Flagg Ex Rel. J. B. v. City of Detroit
827 F. Supp. 2d 765
E.D. Mich.2011Background
- Tamara Greene was killed in Detroit on April 30, 2003; her minor children sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging obstruction of the homicide investigation by City of Detroit and former Mayor Kilpatrick, causing denial of access to the courts.
- Plaintiffs seek damages under § 1983 for the alleged deliberate interference with the investigation that would have allowed a wrongful death action against Greene's killer.
- Defendants City of Detroit and Kilpatrick moved for summary judgment in September 2010; the court held a hearing on October 5, 2011 and issued rulings thereafter.
- The court adopts the Harbury/ Swekel framework for denial-of-access claims, requiring proof of a moving-force policy or direct personal involvement, beyond mere investigative laxness.
- The court analyzes whether Kilpatrick personally interfered or approved interference, and whether City policy or custom caused the alleged denial; finds no such proof.
- The court grants summary judgment for Kilpatrick and for the City, and denies plaintiffs' supplemental motions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kilpatrick personal liability for denial of access | Kilpatrick directly or through approval interfered with Greene investigation. | No evidence tying Kilpatrick to any interference; involvement insufficient for §1983 liability. | Kilpatrick receives summary judgment; no triable evidence of direct/approved interference. |
| City of Detroit liability under Monell | City policy/custom caused the obstruction of the Greene investigation. | No shown deliberate indifference or moving-force policy linking City actions to denial of access. | City granted summary judgment; no policy or custom shown to cause the harm. |
| Use of 404(b) evidence to infer a plan by Kilpatrick | Evidence of Kilpatrick's involvement in Deputy Chief Brown's removal shows a plan to interfere with investigations. | Rule 404(b) bars such propensity-based inference and intrudes on admissibility; cannot prove plan. | 427 cannot rely on 404(b) to establish Kilpatrick's involvement; summary judgment affirmed. |
| Adverse inferences from discovery spoliation | Destroyed emails and missing materials support an inference of municipal responsibility. | Adverse inferences do not establish a municipality-wide policy or the requisite deliberate indifference. | Adverse inferences do not defeat summary judgment for City; no triable issue. |
Key Cases Cited
- Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (U.S. 1997) (rigorous causation standard for municipal liability under §1983)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (local government liability requires policy or custom as moving force)
- Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (U.S. 1986) (official policymaking authority can create municipal policy liability)
- Harbury v. City of, 536 U.S. 403 (U.S. 2002) (denial-of-access claims require concrete evidence of obstruction of litigation)
- Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1989) (conspiracy proof requirements and limitations on inferences)
- Becker v. ARCO Chemical Co., 207 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (404(b) analysis; dangers of propensity inference)
- Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2009) (standard for admissibility and sufficiency in §1983 cases)
- Lucas v. United States, 357 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2004) (propensity inferences and evidentiary limits in trial practice)