Francisco Javier Gonzalez v. State
04-14-00709-CR
| Tex. App. | Aug 17, 2015Background
- Defendant (Francisco Javier Gonzalez) was stopped for an expired inspection sticker; Officer Carmona conducted the stop in Bexar County in 2011.
- Carmona asked about Gonzalez’s destination, ordered him from the vehicle, asked about criminal history, and ultimately discovered cocaine; Gonzalez moved to suppress.
- Trial court denied the suppression motion and also limited cross-examination of Officer Carmona about the effect of elapsed time on his memory.
- Appellant argues Carmona lacked specific, articulable reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop beyond the traffic purpose—Carmona’s claimed factors were (1) a “suspected drug house,” (2) appellant’s nervousness, and (3) suspected inconsistency in appellant’s route.
- Appellant also argues the traffic-stop purpose had concluded (warning/license returned) before Carmona began the narcotics inquiry, shifting the burden to the State to prove the continued detention was reasonable.
- Appellant contends the trial court’s restriction on cross-examining the officer about memory (delay between incident and trial) violated his confrontation/cross-examination rights and was not harmless given the State’s reliance on Carmona as its key witness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Officer Carmona had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop and investigate narcotics | Gonzalez: Carmona’s asserted bases were vague hunches (no personal observations of drug activity at the house; nervousness is weak; route inconsistency unarticulated) and thus insufficient | State: Totality of circumstances (officer experience, suspected drug house, nervousness, prior felony drug arrest, route inconsistency) justified prolongation | Trial court denied suppression; appellant contends denial was erroneous and asks this Court to reverse (trial court found reasonable suspicion but record flaws argued on appeal) |
| Whether the traffic-stop purpose had concluded before Carmona began investigatory questioning (timing of verbal warning) | Gonzalez: Record is silent as to when the verbal warning was given; absence of proof means State failed its burden to show seizure was reasonable | State: Questions about destination can be part of routine traffic stop; the stop was not yet complete when Carmona questioned Gonzalez | Trial court implicitly found detention lawful; appellant argues that finding is unsupported because the State failed to elicit timing of the warning and trial court’s written findings omitted this historical fact |
| Whether evidence obtained after the purported conclusion of the traffic stop was admissible (consent/search) | Gonzalez: Any questioning/search after the stop concluded required independent reasonable suspicion; lacking that, subsequent consent/search were tainted | State: Even if the stop had concluded, officer conduct was reasonable and comparable authority supports continued inquiry | Trial court allowed the evidence; appellant argues legal authorities distinguish his case and that Carmona did not follow steps to confirm suspicions before escalating detention |
| Whether limitation on cross-examination (effect of delay on officer’s memory) violated appellant’s rights and was harmless error | Gonzalez: Court prevented inquiry into witness’s memory impairment from passage of years; no ruling/adverse instruction was required to preserve; error was not harmless given reliance on Carmona as sole witness of the stop | State: Appellant failed to preserve error; even if preserved, any restriction was harmless under Shelby factors | Trial court restricted the questioning and denied suppression; appellant asks reversal/new trial, arguing restriction was not harmless because Carmona was the pivotal witness |
Key Cases Cited
- Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (nervousness and unsupported ‘changing story’ have limited probative value for reasonable suspicion)
- Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (prior arrests, deception, and recent criminal history can contribute to reasonable suspicion when supported by facts)
- Shelby v. State, 819 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (adopted Delaware v. Van Arsdall framework for harmless-error analysis of cross-examination limits)
- Virts v. State, 739 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (preservation of error when defendant establishes general subject matter intended for cross-examination)
- Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (U.S. 1986) (limits on cross-examination of bias are reviewed under harmless-error analysis)
- Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (once arrest/detention is shown to be warrantless, State bears burden to prove reasonableness)
- Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (appellate review affords deference to trial court’s historical fact findings but not to legal conclusions)
- Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (U.S. 1996) (questioning beyond traffic-stop scope requires consent or independent reasonable suspicion)