Eric Samuel Tucker v. State
01-15-00274-CR
| Tex. App. | Oct 13, 2015Background
- Defendant Eric Samuel Tucker was tried in a bench trial for aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury with scissors (deadly weapon); judge found him guilty and sentenced him to 30 years.
- Tucker testified he was in a blackout and has no memory of the assault; he blamed either voodoo or unexpected effects of synthetic marijuana ("cush" laced with cough syrup).
- Complainant Kimberly Lockett testified about a sequence of earlier rough conduct (scratching, punching, attempted sex) and a later, more violent attack in the bathroom where Tucker allegedly cut her with suture scissors, causing severe injuries requiring surgeries; one half of the scissors was found, the other half was not explained.
- Officer found Tucker unresponsive on the apartment floor with half a pair of scissors nearby; paramedics revived him and he was not hospitalized.
- Appellant’s central contention on appeal: the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tucker’s conduct in the specific scissors assault was voluntary and that he acted intentionally or knowingly; the defense emphasizes involuntary action or lack of mens rea due to an unforeseen intoxicating reaction to synthetic marijuana.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Tucker) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State proved the act was voluntary for the specific scissors assault | Earlier voluntary acts that evening show a continuous, voluntary course of conduct culminating in the scissors assault | The scissors assault was a separate act committed while Tucker was blacked out/involuntary from synthetic marijuana; earlier acts do not prove voluntariness for this offense | At trial judge convicted; appellant argues evidence was legally insufficient to prove voluntariness |
| Whether the State proved Tucker acted intentionally or knowingly in causing serious bodily injury with scissors | The overall pattern that night supports an intentional course of conduct; complainant’s testimony that parts of the conduct appeared intentional | Tucker lacked the requisite mens rea because he was unconscious/blackout and did not know cush could cause violent behavior; thus he could not have intended or known the result | Trial court found him guilty; appellant contends the State failed to prove intent/knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Whether evidence of earlier assaults that evening can be used to establish mens rea for the charged offense | The incidents form one continuing assault and are admissible to show intent/voluntariness | Each assaultive contact is a separate offense; earlier incidents cannot supply mens rea or voluntariness for the distinct scissors assault | Appellant argues legal precedent requires proof specific to each charged act; trial court nonetheless convicted |
| Whether unexpected intoxication from synthetic marijuana can negate voluntariness or mens rea | If defendant used an intoxicant voluntarily and knew risks, intoxication may not excuse conduct | Tucker did not know and had no reason to know the cush would produce violent blackouts; his involuntary intoxication negates voluntariness and requisite mental state | Appellant argues this distinction (unexpected effect vs. mistaken/self-induced) defeats State’s proof; trial court made an implicit finding against that view |
Key Cases Cited
- Farmer v. State, 411 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (distinguishes mistaken/intended ingestion and addresses voluntariness in intoxication context)
- Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (gravamen analysis: focus on the specific charged assault)
- Mendenhall v. State, 77 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (unconsciousness/semi-consciousness defenses: lack of mens rea or voluntary act)
- Ramirez-Memije v. State, 44 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (actus reus requires a voluntary act for criminal responsibility)
- Rogers v. State, 105 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (movement is involuntary if product of unconsciousness, hypnosis, or other non-violent impetus)
