Fountain v. Arizona, State of, 2:21-cv-00356

Plaintiff Brittney Fountain alleges her supervisor, Jason McClelland (ADOC), sexually assaulted and harassed her; several other female employees also reported misconduct by McClelland.
Fountain sued McClelland and Warden Jeffrey Van Winkle under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Equal Protection) and the State under Title VII; the Court previously granted leave to amend the Equal Protection claim.
In the First Amended Complaint (FAC) Fountain alleges Van Winkle had actual knowledge of McClelland’s conduct, verbally supported McClelland, threatened Fountain for speaking about the matter, did not reprimand/suspend/terminate him, allowed a lateral transfer, and accepted a voluntary resignation.
Van Winkle moved to dismiss arguing the FAC fails to plead purposeful sex-based discrimination by him and that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court found the FAC’s factual allegations sufficient to plausibly infer Van Winkle’s knowledge and conscious failure to redress harassment and denied the motion to dismiss, also rejecting Van Winkle’s qualified immunity defense at this stage.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of § 1983 Equal Protection claim (supervisor liability)	Fountain: FAC alleges Van Winkle knew of multiple reports, supported McClelland, threatened Fountain, and failed to discipline him	Van Winkle: allegations are conclusory; an investigation occurred, McClelland was investigated, transferred, and resigned — no purposeful discrimination	Court: FAC alleges enough nonconclusory facts to plausibly infer Van Winkle had knowledge and failed to redress harassment; claim survives dismissal
Qualified immunity	Fountain: right to be free from workplace sexual harassment and supervisor liability for inaction is clearly established under Ninth Circuit precedent	Van Winkle: no clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rule for sexual harassment by supervisors; minimal guidance	Court: Ninth Circuit precedent (e.g., Bator, Sampson, Alaska) makes the right clear enough; complete inaction/punishing victim is not objectively reasonable — qualified immunity denied

Sampson v. County of Los Angeles by & through Los Angeles County Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 974 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2020) (sexual harassment is gender-motivated and supports Equal Protection liability)
Bator v. State of Hawai‘i, 39 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1994) (supervisory liability for workplace sexual harassment; right clearly established)
Alaska v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 564 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2009) (supervisor violates Equal Protection by punishing victim or failing to protect her)
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (U.S. 1982) (qualified immunity standard)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (two-step qualified immunity framework)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (legal conclusions not assumed true for pleading)
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (U.S. 2002) (officials can be on notice of constitutional violations even in novel factual circumstances)
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (U.S. 2011) (clearly established law requirement for qualified immunity)
Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986) (supervisor liability for failing to protect employees from abusive conditions)