Fincher v. Town of Brookline, 26 F.4th 479

Deon Fincher was hired in 2009 as a Laborer in Brookline's DPW Sanitation division (one of two Black employees in a ~70 person division); Laborer duties included regular lifting/throwing of trash and advancement required a CDL, which Fincher did not have or seek.
Fincher suffered repeated right-shoulder injuries from throwing trash between 2009–2013, received successive medical restrictions (eventually permanent-like limits on lifting/throwing), and spent periods on workers' compensation leave.
The Town assigned Fincher light-duty tasks at times, convened accommodation meetings in 2014–2015, and ultimately Commissioner Pappastergion terminated Fincher on May 13, 2015 after concluding he could not perform essential job functions with or without accommodation.
Fincher applied for and later received accidental disability retirement benefits retroactive to April 9, 2015 (prior to his termination), stating he could no longer perform essential Laborer duties.
Fincher sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging race-based discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause for the Town’s alleged refusal to accommodate him while accommodating a white coworker; the district court granted summary judgment for the Town.
The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Fincher failed to show a similarly situated comparator or pretext for discrimination, and that the Town offered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether pre-termination conduct is timely/considerable	Fincher argued earlier acts form a continuing violation culminating in the 2015 termination	Town argued only termination is timely actionable	Court applied continuing-violation doctrine and considered pre-termination acts as background to timely claim
Whether Fincher identified a similarly situated comparator	Fincher pointed to K.G., a white sanitation worker who was transferred off packer duties	Town argued K.G. had a CDL and different circumstances making him not similarly situated	Court held K.G. was not similarly situated (key difference: CDL and eligibility for different positions)
Whether Town's reasons were pretextual (McDonnell Douglas)	Fincher argued Town’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons mask racial animus; pointed to other alleged incidents of departmental racism	Town presented legitimate reasons: inability to perform essential functions and attempts at accommodation; Fincher voluntarily sought disability retirement	Court found no evidence of pretext sufficient to defeat summary judgment
Municipal §1983 liability standard	Fincher relied on Monell theory tying Commissioner Pappastergion’s decision to municipal policy/custom	Town noted legitimate policymaker acted based on medical restrictions/operational limits	Court accepted §1983 as proper vehicle (Commissioner has final policymaking authority) but found no constitutional violation proved

Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under §1983 requires action pursuant to official policy or custom)
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (pre-termination acts may be considered as background under continuing-violation doctrine)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination cases lacking direct evidence)
Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1989) (standard for identifying similarly situated comparators)
Poy v. Boutselis, 352 F.3d 479 (1st Cir. 2003) (federal law governs accrual of §1983 claims)
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989) (state statute of limitations applies to §1983 claims)
Alston v. Town of Brookline, 997 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2021) (elements of equal protection discrimination analysis)
Cordi-Allen v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245 (1st Cir. 2007) (summary judgment is appropriate when no reasonable jury could find comparator prong met)