Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for P. R. v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc.
598 U.S. 339
SCOTUS2023Background
- Congress enacted PROMESA (2016) to address Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis and created the Financial Oversight and Management Board (the Board) as an “entity within the territorial government.”
- PROMESA empowers the Board to approve/enforce fiscal plans, supervise borrowing, and represent Puerto Rico in Title III debt-restructuring (bankruptcy-like) cases; Title III incorporates the Bankruptcy Code’s express abrogation of sovereign immunity.
- Centro de Periodismo Investigativo (CPI) sought public records from the Board under Puerto Rico law; after the Board did not comply, CPI sued in the U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico seeking injunctive relief to compel disclosure.
- The Board moved to dismiss invoking sovereign immunity; the District Court denied the motion, and the First Circuit affirmed, holding PROMESA (particularly §2126(a)) abrogated the Board’s immunity.
- The Supreme Court assumed (without deciding) that Puerto Rico and the Board enjoy sovereign immunity, and held PROMESA does not unmistakably abrogate that immunity: PROMESA neither explicitly strips immunity nor creates causes of action against the Board outside Title III, and its jurisdictional and anti‑liability provisions are compatible with continued immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (CPI) | Defendant's Argument (Board) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether PROMESA abrogates the Board’s sovereign immunity generally | PROMESA’s judicial‑review scheme and provisions show Congress intended to subject the Board to suit | PROMESA does not say it abrogates immunity (except Title III); no clear congressional statement | Held: PROMESA does not unmistakably abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity outside Title III |
| Whether §2126(a) (forum/jurisdiction clause) constitutes a clear‑statement abrogation | §2126(a)’s command that “any action against the Oversight Board…shall be brought” in the D. Puerto Rico demonstrates clear intent to permit suits | §2126(a) merely prescribes a forum for suits that might proceed if immunity is waived or abrogated by other laws; it is not an abrogation | Held: §2126(a) is not an abrogating clear statement; jurisdictional provision alone is insufficient |
| Whether §2126(c), §2125, and §2126(e) (judicial‑review timing and liability limits) show intent to waive immunity | Those provisions presuppose suits against the Board and would be pointless if the Board were immune | These provisions are compatible with immunity: they address timing, limit monetary recovery if other statutes permit suit, and block Ex parte Young bypasses | Held: These provisions do not demonstrate unmistakable abrogation; they operate even when immunity is otherwise waived or abrogated |
Key Cases Cited
- Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Congress must make unmistakably clear statement to abrogate sovereign immunity)
- Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (abrogation requires unequivocal declaration)
- Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991) (jurisdictional provisions alone do not amount to abrogation)
- Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Congress can authorize suits against states when it creates a cause of action)
- Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (statute authorizing suits can effect abrogation where necessary to enforce rights)
- Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782 (2014) (treatment of tribal immunity and abrogation principles)
- Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011) (clear‑statement rule applied where statutes are susceptible to multiple interpretations)
- Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247 (2011) (discussing Ex parte Young and limits on using individual suits to evade sovereign immunity)