Francisco Garcia-Mendez v. Loretta E. Lynch
788 F.3d 1058
9th Cir.2015Background
- Garcia-Mendez, a Mexican national who entered without inspection in 1989, conceded removability in 2002 and later sought cancellation of removal; he married a U.S. citizen in 2002 and separated in 2004.
- He was convicted in 2003 of offenses the immigration judge found to be crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs), which can bar certain relief absent a waiver.
- In 2007 Garcia-Mendez filed an I-360 seeking VAWA self-petitioner classification to obtain a §212(h) inadmissibility waiver; USCIS denied the I-360 for failure to show a good-faith marriage.
- He then applied for special rule cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(2) and argued he could seek a §212(h) waiver to cure the CIMT-based bar; the IJ denied relief and the BIA affirmed.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether special rule cancellation applicants may (a) be treated as VAWA self-petitioners for §212(h) purposes or (b) otherwise obtain a §212(h) waiver in conjunction with special rule cancellation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether applying for special rule cancellation makes one a VAWA self-petitioner (entitling §212(h) access) | Garcia-Mendez: special rule applicants are within VAWA self-petitioner scope or at least entitled to §212(h) | Government: VAWA self-petitioner is exhaustively defined and does not include §1229b(b)(2) applicants | Held: No — statute’s definition is exclusive; special rule applicants are not VAWA self-petitioners |
| Whether a denied I-360 nonetheless allows §212(h) relief | Garcia-Mendez: his I-360 filing or prima facie showing entitles him to seek §212(h) | Government: denial means he did not “qualify for” VAWA relief and §212(h) prerequisites unmet | Held: No — denial means he did not qualify; §212(h) unavailable on that basis |
| Whether §212(h)’s reference to “adjustment of status” includes adjustment resulting from special rule cancellation | Garcia-Mendez: §1229b(b) uses “adjustment of status,” so §212(h) should apply to special rule cancellation | Government: §212(h) ambiguity resolves against allowing §212(h) for cancellation applicants; §245-style adjustment is what §212(h) contemplates | Held: Statute ambiguous; BIA’s interpretation that §212(h) does not cover special rule cancellation is a permissible construction |
| Whether the BIA’s denial of §212(h) for special rule applicants is lawful under Chevron deference | Garcia-Mendez: BIA misread precedent and VAWA’s ameliorative purpose demands broader reading | Government: BIA’s published decision (Y-N-P-) is reasonable and entitled to deference | Held: Defer to BIA; its interpretation is not arbitrary or contrary to statute; petition denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (agency deference framework)
- Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (application of Chevron to immigration decisions)
- National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (deference even if court might prefer different reading)
- FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (interpretation of statutory ambiguity by context)
- Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (presumption that identical words have same meaning across statute)
- Wilderness Society v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 353 F.3d 1051 (standard for arbitrary and capricious review)