108 F. Supp. 3d 279
E.D. Pa.2015Background
- Randolph Tyler's property at 656 North 54th Street was seized via a civil forfeiture based on Officer Liciardello's affidavit, despite his criminal charges and barred testimony in criminal cases.
- Tyler was deceased and his estate had not been raised when the forfeiture proceeding commenced and capitalized on a default judgment and a lis pendens against the Property.
- The District Attorney's Office allegedly misrepresented that an estate had been raised, and proceeded with the forfeiture without proper representation for Tyler's estate.
- Property was sold for $5,500 in December 2012, after a notice letter was sent to ‘Occupant’ but before the estate was raised in April 2013.
- Tyler's Estate, raised in 2013, filed a 2014 federal suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City, the DA's Office, Dupree, and Grossman alleging violations related to the use of Liciardello's evidence and due process.
- The District Attorney’s Office and individual defendants moved to dismiss; the court granted in part and denied in part, with the City’s judgment on pleadings motion denied and leave to amend granted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the District Attorney’s Office a proper §1983 defendant? | Estate contends the DA’s Office is suable under §1983. | Third Circuit law bars suit against Bucks County DA’s Office as a proper entity. | DA’s Office is dismissed with prejudice. |
| Are Dupree and Grossman liable in their official capacities? | Estate asserts official-capacity claims against Dupree/Grossman survive. | Because the DA’s Office isn’t suable, official-capacity claims fail. | Official-capacity claims against Dupree and Grossman dismissed. |
| Does res judicata bar the Estate’s claims? | Res judicata should not bar in-personam claims arising from the same transaction. | PA res judicata bars later actions on same cause of action. | Res judicata does not apply; conditions for bar not satisfied. |
| Are Dupree and Grossman entitled to prosecutorial immunity? | Dupree’s notice/serving process and Grossman’s supervision are not protected by absolute immunity. | Notice initiation and supervisory actions are protected if closely connected to judicial process. | Dupree: absolute immunity for notice; Dupree’s failure to inform is not protected; Grossman: not absolutely immune for supervisory conduct tied to non-trial administrative action. |
| Are supervisory/municipal liability claims viable against Grossman and the City? | There were policies or customs allowing improper use of evidence; Monell claim viable. | No final policymaker; claims fail or lack policy/custom proof. | Grossman’s supervisory liability dismissed; Monell claim against City survives for pleading and may be amended. |
Key Cases Cited
- Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139 (3d Cir.1997) (DA’s Office not a §1983 entity; distinguishes in rem vs in personam actions)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (Supreme Court 1976) (prosecutorial immunity for initiating/prosecuting; initiates absolute immunity framework)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (Supreme Court 1993) (rejects extreme scope of immunity; protects acts intimately associated with judicial process)
- Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (Supreme Court 2009) (supervising prosecutors may be immune where acts are closely connected to trial)
- Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202 (3d Cir.2008) (administrative duty to inform court not protected by absolute immunity)
- Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313 (3d Cir.2011) (aftermath of Odd; clarifies administrative vs advocacy functions for immunity)
- Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir.1991) (prosecution and in rem civil forfeiture contexts related to immunity)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (Supreme Court 1976) (prosecutorial immunity for initiating a prosecution)