OPINION
delivered the opinion of the Court,
In this case, we must determine whether the Tenth Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not reversibly err in refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense оf insanity due to involuntary intoxication. We begin our discussion with a review of the relevant facts. 1 A Freestone County grand jury indicted appellant, Craig Emmett Mendenhall, for assaulting a public servant. See Tex. Pen. Code § 22.01(b)(1). The case went to trial before a petit jury. • At trial the State presented evidence that on March 6, 1997, appellant assaulted а deputy sheriff on duty during appellant’s divorce trial. In his defense, appellant presented evidence, including his own testimony, to the effect that (1) approximately six weeks before the assault, appellant’s physician informed him that he was diabetic and placed him on a daily regimen of insulin injections; (2) his physician told him little regarding the аppropriate diet for control of his illness; (3) in the hours before the assault, he received an insulin injection but failed to eat much afterward, leading to a decrеase in his blood sugar; (4) the assault occurred during a brief episode in which he was unconscious or semi-conscious due to hypoglycemia (ie., low blood sugar); and (5) he “did not knоwingly, intentionally, or recklessly try to cause [the victim] harm.”
At the close of the evidence, appellant asked the trial court to instruct the jurors on the defense of insanity due to involuntary intoxication, but the trial court refused. The trial court did instruct the *817 jurors, however, that they could not convict appellant unless they believed beyond a rеasonable doubt that his assaultive conduct was intentional, knowing, or reckless.
In closing argument, appellant argued that his “illness” was “the cause of him losing control” and that his assaultive conduct on the day in question was not intentional, knowing, or reckless. The jurors rejected appellant’s argument and found him guilty as charged.
On appeal аppellant argued that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the insanity defense because there was some evidence that, at the time of the alleged offense, he was insane due to involuntary intoxication. The Tenth Court of Appeals agreed and held that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the insanity defense because the record contained some evidence that, at the time of the alleged offense, appellant was “incapable of conforming his conduсt to the requirements of the law.”
Mendenhall v. State,
We granted review of the court of appeals’ decision, pursuant to appеllant’s petition for discretionary review, to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court’s error in refusing to instruct the jury on the insanity defensе was harmless. See Tex.R.App. Proc. 66.3(b). Later, on our own initiative, we granted review of the court of appeals’ decision to determine, in the first instance, whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the insanity defense. See Tex.R.App. Proc. 67.1.
From 1974 to 1983, Texas Penal Code § 8.01(a) provided that “[i]t is an affirmative defensе to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of mental disease or defect, either did not know that his conduct was wrong or was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he allegedly violated.” In
Torres v. State,
In 1983 the Legislature amended § 8.01(a) by adding the word “severe” and by deleting the words “either” and “or was incapable of conforming his conduсt to the requirements of the law he allegedly violated.” Section 8.01(a), as amended, now provides that “[i]t is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of *818 severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.” Although the 1983 amendment to § 8.01(a) does not сhange our view that the Legislature intended § 8.01(a) to encompass the defense of insanity due to involuntary intoxication, the precise nature of that defense has сlearly changed. It is now an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental defect caused by involuntary intoxication, did not know that his conduct was wrong. It is no longer an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant, as a result of a mental defect caused by involuntary intoxication, was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law hе allegedly violated.
In this case, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defense of insanity due to involuntary intoxication. But, undеr § 8.01(a), is the insanity defense available to a defendant who was unconscious or semi-conscious at the time of the alleged offense, so that it might be said of him that he did nоt know his conduct was wrong only because he did not consciously know of his conduct at all? We conclude the answer to that question is'“no.”
We have carefully reviewed the legislative history of § 8.01(a), and nothing in it suggests that any legislators intended for the insanity defense to apply to persons who were unconscious or semi-conscious at thе time of the alleged offense. See
Boykin v. State,
We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Notes
. We discuss only those facts essential to our decision today. The court of apрeals' opinion contains a more elaborate discussion of the facts.
See Mendenhall v. State,
. Other jurisdictions have also held that their insanity statutes encompass the defense of insаnity due to involuntary intoxication. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 4.10(f) (1986 & Supp.2002).
.
But see
Annot.,
When Intoxication Deemed. Involuntary so as to Constitute a Defense to Criminal Charge,
. In their treatise on criminal law, Professors LaFave and Scott explain:
A defense related to but different from the defense of insanity is that of unconsciousness, often referred to as automatism: one who engages in what would otherwise be criminal conduct is not guilty of a сrime if he does so in a state of unconsciousness or semi-consciousness. Although this is sometimes explained on the ground that such a person could not have the requisite mental state for commission of the crime, the better rationale is that the individual has not engaged in a voluntary act.
W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 4.9 (1986).
. Since appellant’s petition concerns the court of appeals’ harmless error analysis, we dismiss it as improvidently granted. See Tex. R.App. Proc. 69.3.