EX PARTE Stacey LOVINGS, 480 S.W.3d 106

In 1998 J.L. reported a sexual assault; a sexual-assault kit was collected and the investigation was closed that month for lack of prosecution by the complainant.
A DNA profile from the assault kit was analyzed in 2004 but that profile was not uploaded to CODIS until October 2013.
Lovings’s DNA was uploaded into CODIS around 2000–2001 as part of an unrelated conviction; a CODIS match to the 1998 kit occurred October 15, 2013.
The State indicted Lovings for the 1998 sexual assault in 2014; Lovings filed a pretrial habeas application arguing the indictment was barred by the 10-year statute of limitations (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 12.01(2)(E)).
The State argued the no-limitation exception in article 12.01(1)(C) applies when biological matter is tested and results show the matter does not match the victim or any person whose identity is readily ascertained.
The trial court denied habeas relief; the court of appeals affirmed, holding article 12.01(1)(C) applied and the indictment was timely.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Lovings)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether article 12.01(1)(C) applies when an investigation was previously closed	"Investigation" requires an ongoing/open investigation; the investigation was closed in 1998 and not reopened until the 2013 CODIS hit	"Investigation" needs no temporal modifier; the statute covers investigations in which biological matter was collected and tested, regardless of prior closure	Court: "investigation" need not be read to mean "open/ongoing"; do not add modifiers to statute; article 12.01(1)(C) can apply here
Whether a person whose DNA was in CODIS (Lovings) was a person "whose identity is readily ascertained" at the time of testing	Lovings: his identity could have been readily ascertained earlier because his DNA was already in CODIS; the State had a duty to search/match earlier	State: statute applies unless testing results match the victim or any person whose identity was readily ascertained at time of testing; no statutory duty imposed to search earlier	Court: "readily ascertained" means actually ascertainable "without delay or difficulty"; statute uses "ascertained," not "ascertainable," and does not impose an affirmative diligence/search duty on the State; article 12.01(1)(C) applies

Ex parte Doster, 303 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (limits on pretrial habeas as extraordinary remedy)
Ex parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (statute-of-limitations claims may be raised pretrial when they bar prosecution)
Ex parte Tamez, 38 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (pretrial habeas review of limitations issues affecting jurisdiction)
Ex parte Dickerson, 549 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (defect barred by limitations renders indictment incurably defective)
Harris v. State, 359 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (rules of statutory construction)
Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (courts must give effect to clear statutory language)
Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (purpose of statutes of limitation)