Farmer v. State, 281 A.3d 834

Background

Michael Farmer pleaded guilty in 2002 to two first-degree murders committed when he was 17 and, after breaching a plea agreement, was sentenced to two consecutive life terms with the possibility of parole.
Because of the consecutive life terms and an additional consecutive 10-year sentence for assault, Farmer will not be parole-eligible until many years into his incarceration (roughly under 35 years depending on diminution credits).
Farmer filed a motion under Maryland Rule 4-345(a) arguing his sentence is illegal because Maryland does not provide State-furnished counsel for parole hearings, allegedly denying juvenile lifers a “meaningful opportunity” for release required by Eighth Amendment juvenile-sentencing jurisprudence.
The Circuit Court denied the Rule 4-345(a) motion; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Farmer petitioned for certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
The Court of Appeals held Farmer’s claim is not cognizable under Rule 4-345(a) because lack of State-furnished counsel does not inhere in the sentence itself; it distinguished Carter v. State (which found a Governor-based defect could inhere in a sentence).
The Court declined to resolve whether the Juvenile Restoration Act (JUVRA) renders Farmer’s claims moot, noting open questions about JUVRA’s application and preserving other remedies (e.g., declaratory judgment) for an appropriate time.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether lack of State-furnished counsel at future parole proceedings makes Farmer’s sentence "illegal" and thus cognizable under Maryland Rule 4-345(a)	Farmer: No appointed counsel will deprive him of a meaningful opportunity for release, turning his life-with-parole sentence into de facto life without parole	State: Rule 4-345(a) is limited to illegality that inheres in the sentence; counsel availability is an administrative/procedural matter, not part of the sentence	Court: Not cognizable under Rule 4-345(a); assistance of counsel is not an element that inheres in the sentence
Whether this claim is like Carter v. State (Governor’s parole role) and therefore cognizable	Farmer: Parallels Carter — procedural/parole defects can make a sentence illegal	State: Carter concerned the identity/authority of the final decisionmaker (Governor), which was an element of the legal regime; counsel availability is not equivalent	Court: Distinguished Carter; Carter’s defect inhered in the sentence because the Governor’s role was part of the law annexed to the crime; counsel access is not similarly "baked into" the sentence
Whether JUVRA or other developments moot Farmer’s claim	Farmer: JUVRA’s application to aggregate/consecutive sentences and availability of counsel is uncertain; claim may still have bite	State: JUVRA (and other reforms) may provide a meaningful release mechanism, potentially mooting the Rule 4-345 claim	Court: Declined to decide mootness; left open that JUVRA and other remedies may affect future relief and noted unresolved statutory/regulatory questions

Key Cases Cited

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Eighth Amendment bars death penalty for juvenile offenders)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment forbids life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates Eighth Amendment)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller errors must be given retroactive effect; states may provide meaningful opportunity for release through parole or other mechanisms)
Carter v. State, 461 Md. 295 (2018) (Maryland parole laws, regulations, and an executive order addressed constitutional defect tied to Governor’s parole role)
Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460 (2007) (Rule 4-345(a) narrow: not a vehicle for belated appellate review of trial/sentencing procedures)
State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170 (1999) (parole-commission misconduct or procedural defects do not inhere in the sentence and are not cognizable under Rule 4-345(a))