Gonzales v. State

See case details

Jimmy GONZALES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.

No. PD-0683-11

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 27, 2012

369 S.W.3d 851

and two other provisions. Of the other two, the Bill expressly made one applicable only in future PUC proceedings and the other in pending and future PUC proceedings.²⁹ Otherwise, Section 5 provided that the Bill should take effect immediately if it received a two-thirds vote in both houses of the Legislature,³⁰ which it did. Thus, Section 37.053(d) was expressly made effective immediately in all proceedings.

Applying the statute in this proceeding does not violate the Constitution. “The prohibition against retroactive application of laws does not apply to procedural, remedial, or jurisdictional statutes, because such statutes typically do not affect a vested right.”³¹ Immunity from suit is a matter of jurisdiction. Furthermore, “changes in the law that ... have little impact on prior rights[] are usually not unconstitutionally retroactive.”³² “A governmental entity cannot complain of a retroactive waiver of immunity, since all governmental immunity derives from the State, and a governmental entity acquires no vested rights against the State.”³³

Accordingly, we conclude that Section 37.053(d) applies in this case.

IV

Finally, the Authorities argue that their property falls within Section 37.053(d)‘s exception for “land owned by the state“. They concede, as they must, that they are not the State,³⁴ but they argue that because their immunity is derived from the State, they should share the exception. But the exception is based on ownership, not the source of immunity, and plainly, the State does not own the Authorities’ rail line. Moreover, if the exception applied to the property of every governmental entity with State-derived immunity, it would apply to all public land and would swallow the rest of the provision, denying it effect. We must presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to be effective.³⁵ Consequently, we cannot construe the exception to include the Authorities’ property.

* * *

For these reasons, we vacate the opinion and judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.³⁶

Tim Copeland, Cedar Park, for Appellant.

Patricia K. Dyer, Asst. D.A., Abilene, Lisa C. McMinn, State‘s Attorney, Austin, for State.

OPINION

KEASLER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KELLER, P.J., and WOMACK, HERVEY, COCHRAN, and ALCALA, JJ., joined.

Before trial, Jimmy Gonzales filed a motion to suppress asserting that his seizure violated the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Texas Constitution. The trial judge overruled the motion. The court of appeals affirmed and held the seizure was a reasonable exercise of the officer‘s community-caretaking function. Holding that Gonzales‘s motion to suppress was properly denied, we affirm the court of appeals‘s judgment.

Background

At the hearing, Abilene Police Department Officer Adam Becker testified that just before 1:00 a.m. on August 27th, 2007, while sitting at a red light, he observed Gonzales‘s vehicle pull off of the road and come to a stop on the shoulder just a short distance ahead. The area where Gonzales stopped was on the way out of town towards the neighboring town, with only a few businesses in the area, no houses nearby, and only light traffic passing by at that time of night. Believing the driver needed assistance, Officer Becker activated both his front-facing and rear-facing overhead red and blue lights to notify Gonzales that it was the police and not “some bad guy” who had pulled in behind him. As Officer Becker pulled onto the shoulder behind the vehicle, Gonzales began to drive away, but quickly stopped. Officer Becker stated that his sole reason for pulling in behind Gonzales was “to check on them, see if they had a flat tire, if everything was okay, if maybe they were lost” and “to see if he was ... having trouble, if he needed assistance. . . .”

Officer Becker contacted Gonzales and asked him if everything was okay. While speaking with Gonzales he noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle and that Gonzales‘s eyes were bloodshot and his speech was slurred. Officer Becker then began a driving-while-intoxicated investigation resulting in Gonzales‘s arrest for that offense.

The trial judge denied Gonzales‘s motion to suppress and concluded that, while Officer Becker “did not have a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed,” he “was concerned that the operator of the vehicle might need assistance” and that this belief was reasonable. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law supported by the record. Gonzales subsequently pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated and was sentenced and placed on community supervision for five years.

On appeal, Gonzales asserted that he was seized when Officer Becker activated his emergency lights and that his seizure was not a reasonable exercise of Officer Becker‘s community-caretaking function. The court of appeals held that the use of Officer Becker‘s emergency lights constituted a seizure, but that the seizure was permissible under the community-caretaking exception.¹ The latter holding is the subject of Gonzales‘s petition for discretionary review.

Discussion

A. Standard of Review for Suppression Motions

When reviewing a trial judge‘s ruling on a motion to suppress, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial judge‘s ruling.² When supported by the record, the trial judge‘s determination of historical facts are afforded almost total deference.³ Further, “courts afford the prevailing party ‘the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.‘”⁴ Almost total deference is afforded to a trial judge‘s ruling on mixed questions of law and fact that depend upon an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.⁵ But when mixed questions of law and fact do not depend on evaluation of credibility and demeanor, we review the trial judge‘s ruling de novo.⁶ All purely legal questions are reviewed de novo.⁷

B. The Fourth Amendment and the “Community Caretaking Function”

“The Fourth Amendment [of the United States Constitution] proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.‘”⁸ In Cady v. Dombrowski, the United States Supreme Court established what has become known as the “community-caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement in recognizing that police officers may contact citizens “and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”⁹ But even in light of this newly created exception, the Cady Court acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment requires only reasonableness.¹⁰

In recognizing the community-caretaking function as an exception, we stated in Wright v. State that “[a]s part of his duty to ‘serve and protect,’ a police officer may stop and assist an individual whom a reasonable person, given the totality of the circumstances, would believe is in need of help.”¹¹ However, “a police officer may not properly invoke his community caretaking function if he is primarily motivated by a non-community caretaking purpose.”¹² Whether an officer properly invoked his community-caretaking function requires a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the officer was primarily motivated by a community-caretaking purpose; and (2) whether the officer‘s belief that the individual needs help was reasonable.¹³

To determine the reasonableness of the police officer‘s belief that an individual needs assistance, we proposed a non-exclusive list of factors that courts may consider: (1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual was alone and/or had access to assistance independent of that offered by the officer; and (4) to what extent the individual—if not assisted—presented a danger to himself or others.¹⁴ While we have stated that the first factor is entitled to the greatest weight, it is not always dispositive.¹⁵ “A particular level of exhibited distress may be seen as more or less serious depending on the presence or absence of the remaining three factors.”¹⁶ However, the presence of unique circumstances “may swing the balance the other way.”¹⁷ As in all Fourth Amendment cases, the facts unique to each case control its result and, in cases involving the community-caretaking exception, may render certain Wright factors inapplicable or afford them varying weight. The Wright factors were intended to assist courts in determining reasonableness in this context; they are not elements of reasonableness.¹⁸

C. Analysis

Because neither party contests the court of appeals‘s holding that Gonzales was seized, we assume, without deciding, that Gonzales was seized under the Fourth Amendment. Gonzales petitioned this Court‘s review of the following issue: “When an officer undertakes a ‘community caretaking’ stop of a motor vehicle, but, prior to the stop, changes his mind about the need to investigate the driver‘s wellbeing, is a subsequent detention and arrest illegal?”¹⁹ We understand Gonzales‘s initial argument, as framed in his petition for discretionary review, to be that Officer Becker was not primarily motivated by a community-caretaking purpose. In support, he points to Officer Becker‘s statement that had Gonzales pulled away, rather than stopping or returning to the shoulder, he would have turned off his lights and—as the trial judge described in his findings—“not have tried to stop [the car] or pull [the car] over.” Even acknowledging Officer Becker‘s response to this hypothetical situation, the trial judge concluded that he was primarily motivated by his public-safety role. We see no reason to second-guess the trial judge‘s determination of an issue that is supported by the record and depends so much on credibility and demeanor.²⁰

Despite Gonzales‘s framing of this issue, the focus of his argument is whether Officer Becker‘s exercise of his community-caretaking function was reasonable, and it centers on the court of appeals‘s alleged misapplication of the Wright factors.

Gonzales asserts that, “Officer Becker‘s belief that [he] needed help was unreasonable because [Officer Becker] did not have sufficient information to reach that conclusion.”²¹

Officer Becker observed discernible indicia of distress upon seeing Gonzales pull off the highway around 1:00 a.m. Although he did not know the exact nature of Gonzales‘s distress, it was reasonable, based on the inferences from his observations and the circumstances surrounding Gonzales‘s stop, for Officer Becker to believe that when Gonzales pulled off the road at this hour he was experiencing distress—mechanical, health-related, or otherwise. In evaluating reasonableness in this context, courts have never required an officer to know, with any degree of certainty, the specific distress an individual may be suffering.²² Instead, the proper analysis—as cast by Wright—is an objective one focusing on what the officer observed and whether the inference that the individual was in need of help was reasonable. Additionally, these exhibited indicia of distress were compounded by Gonzales‘s location—the second Wright factor—which Officer Becker described as a fairly isolated area.

• It was not “heavily populated;”
• it was on the way out of town towards the neighboring city;
• there were no houses nearby;
• there were only a few businesses in the area; and
• there was minimal traffic on the highway at that hour.

The third and fourth Wright factors respectively weigh whether Gonzales was alone or had access to assistance apart from Officer Becker‘s and to what extent Gonzales, if not assisted, presented a danger to himself or others. The record is unclear whether Officer Becker knew, or could even see, how many people were in Gonzales‘s vehicle. But as to Gonzales‘s access to assistance, the record is clear that Gonzales‘s location, the time of night, and the light traffic passing by significantly limited his access to assistance.

The fourth Wright factor‘s application to these facts is less straight-forward. We find that this factor should be afforded little weight in light of the unique facts presented by this record. While Officer Becker witnessed indicia of distress, he was unaware of Gonzales‘s precise distress, much less whether the distress rose to a level of danger to Gonzales or others. As applied here, this factor would force us to assume that danger always accompanies witnessed distress. But in this case, Officer Becker could have reasonably concluded that Gonzales was suffering from distress resulting from car trouble, a flat tire, or running out of gas—a distress no less significant to an officer‘s function as a public servant.²³ Because of the factor‘s awkward fit to the circumstances as observed by Officer Becker at the time he seized Gonzales, it should be afforded little weight in this case.

Conclusion

We hold that Officer Becker reasonably exercised his community-caretaking function in seizing Gonzales because, under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable to believe Gonzales was in need of help.²⁴ Gonzales‘s motion to suppress was properly denied. We affirm the court of appeals‘s judgment.

MEYERS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which PRICE, J., joined.

JOHNSON, J., dissented.

MEYERS, J., dissenting in which PRICE, J., joined.

An officer cannot investigate to see if community caretaking is needed—he must actually observe a threat to the general public before he can investigate. The majority cites the following factors from Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 152 (Tex. Crim.App.1999), which it says are relevant to the determination of whether an officer acted reasonably in a community-caretaking stop: (1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual was alone and/or had access to assistance independent of that offered by the officer; and (4) to what extent the individual—if not assisted—presented a danger to himself or others. The majority says the fourth Wright factor “should be afforded little weight in light of the unique facts presented by this record.” However, the consideration of whether the individual presents a danger to himself or others is the crux of the community-caretaking function by the police. Here, (1) Appellant exhibited no distress at all; (2) he was located safely on the shoulder of the road at a time when there was very little traffic, so no possibility of danger to other drivers; (3) the officer could not tell if Appellant was alone, and; (4) he presented no danger to himself or others.

In order to invoke a community-caretaking role, an officer must observe activity that puts the well-being of the general public at risk. Someone who has safely pulled over on the side of the road may be looking at a map, talking on a cell phone, sending a text message, or picking up an item dropped on the floor of the car. I understand, of course, that he could also be having medical problems or car trouble. But here, Appellant gave no indication that he was in distress or needed help, and he had done nothing that should make the officer concerned for the safety of the general public. All the officer knew was that Appellant had briefly pulled over, at night, in an out-of-the-way location. The officer had no idea why Appellant pulled over. But, what the officer does not know cannot render the stop reasonable. The majority appears to convert the officer‘s ignorance into a rationale for saying that his caretaking concern was justified. The officer was investigating to see what Appellant was doing, without any reason to think that there was something wrong. That, quite obviously, is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The majority sets a dangerous precedent here by basically saying that an officer may investigate a person‘s harmless activities without observing any danger or distress.

However well-intentioned the officer was in this case, the community-caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment‘s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures should be reserved for circumstances in which police intervention is clearly necessary. Because no such circumstances existed in this situation, I respectfully dissent.

Notes

1

Gonzales v. State, 342 S.W.3d 151, 153-54 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011).

2

State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

3

Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

4

State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 241).

5

Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89.

6

Id.

7

Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 410; Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

8

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).

9

Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).

10

Id. at 439.

11

Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (emphasis in original).

12

Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

13

Id.

14

Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 151-52.

15

Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 277.

16

Id.

17

Id. at 277 n. 6.

18

Accord United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991) (“In community care-taking cases, as elsewhere, reasonableness has a protean quality. The term embodies a concept, not a constant. It cannot be usefully refined ‘in order to evolve some detailed formula for judging cases.‘“) (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 448).

19

Pet. for Discretionary Review 3; Appellant‘s Brief at 6.

20

See Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 277 (holding that, “The trial court, as the exclusive judge of credibility and finder of fact, could have concluded that [the officer] was primarily motivated by community caretaking concerns.“).

21

Appellant‘s Brief 10.

22

See, e.g., Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 278 (examining whether the “indications” of distress were sufficient); Kuykendall v. State, 335 S.W.3d 429, 435 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. ref‘d) (finding reasonableness in officers’ making contact “to make sure the driver is okay, make sure they are not having any kind of medical problem.... If they are broke down.“).

23

See A.B.A., Criminal Justice Section, Standards on Urban Police Function, 1-2.2 (2d ed. 1980), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_urbanpolice.html (“In assessing appropriate objectives and priorities for police service, local communities should initially recognize that most police agencies are currently given responsibility, by design or default, to: ... (c) facilitate the movement of people and vehicles ... (i) create and maintain a feeling of security in the community ... (k) provide other services on an emergency basis.“)

24

See Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 151.

29

House Bill 971 §§ 2(b) & 4.

30

Id. § 5.

31

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Estate of Arancibia, 324 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex. 2010).

32

Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126, 146 (Tex. 2010).

33

Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 345 (Tex. 2006).

34

Cf. Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 939-940 (Tex. 1993).

35

Tex. Gov‘t Code § 311.021(2) (providing that, when a statute is enacted, it is presumed that “the entire statute is intended to be effective“).

36

See Tex. R. App. P. 60.2(f).

Case Details

Case Name: Gonzales v. State

Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Date Published: Jun 27, 2012

Citation: 369 S.W.3d 851

Docket Number: PD-0683-11

Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.