931 F.3d 830
9th Cir.2019Background
- Diaz-Quirazco, a Mexican national, was arrested after violating an Oregon Family Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) restraining order (no-contact provision) and pled guilty to contempt of court; he received jail time, a fine, and supervised probation.
- DHS initiated removal proceedings; Diaz-Quirazco conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal under INA §1229b(b)(1)(C).
- The IJ denied cancellation as barred by conviction for violating a protection order under INA §1227(a)(2)(E)(ii); the IJ applied a modified categorical analysis to find the state judgment matched removable conduct.
- The BIA dismissed his appeal, holding: (1) the contempt judgment satisfied the INA definition of “conviction” (8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(48)(A)) because the proceeding was criminal in nature and afforded safeguards; and (2) the categorical approach need not be applied to §1227(a)(2)(E)(ii); instead IJs should assess whether the state court determined the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct (as in Matter of Obshatko / Medina-Jimenez).
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether Chevron deference applies to the BIA framework and whether the contempt judgment qualifies as an INA “conviction,” and whether Diaz-Quirazco is therefore ineligible for cancellation.
Issues
| Issue | Diaz-Quirazco's Argument | Government/BIA Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the categorical approach applies to determining ineligibility under §1229b(b)(1)(C) for violations of protection orders under §1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) | Categorical approach should apply because §1229b(b)(1)(C) uses the word “convicted,” which generally triggers Taylor/Descamps analysis | BIA: §1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) focuses on conduct not conviction; categorical approach unnecessary; agency’s published framework is reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference | Court defers to BIA under Chevron and upholds BIA’s Medina-Jimenez/Obshatko framework (no categorical approach required) |
| Whether §1101(a)(48)(A) requires the underlying proceeding be labeled a crime under state law to be an INA “conviction” | Contempt judgment isn’t a crime under Oregon law, so it cannot be an INA conviction | BIA: label is not dispositive; a “formal judgment of guilt” may qualify if the proceeding is criminal in nature and includes constitutional safeguards; this interpretation is reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference | Court defers to BIA and holds the contempt judgment qualifies as a “conviction” for INA purposes |
| Whether remand to the BIA is required because Medina-Jimenez/Obshatko issued after the BIA decision | Remand necessary for the BIA to apply its new framework and reconcile precedent | Government: no remand; IJ/BIA effectively performed the required conduct-based analysis and record was complete | Court denies remand, finds BIA and IJ already addressed the necessary evidence and legal steps; petition denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (U.S. 1984) (framework for judicial deference to reasonable agency statutory constructions)
- Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 545 U.S. 967 (U.S. 2005) (agency interpretation entitled to deference even if court would read statute differently)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1990) (categorical approach for defining predicate offenses)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (U.S. 2013) (limits and application of the categorical and modified categorical approaches)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (U.S. 2013) (conviction as the statutory trigger for immigration consequences and categorical approach context)
- Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (U.S. 2015) (discussion of conviction-focused categorical approach rationale)
- Szalai v. Holder, 572 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2009) (Ninth Circuit holding that violation of Oregon FAPA stay-away provision is removable conduct)
- Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpretation of §1229b cross-referencing listed offenses rather than whole statutes)