Eva Moore v. John Urquhart, 899 F.3d 1094

Background

Tenants Moore and Shaw were served with a writ of restitution under Wash. Rev. Code § 59.18.375 after falling behind on rent; no hearing was held before the writ issued.
§ 59.18.375 is a statutory summary eviction procedure (nonpayment only) that permits a landlord to obtain a writ without a hearing unless the tenant pays into court or files a sworn denial; the notice does not advise tenants of a right to request a hearing.
Plaintiffs sued the King County Sheriff (who enforces writs) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that § 375 is facially unconstitutional for allowing eviction without a pre-deprivation hearing; the Sheriff removed the case to federal court.
The district court dismissed with prejudice, concluding § 375 requires a hearing in all cases (thus plaintiffs failed to state a claim); the State was invited to intervene but the district court decision preceded that appearance.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit found Moore and Shaw had Article III standing and their claims fit the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" mootness exception; the court rejected the district court’s statutory reading and reversed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing	Moore & Shaw faced imminent eviction under an active writ, so they had Article III standing.	Sheriff contends plaintiffs lack standing (and some added plaintiffs lacked standing).	Moore & Shaw had standing at filing; two later-added plaintiffs lacked standing.
Mootness / "Capable of repetition, yet evading review"	The eviction process is too short for full federal review and plaintiffs are likely to be subject again, so the case is not moot.	Sheriff argues plaintiffs could raise the constitutional claim in state eviction proceedings, so it does not evade review.	Exception applies: the short duration of § 375 proceedings and reasonable expectation of repeat injury keep the dispute justiciable in federal court.
Statutory interpretation of § 59.18.375	§ 375 authorizes eviction without a mandatory pre-writ hearing; tenants need to pay into court or file sworn denial to stop immediate issuance.	District court held § 375 requires a hearing in all cases; Sheriff does not defend that reading on appeal.	§ 375 does not mandate a pre-writ hearing; it creates a summary, nonpayment-only procedure permitting issuance of a writ without a hearing (although a tenant may request one).
Proper remedy / cause of action	Plaintiffs seek injunctive/declaratory relief against the Sheriff to enjoin enforcement (Ex parte Young).	Sheriff argues relief must be via § 1983 and that plaintiffs failed to state a § 1983 claim.	Ex parte Young suffices to seek prospective relief against the Sheriff; § 1983 does not displace Ex parte Young here.
Judicial immunity and FCIA (1996 amendment to § 1983)	Plaintiffs contend the Sheriff, an executive officer executing writs, is not protected from injunctive relief by the FCIA.	Sheriff claims judicial/quasi-judicial immunity (and FCIA limits injunctive relief against judicial officers) bars relief against him.	FCIA limitations do not extend to an executive-branch sheriff executing writs; he is not entitled to immunity from injunctive or declaratory relief here.

Key Cases Cited

Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (standing analyzed at time of filing)
Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (future injury must not be speculative)
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (lesser likelihood required to avoid mootness than to establish standing)
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (equitable relief to enjoin enforcement of unconstitutional state statutes)
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (common-law judicial immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against judges)
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (limits of Rooker-Feldman doctrine)
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (definition of judicial acts)