Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Thrivent Financial for Lutherans
700 F.3d 1044
7th Cir.2012Background
- EEOC sued Thrivent for allegedly violating ADA confidentiality by revealing Messier’s migraine information during reference checks.
- Messier was employed by Omni and assigned to Thrivent as a temporary SAS programmer; he left in December 2006.
- Messier later learned that Thrivent may have communicated his medical condition to prospective employers; he hired RMI to verify what Thrivent had said.
- Brey at Thrivent sent an email after Messier’s absence on November 1, 2006, which Messier characterized as a disclosure of his migraine history.
- District court granted Thrivent summary judgment, ruling the disclosure was not a medical inquiry under § 12112(d)(3) because it was not learned through a medical examination or inquiry.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Thrivent did not receive Messier’s medical information via a medical inquiry, so § 12112(d) did not apply.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 12112(d) applies to the disclosure. | Messier argues disclosures were protected medical-records. | Thrivent contends no medical inquiry occurred. | No confidentiality duty; not a medical inquiry. |
| Whether Brey's email constitutes a medical inquiry under § 12112(d)(4)(B). | EEOC contends any inquiry about medical conditions falls under § 12112(d)(4)(B). | Thrivent argues it was not a medical inquiry since no medical context existed. | Not a medical inquiry; email did not trigger confidentiality. |
| Does 'inquiries' in § 12112(d) extend to all job-related inquiries. | EEOC advocates a broad reading of 'inquiries' to protect medical disclosures in any job-related inquiry. | Thrivent argues 'inquiries' must be medical inquiries under the statute's text. | Plain meaning limits 'inquiries' to medical inquiries. |
| Should the court apply Chevron deference to the EEOC’s interpretation of § 12112(d). | EEOC asserts a liberal interpretation consistent with congressional intent. | Court should adopt a plain-meaning approach without deferring. | Court uses plain meaning; declines to adopt EEOC's broader interpretation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., 317 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (inquiries under § 12112(d)(4)(B) where employer initiated with illness knowledge)
- Ford Motor Credit Co., 531 F. Supp. 2d 930 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (inquiries under § 12112(d)(4)(B) after employer knew of illness)
- Harrison v. Benchmark Electronics Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (inquiry after employer learns of potential drug issue)
- Fleming v. State Univ. of New York, 502 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (inquiry after employee reveals illness to attending physicians)
- Hess v. Reg-Ellen Mach. Tool Corp., 423 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2005) (standard for de novo review of summary judgment in APA context)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agency interpretations limited by direct congressional intent)