changes about parole; counsel failed to preserve objections; cumulative effect likely changed sentencing | State argued many remarks were invited by defense or harmless in aggregate | Court: Pattern of misconduct was prejudicial in aggregate; counsel deficient for failing to object; undermines confidence in penalty verdict |
| AEDPA deference to state-court Strickland rulings on habeas | State courts reasonably concluded counsel not ineffective or no prejudice | Federal habeas review limited but permits relief when state decision was unreasonable under Strickland/AEDPA | Court: Under AEDPA, the Indiana Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland on instructional and prosecutorial-misconduct claims; habeas relief granted for penalty phase |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (sentencer must be able to consider any relevant mitigating evidence)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (federal habeas review of state-court Strickland rulings is highly deferential but not unreviewable)
- Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (jury instructions must be read as a whole; context controls juror understanding)
- Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (focus on what a reasonable juror could have understood the instructions to mean)
- Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (prosecutorial comments evaluated for due-process prejudice)
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (limits on victim-impact evidence but not a total ban)
- Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (false juror perceptions about parole eligibility can create reversible due-process error)
- Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (suppressed or unconsidered mitigation evidence can be material to sentencing)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (federal courts need not defer to every reasonable state-court interpretation of federal law on habeas)