Estate of Tyler ex rel. Floyd v. GrossmanEstate of Tyler ex rel. Floyd v. Grossman
OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
This litigation arises from the civil forfeiture of property that belonged to the late Randolph Tyler. According to the allegations in the Complaint, the property was seized based on the report of Philadelphia Police Officer Thomas Liciardello, who was then under investigation for criminal charges and whose evidence and testimony had been barred by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office from use in criminal cases. This policy did not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings, and Tyler’s property was seized. Despite the fact that Tyler was deceased and his estate had not been raised, representatives of the District Attorney’s Office proceeded with the civil forfeiture case, a default judgment was entered, and Tyler’s property was sold for pennies on the dollar. Tyler’s Estate, which was raised after the sale of the forfeited property and which is the plaintiff in this action, has brought various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, and two Assistant District Attorneys (Clarence Dupree, the ADA who prosecuted the civil forfeiture case on behalf of the Commonwealth, and Beth Grossman, chief of the Public Nuisance Task Force Unit and Dupree’s supervisor), alleging that the use of Officer Liciardello’s affidavit of probable cause to initiate the civil forfeiture proceedings while simultaneously barring similar evidence from criminal cases set in motion a series of events which resulted in several violations of its constitutional rights.
II. BACKGROUND
On March 30, 2009, Randolph Tyler died. At the time of his death, he owned the property located at 656 North 54th Street (the “Property”), but he left no will or written instructions regarding its disposition. Compl. ¶¶ 16-18.
In February 2010, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office allegedly instituted a policy and practice of rejecting the evidence and testimony of City of Philadelphia Police Officer Thomas Liciardello in state court criminal cases, declining to bring prosecutions based on his reports. Id. ¶ 11. The City, the District Attorney, and several high-ranking officials allegedly agreed to keep the reasoning underlying that policy secret from the public. Id. ¶ 15. Officer Liciardello and several of his associates subsequently were arrested and tried in this District on numerous criminal charges. Id. ¶ 22.
On August 2, 2010, 491 days after Tyler’s death, the District Attorney’s Office commenced a civil drug forfeiture proceeding against the Property. It was based solely on an affidavit of probable cause prepared by Officer Liciardello’s on February 22, 2010, and approved by his superior. Id. ¶¶ 10, 19-20. The affidavit contained details regarding criminal activity at the Property and had been used to support a criminal case. It contained no allegations that Tyler himself had been involved in any of the alleged criminal activity; indeed, he had been deceased for 330 days when the alleged criminal activity took place. Id. ¶21. As Tyler was deceased, and at the time the civil forfeiture action was commenced his estate had not been raised and no legal representative was present to act on his behalf, neither he nor anyone else was served a copy of the drug forfeiture complaint. Id. ¶¶ 23-25. The civil forfeiture case was assigned to Defendant Assistant District Attorney Clarence Dupree, who appeared several times between June 2011 and April 2012 before the Court of Common Pleas in the forfeiture proceeding. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28. A lis pendens was filed against the Property at the start of the proceeding, indexed under “Randolph Tyler, 656 North 54th Street, Philadelphia, PA.” The lis pendens could not be served on the deceased Tyler, but neither was it served on anyone else. Id. ¶¶ 31-32. Instead, notice of the drug forfeiture action was mailed to the Property. Id. ¶ 33. Shortly thereafter, the Estate alleges that Dupree was personally informed that Tyler was dead and did not have an estate, and though the District Attorney’s Office could have raised an estate itself under Pennsylvania law, an unknown individual in the District Attorney’s Office misinformed the state forfeiture court that an estate had been raised. Id. ¶¶ 34-36.
Over the course of the civil forfeiture proceeding, the following notations were made on the court’s docket sheet:
Sept. 9, 2010: “Rep failed to appear.”
Oct. 26, 2010: “Estate.”
Mar. 1, 2011: “Advertisement,” “Interest.”
June 9, 2011: “Status of estate.” The action was stayed by Kerry Parsnap, Court of Common Pleas Commissioner.
Jan. 23, 2012: “Status of Estate.” The action was further stayed by Kerry Parsnap, Court of Common Pleas Commissioner.
Apr. 9, 2012: Default judgment was granted allowing the forfeiture to be “index[ed] ... under RANDOLPH TYLER.” .
Id. ¶¶ 37-40, 42-43, 45. By the time the default judgment was entered, the underlying criminal action — brought based solely on the evidence and testimony contained within Officer Liciardello’s affidavit of probable cause — had been withdrawn. Id. ¶44. The District Attorney’s Office did not advertise the default judgment or notify any of Tyler’s prospective heirs. Id. ¶ 47.
On October 2, 2012, 177 days after the entry of default judgment in the forfeiture proceeding, Defendant Assistant District Attorney Beth Grossman, chief of the Public Nuisance Task Force Unit, personally sent a letter addressed to “Occupant” at 656 North 54th Street advising that “this property has been forfeited by the District Attorney’s Office.” Id. ¶ 49. On December 10, 2012, the District Attorney’s Office sold the Property to an individual, Jeff R. Cater, for the sum of $5500, far less than its value. Id. ¶ 50. The Plaintiff alleges that the $5500 received for the Property “is part [of] a multi-million dollar proprietary forfeiture enterprise by Defendants CITY and DISTRICT ATTORNEY that has netted them nearly $100,000,000.00 in the past 15 years.” Id. ¶ 53. Tyler’s Estate was ultimately raised on April 23, 2013 (nearly five months after the sale of the Property), when Kevin Floyd, Tyler’s son, was issued Letters of Administration by the Register for the Probate of Wills, Office of Register of Wills of Philadelphia County. Id. ¶ 4.
The Estate, by and through. Floyd as Administrator, filed an action in this Court on August 26, 2014, alleging five claims: (1) failure to supervise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and District Attorney’s Office; (2) failure to supervise under Section 1983 against the City, District Attorney’s Office, and Grossman; (3) denial of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution against all Defendants; (4) unlawful taking of property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution against all Defendants; and (5) excessive and disproportionate punishment and fines in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See id. ¶¶ 58-72.
The District Attorney’s Office, Dupree, and Grossman (the “D.A. Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss on September 29, 2014. In it, they contend that the Estate’s claims cannot prevail because: (1) the claims are barred by res judicata; (2) the District Attorney’s Office is not an entity capable of being sued; (3) Dupree and Grossman cannot be sued in their official capacities; (4) Dupree and Grossman are absolutely immune from suit in their individual capacities; (5) the Estate has set forth insufficient facts to establish a claim for supervisory or municipal liability; and (6) the Estate’s due process claim is time barred. See D.A. Defs.’ Mot. at 4-9. The Estate responded on October 17, 2014, arguing: (1) the D.A. Defendants have not carried their burden to show that res judi-cata attaches in this case; (2) the District Attorney’s Office is amenable to suit; (3) Dupree and Grossman can be sued in their official capacities; (4) Dupree and Gross-man are not entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in their individual capacities; (5) the. Estate has pled sufficient facts to plausibly state a claim for supervisory/municipal liability; and (6) the due process claim is timely under either the
Following argument, the Court directed the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the res judicata issue. See ECF No. 20. The Defendants together filed a joint supplemental brief on April 30, 2015, and Tyler’s Estate filed its response on May 11.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss
To survive a motion to dismiss, a claim “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
B. Judgment on the Pleadings
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “[j]udgment will only be granted where the moving party clearly establishes there are no material issues of fact, and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp.,
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Claims Against the District Attorney’s Office
The D.A. Defendants argue that the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office is not an appropriate defendant in this case because it is not an entity that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See D.A. Defs.’ Mot. at 6-7 (citing 53 Pa. Stat. § 16257). While the Estate invites this Court to follow Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia,
The Estate has brought claims against Dupree and Grossman in their official capacities as Assistant District Attorneys.
C. Res Judicata
The parties dispute whether res judicata applies to bar the Estate’s claims. “[T]he preclusive effect of prior cases are determined by the law of the prior forum.” Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta,
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that res judicata “bars a later action on all or part of the claim which was the subject of the first action. Any final, valid judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction precludes any future suit between the parties or their privies on the same cause of action. Res judicata applies not only to claims actually litigated, but also to claims which
For res judicata to apply, Pennsylvania courts require that the two actions share the following four conditions: (1) identity of the thing sued upon or for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties or their privies to the action; and (4) identity of the capacity of the parties to sue or be sued. R & J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Auth.,
The Defendants argue that the first and second conditions are satisfied because the Complaint “relates to the propriety of the underlying forfeiture proceeding” and because the “the subject matter and the ultimate issues are the same in both proeeed-ings.” Defs.’ Supp. Br. at 8-9 (quoting Tobias v. Halifax Township,
The Court agrees with the Estate’s argument on this point. “It sometimes happens that out of the same transaction there arise rights both in personam and in rem. In such case, a judgment in rem does not merge the action in person-am on the original claim, and does not constitute a bar to an action thereon.” Matternas v. Stehman,
As to the identity of the capacity of the parties to be sued, the Defendants argue only that the condition is satisfied because Floyd was, in their view, party to the forfeiture case and the administrator here. See Defs.’ Supp. Br. at 13. But no estate had been raised at the time of the forfeiture proceeding, and no estate had been raised when the Property was sold. The Estate therefore had no capacity to sue or be sued at the time of the forfeiture proceeding, as it did not exist. Although Floyd did, eventually, become the Estate Administrator, he was not such during the entire span of the civil forfeiture proceedings. Moreover, the Defendants make no argument respecting their own capacity to be sued in both matters. Because the claims against Dupree and Grossman in their official capacities have been dismissed, as well as the claims against the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, all that remains are the claims against Dupree and Grossman in their individual capacities and against the City. As the City was not a party in the forfeiture (the plaintiff, as stated above, was the Commonwealth), its capacity to be sued here necessarily cannot be identical, because it was not involved as a party in the civil forfeiture. Furthermore, Dupree and Gross-man’s official-capacity roles in the forfeiture proceeding do not give rise to a bar under res judicata for claims against them in their individual capacities here. See Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square,
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Defendants have not borne their burden to show that res judicata applies, and the motions on this ground shall be denied.
D. Prosecutorial Immunity
Defendants Dupree and Grossman argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity for any action they took in initiating, maintaining, and prosecuting the civil forfeiture proceeding to its conclusion. See D.A. Defs.’ Mot. at 5-6. The Estate asserts that Dupree’s failure to serve process is an unprotected ministerial function and that Dupree’s failure to inform the forfeiture court of the fact that Tyler had no estate was an abdication of his duty to disclose, which was an administrative act not entitled to immunity. See PL’s D.A. Opp’n at 13-14. It also argues that Grossman’s actions taken as part of her supervisory and administrative duties are entitled only to qualified, not absolute, immunity. See id. at 10-13.
A prosecutor’s entitlement to absolute immunity is not automatic. Dupree and Grossman bear a “heavy burden” to establish the right. Odd v. Malone,
Analysis of prosecutorial immunity questions is a two-step process. First, the court “must ascertain just what conduct forms the basis for the plaintiffs cause of action.” Schneyder,
1. ■ Sale of the Property
As an initial matter, the Court concludes that any of Dupree and Gross-man’s alleged actions attendant to and involving the allegedly illegal sale of the Property “involve[s] administrative duties, for which [they are] not entitled to absolute immunity.” Giuffre v. Bissell,
2. Clarence Dupree
The Estate argues that Dupree is not entitled to absolute immunity for the following conduct: first, his failure to ensure that service of process was made upon the Property’s owner at the outset of the forfeiture proceeding; and second, his “repeated failure” to inform that forfeiture court over the course of the proceedings that Tyler did not have an estate raised. See Pl.’s D.A. Opp’n at 13-14. The Defendants argue that any actions Dupree took were performed pursuant to his judicial or quasi-judicial functions as an advocate for the state. See D.A. Defs.’ Mot. at 5-6. The Court addresses each of the Estate’s arguments in turn.
a. Service of Process
The Estate contends that Dupree initially “failed to ensure that service of process was made upon ... the in rem’s owner,” which, it argues, is a ministerial function not entitled to immunity.' PL’s D.A. Opp’n at 13. While in their briefing the Defendants did not address the service of process issue specifically in the immunity con
Although not precedential here, Smith v. Power,
Here, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, on whose behalf Dupree acted when he sent the notice of the initiation of the forfeiture proceedings, is authorized to prosecute a civil forfeiture under state law. By sending the notice of the proceedings, Dupree was acting as an advocate of the Commonwealth. The Court does recognize that the filing of the notice in Smith was a condition precedent to the “initiation of a lawsuit” under Illinois law — the action explicitly protected in Imbler was one “preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution.” The notice here, by contrast, was sent subsequent to the filing of the civil forfeiture petition in state court — it was, for all intents and purposes, the second step of the proceedings. But this is merely a distinction without a difference. See Buckley,
b. Failure to Inform
The Third Circuit’s decision in Odd v. Malone,
Odd was a consolidated appeal of two cases in which prosecutors had obtained bench warrants to detain material witnesses whose testimony was to be used in murder prosecutions. In the relevant appeal, Nicole Schneyder was a no-show witness in the Commonwealth’s attempts to convict a defendant of first-degree murder. She was arrested for failure to appear and detained when she failed to post bail. At the time, the judge directed the ADA to notify him of any delays in the criminal prosecution. Schneyder alleged that the judge made clear he intended to release her in the event of a continuance and that the ADA acknowledged the judge’s instruction. Less than a week later, the trial was continued for more than three- and-a-half months. The ADA did not notify the detaining judge, and Schneyder remained incarcerated. Her family hired an attorney, who learned of the detaining judge’s admonition to the ADA to notify him of any continuances in the criminal prosecution. The attorney notified the judge, and Schneyder was released, forty-eight days after the prosecution was continued. Odd,
Schneyder sued the District Attorney’s Office and the ADA under Section 1983. The Third Circuit described the omission giving rise to Schneyder’s suit as a failure .to notify the detaining judge that the criminal case had been continued, and also as an omission to “inform[] the court about the status of a detained witness.” Id. at 212-13. The ADA’s duty to advise the judge of these facts “required no advocacy on her part.” Id. at 213. The court added that because of the continuance in the criminal proceeding, the ADA’s “failure to act occurred during [a] period of judicial inactivity” — a fact that “cast[] serious doubt on [her] claims that her actions were ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the litigation.’ ” Id. at 213-14 (emphasis added) (quoting Imbler,
The Odd/Schneyder duet control here. As alleged in the Complaint, Dupree was the “sole government official in possession of the relevant information,” i.e., the fact that Tyler had no estate at any time throughout the civil forfeiture proceeding. Id. at 334. The Estate alleges that Dupree was personally and promptly informed of Tyler’s death and the lack of an estate shortly after the notice of the forfeiture action was mailed to the Property. Compl. ¶ 33-34. The fenc
3. Beth Grossman
The Court now considers whether Grossman is entitled to absolute immunity for her alleged supervision of Dupree in his actions throughout the forfeiture proceedings.
The Supreme Court recently analyzed allegations of Section 1983 violations against supervising prosecuting officials and whether they invoke the protection of absolute immunity. In that case, Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,
The Third Circuit, reviewing Van de Kamp in Sehneyder, recognized that if the Supreme Court had allowed the Van de Kamp suit to proceed, such a ruling would
In the Complaint, the Estate alleges that Grossman “personally supervised and reviewed” all of Dupree’s actions in the forfeiture proceedings, and that Dupree “did not take any actions without [her] prior knowledge, approval and participation.” Compl. ¶ 27. Further, it alleges that from June 2011 through April 2011, Dupree made appearances in the forfeiture proceeding “under [Grossman’s] direct supervision, knowledge and acquiescence.” Id. In light of the Third Circuit’s analysis of Van de Kamp in Sehneyder, this Court finds that Grossman’s alleged actions were, like Dupree’s, administrative in nature and are not subject to absolute immunity. Under Van de Kamp, a supervising prosecutor is not liable for his actions relating to a particular trial when the trial prosecutor himself is absolutely immune from suit because both parties’ actions are closely associated with the judicial process. The logical corollary of that argument, then, is that when a trial prosecutor is not absolutely immune from suit as a result of his engaging in administrative action which is not itself protected by absolute immunity (because it involves no discretionary or advocative component and is unrelated to the trial), the prosecutor responsible for supervising and training that trial prosecutor is similarly not absolutely immune from suit for her conduct in sanctioning, supervising, and approving that trial prosecutor’s action.
Applying this rule to the circumstances here, the Court finds that, because Dupree engaged in administrative action not protected by absolute immunity when he failed to inform the forfeiture court of the status of Tyler’s estate, Grossman’s action in supervising that conduct is similarly unprotected.
E. Supervisory/Municipal Liability
The Defendants next contend that the Estate has failed to allege facts sufficient to plausibly state a claim for supervisory liability against Grossman and the City,
“[A] municipality can only be held liable for the acts of its officials undertaken in an administrative capacity.” Whitfield v. City of Philadelphia,
“[Rjegardless of whether the conduct at issue constituted policy or custom, policymaking liability is only appropriate if [the plaintiff] can demonstrate that [the defendant] had ‘final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take an action.’ ” Whitfield,
[U]pon reasonable belief and information, Plaintiff avers that for years that high-ranking Defendant CITY and DISTRICT ATTORNEY officials, including, but not- limited to Mayor, Michael Nutter, District Attorney, R. Seth Williams and Police Commissioner, Charles H. Ramsey knew the reasons behind the policy and practice of rejecting the evidence and testimony of City of Philadelphia police officer THOMAS LICIAR-DELLO in state court criminal cases, but did not implement any practices and protocols to ensure that evidence and testimony gathered by City of Philadelphia police officer THOMAS LICIAR-DELLO would be barred from all state court cases, including drug forfeiture cases.
Compl. ¶ 15. The other allegations in the Complaint do not give rise to a custom claim because “under either route” to a Monell claim, policy or custom, “a plaintiff must show that an official who has the power to make policy is responsible for either the affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled custom,” and this paragraph is the only one that alleges conduct by officials with the power to make policy. Watson,
F. Timeliness of Due Process Claims
The Defendants argue that any claim the Estate could plead that its due process rights were violated through the forfeiture proceeding and subsequent sale of the Property are barred by the statute of limitations. See D.A. Defs.’ Mot. at 8-9; City Mot. at 8-9. Specifically, they contend that the Complaint, which was filed on August 26, 2014, was filed well over two years past February 2010, when the arrest giving rise to the forfeiture action occurred; March 2010, when the forfeiture proceeding was initiated; and April 2012, when the order of forfeiture was issued. D.A. Defs.’ Mot. at 9. The Estate counters that the due process claims can be considered timely either under the continuing violations doctrine or Pennsylvania’s discovery rule. See Pl.’s D.A. Opp’n at 15-19.
The personal injury tort law of the state where the cause of action arose governs the length of the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim. Wallace v. Kato,
At oral argument, counsel for the Defendants argued that Floyd knew in February 2010, when the search and seizure warrant was executed, that the allegations against him in the criminal action underlying the forfeiture proceeding were based on Officer Liciardello’s affidavit. See Hr’g Tr. at 48. Thus, the Defendants contend that the Complaint, filed nearly four-and-a-half years later, should be barred by the statute of limitations. The Court disagrees. Under the plainest reading of the definition of “accrual” iterated above, the Estate’s claims are timely. Floyd is not a party here. The plaintiff in this action is “Estate of Randolph Tyler, by and through Kevin Floyd, Administrator.” Floyd, as administrator, could not have “known” for the purposes of the analysis here anything with respect to the estate until such time as the estate was raised on April 23, 2013, and he was named administrator. See Stone v. Whitman,
2. Discovery Rule
Regardless of when the cause of action accrued, the Estate argues that the discovery rule should apply to toll the statute of limitations. See PL’s D.A. Opp’n at 18-19. The Defendants do not argue against the applicability of the discovery rule anywhere in their briefing, but, as stated above, they asserted at oral argument that Floyd was aware in February 2010 that the criminal proceedings were based on Officer Liciardello’s affidavit. Hr’g Tr. at 48.
Under Pennsylvania’s discovery rule, “the statute of limitations begins to run when the complaining party knows, or reasonably should know (1) that he has been injured, and (2) that his injury has been caused by another party’s conduct.”
The injury of which the Estate complains flows from the alleged violation of the Estate’s constitutional rights caused by Defendants’ policy and practice of using Officer Liciardello’s evidence and testimony in the civil forfeiture proceeding after having barred that same evidence and testimony from being used in criminal proceedings. The Estate contends that it was unaware of this policy until it was reported by the Philadelphia media on July 30, 2014. See Pl.’s D.A. Opp’n at 19. It also argues that, under the discovery rule, no reasonable person could have known, or should have known, about the internal policies of the District Attorney’s Office regarding the use (or nonuse) of evidence in the various cases it prosecutes.
The Court agrees. No amount of diligence on the Estate’s part in the time between the underlying criminal action and the relevant news reports could have revealed to it the District Attorney’s Office’s inner workings, its policies, or its decisions regarding treatment of evidence and testimony. Given these circumstances, the Court concludes that the discovery rule should apply to toll the statute of limitations until July 30, 2014. And given that the Estate filed its Complaint on August 26, 2014, less than one month later, the due process claims are timely. The motions on this issue shall be denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 11th day of June, 2015, upon consideration of Defendants Beth Grossman, Clarence Dupree, and Office of Philadelphia District Attorney’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 7]; Plaintiff Estate of Randolph Tyler’s response in opposition thereto [ECF No. 8]; Defendant City and County of Philadelphia’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 14]; the Plaintiffs response in opposition thereto [ECF No. 15]; the parties’ supplemental briefs [ECF Nos. 21 & 23]; and oral argument held on April 7, 2015, and for the reasons provided in the Court’s Opinion of June 11, 2015 [ECF No. 29], IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) the motion to dismiss all claims against Defendant Office of Philadelphia District Attorney is GRANTED; the claims against the Office of Philadelphia District Attorney are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
(2) the motion to dismiss all claims against Defendants Beth Grossman and Clarence Dupree in their official capacities is GRANTED; all official-capacity claims against these Defendants , are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
(3) the motion to dismiss all claims against Defendant Clarence Dupree in his individual capacity based on absolute prosecutorial immunity is GRANTED IN PART; to the extent any claims are based on Dupree’s alleged failure to either provide notice or serve process in the civil forfeiture proceeding, he is immune from suit on those grounds and those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
(4) the motion to dismiss all claims against Defendant Beth Grossman in her individual capacity based on absolute prosecutorial immunity is GRANTED IN PART; to the extent any claims are based on Grossman’s supervision of Defendant Dupree’s alleged failure to either provide notice or serve process in the civil forfeiture proceeding, she is immune from suit on those grounds and those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(5) the motion to dismiss all supervisory claims against Defendant Beth Grossman in Count II of the Complaint is GRANTED; all claims against Grossman in Count II are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
(6) the motion to dismiss is otherwise DENIED;
(7) the City and County of Philadelphia’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED; and
(8) the Plaintiff shall be granted to leave to file an Amended Complaint by June 22, 2015.
Notes
. Officer Liciardello was acquitted of all charges by a jury on May 14, 2015. See Judgment of Acquittal/Not Guilty, United States v. Liciardello, No. 14-cr-0412 (E.D.Pa. May 14, 2015), ECF No. 505.
. The Complaint is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the Estate is suing Dupree and Grossman in their official or individual capacities, as it mentions that Dupree and Gross-man were acting in their official capacities at all relevant times, see Compl. ¶¶ 7-8, but never mentions in what capacity suit has been brought against them.
The Third Circuit instructs district courts to look at the complaint and the course of proceedings to determine whether the plaintiff has sued the defendants in their individual capacities, official capacities, or both. See Melo v. Hafer,
The Defendants raised arguments regarding Dupree's and Grossman’s absolute immunity as prosecutors — a defense that can be raised only to an individual capacity suit. See Kentucky v. Graham,
. Because the Court finds that the Defendants have not borne their burden to establish these conditions, it will not address any of the parties’ other arguments on this issue.
. Odd was a consolidated appeal of two cases, including Schneyder, which was later appealed on its own to the Third Circuit.
. Pursuant to the rule in Van de Kamp, Gross-man is absolutely immune from liability for any supervision in connection with Dupree's alleged failure to provide proper notice, as discussed supra, subsection IV.D.2.b.
. The standard of liability for individual policymakers under Section 1983 is the same as the standard for municipalities. Carter v. City of Philadelphia,
. When dismissing a civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, a district court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend — even when the plaintiff does not request leave — unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc.,